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In the last decade, mobile computing as evidenced by the emergence of mobile devices
(smartphones, phablets, tablets) has dominated personal and business computing. Users of
traditional computing devices (e.g., PCs, laptops, etc.) are transitioning to mobile devices
to perform daily tasks such as managing emails, playing games, viewing/editing
documents, paying bills, managing healthcare data, etc. The majority of these tasks can be
performed through the means of mobile applications, which is a piece of software
specifically made to run on a mobile device. Mobile applications (apps) can contain data
that ranges from being non-sensitive to highly-sensitive. Specifically, for those apps that
contain highly-sensitive data (e.g., banking apps, electronic health records (EHRs), etc.),
there is a need to provide authentication and authorization mechanisms in order to secure
the application’s data. Many mobile apps provide basic user authentication, and, after
successful authentication, the user has access to all of its features. Nevertheless, even
though there are critical requirements for mobile apps to secure highly-sensitive data,
developers have failed to establish sophisticated and multi-faceted authorization
mechanisms within the mobile computing design and development process. Specifically,
an argument can be made that mobile computing would significantly benefit through the
adoption of the three classic access control models: Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), and Discretionary Access Control (DAC).
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The overall high-level focus of this dissertation is to propose and realize a
configurable framework for RBAC, MAC, and DAC for mobile applications that is capable
of supporting access control in different security layers. Security is controlled from three
perspectives. The first perspective is for the user interface in terms of which screens and/or
their components are accessible to a user under RBAC with optional delegation via DAC.
This security layer focuses on modifications to the UI. The second perspective is to control
the mobile application’s API services in order to define the API services that can be
invoked by a particular user based on RBAC and/or MAC permissions with optional
delegation via DAC. This security layer between the UI and mobile application API
replicates the mobile application’s API by creating a mirrored set of services that invoke
the original API services so that each call can be intercepted to add RBAC, MAC, and or/
DAC security checks. The third perspective focuses on interactions between the services
of the mobile application’s API and server-side APIs for the various data servers, to again
control whether the user via the mobile application service is authorized to invoke specific
server-side APIs by RBAC and/or MAC with optional delegation via DAC. This security
layer between the two different APIs (mobile app and server-side) is accomplished through
the creation of a server interceptor API associated with a cloud computing infrastructure to
intercept invocations for RBAC, MAC, and DAC checks. In support of these three
perspectives, there is a unified mobile computing and security model with RBAC, MAC,
and/or DAC can be leveraged to define and enforce UI and service-based permissions in a
mobile application. Choosing security features from one or more of these three perspectives
provides for the dynamic combination of access control models and configuration options
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to allow for custom security on a mobile-app-by-mobile-app basis. The final step is the
ability for the framework to provide human assisted processes and automated algorithms
for access control security enforcement code generation and interceptors. The end result
is that the mobile app can secure the data that can be managed (e.g., inserted, retrieved,
updated, deleted) via it’s APIs from differing and complementary perspectives, creating
multiple additional security layers for RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC that are then adaptable
to different mobile apps.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The increase of capabilities and features of mobile computing devices have changed
the way that individuals perform many of their daily activities. Numerous tasks previously
performed with a desktop or laptop have transitioned to mobile devices (phones, phablets,
and tablets). As we have seen in recent years, mobile devices have become mainstream and
begun to serve as a replacement for traditional PC-based computing in numerous and varied
consumer and industrial markets. Nevertheless, all of these advances come with critical
security risks that can lead to the compromising of confidential data that could affect a
user, a group of individuals, and/or an organization. Despite the presence of secure highlysensitive data, mobile development frameworks and developers have failed to establish
sophisticated and multi-faceted authorization mechanisms within the mobile computing
design and development process. Access control mechanisms are commonly utilized to
secure highly-sensitive data and are able to determine which information each user can
access/store in a particular system, with the proviso that disclosing the wrong information
could lead to serious consequences (Rindfleisch, 1997). One important dimension of
security that has been largely overlooked for mobile applications and that has been
dominant in traditional systems and database applications are the three classic access
control models: Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992),
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994), and Discretionary Access
Control (DAC) (Department of Defense, 1985). The other dimension that has been often
not adequately considered is that almost all mobile applications in all domains access data
not directly but via a wide array of web and cloud application programmer interfaces
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(APIs). In fact, in healthcare, the Meaningful Use Stage 3 (Himss, 2016) guidelines require
all health information technology (HIT) systems (e.g., electronic health records (EHR),
personal health records (PHR), etc.) to have API services to access, modify, and exchange
health-related data. This necessitates the consideration of the usage of RBAC, MAC, and
DAC to control access to the services that are utilized by a mobile application.
The approach in this dissertation is to explore the different ways or configurations
that RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC capabilities can be included as multiple separate and
interacting security layers in a mobile application that range from the mobile application’s
user interface to the server side APIs utilized by the mobile application’s API services to
access multiple data sources. Mobile applications contain dynamic data and are
characterized by a set of interacting components that include: a user interface (UI) to
facilitate interactions; a middle layer component that is an Application Programming
Interface (API); and a data source (e.g., database, repository, cloud, server, etc.) that are
the APIs that the mobile app’s API services invoke to interact with multiple data sources.
In the process, data is retrieved from a data source (e.g., repository, database, etc.) and/or
stored into the source, at varied intervals. To illustrate, Figure 1.1 augments the
components of a mobile application with three additional security layers: one layer to
control the look-and-feel and content of the UI and two layers to control data that is
interchanged between the mobile app UI, the mobile app API, and the data source via
server-side API. The two security layers for data interchange involve the invocation of
services for the mobile app. In the first of these two layers, the mobile app invokes its own
API services, and there is a need to provide RBAC and MAC permissions to intercept these
invocations to control which services can be invoked by which user based on RBAC and/or
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MAC permissions. In the second of these two layers, the mobile app’s API services invoke
server-side APIs for multiple data sources, and there is a need to provide another intercept
to control which server-side services of data sources the mobile app can invoke based on
RBAC and/or MAC permissions. In the top of Figure 1.1, the different access control
models are shown and can be utilized to generate a set of RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC
security policies that are enforced in the mobile application. From left to right in Figure
1.1, this includes:
•

Defining for each user a role (RBAC) and a sensitivity level (MAC) (i.e., a clearance
such as top secret, secret, confidential, unclassified, etc.) that are utilized to define and
support permissions and providing the ability for a user to delegate via DAC RBAC
and/or MAC permissions to another user.

•

Defining user interface (UI) permissions on the mobile app user interface to control
which screens and/or their components are accessible to a user under defined roles
(RBAC) and are delegable from one user to another by role in support of DAC.

•

Defining API permissions that identify which services of the mobile app’s API need to
be securely controlled using RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC and creating a mirrored API
that replicates the signature of each mobile app’s API service of the mobile app’s API
and servers as an intercepting API to intercept mobile app service invocations in order
to embed and perform RBAC, MAC, and DAC permission checks.

•

Defining server interceptor API permissions for the data source/repository/database
that provides an additional level of RBAC, MAC, and DAC permission checks on the
server-side APIs that are invoked by the mobile app’s API services.
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The end result is the ability to generate and enforce permissions (shown in the middle part
of Figure 1.1) utilizing the RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC models to create a customized
version of the user interface (UI), to create a customized version of the mobile app’s API,
and/or to create a customized version of the server-side API that can check RBAC, MAC
and DAC permissions.

Figure 1.1. Flow of Proposed Configurable Framework.

1.1.

Motivation for Access Control for Mobile Applications
Mobile devices are highly portable and can be utilized to perform daily tasks such

as reading a document, browsing the internet, and managing emails. In addition, mobile
devices contain a wide range of mobile applications including: games, social media, health
& fitness, ebooks, banking, email, music, etc. According to ‘The 2015 U.S. Mobile App
Report’ (Lella, Lipsman, & Martin, 2015), mobile application usage is rapidly increasing
among mobile device users, surpassing the time they spend on their mobile device web
browser as well as the time they spend utilizing a PC/laptop. For both personal and business
usage, there is a need to protect secure information in mobile applications ranging from

4

personally identifiable information (PII) to protected health information (PHI) to
confidential work product that is displayed, accessed, modified, and stored. Commonly,
developers of software and mobile applications focus on applying typical authentication
mechanisms (e.g., passwords, PINs, fingerprints, etc.) in order to protect a user’s data
(Rivera Sánchez & Demurjian, 2016). In addition, an authenticated user often receives all
or nothing; successful authentication means the ability to access (read, write, or modify)
all of the resources of the application, which may not always be desired on an applicationby-application and user-by-user basis. This mentality has led the developers to not take
into consideration the fact that they need to verify the user’s identity each time a user
performs an action. As a result, this can lead to the possibility of having malicious attacks
in the system since an unauthorized user could attempt to become over privileged or could
obtain improper access to resources.
In addition, many mobile applications do not support fine-grained security policies
that are able to specify which resources/features a specific user has access to. For instance,
suppose that we have a mobile application utilized by personnel at a pharmacy to fill and
process prescriptions for customers with a user interface (UI) that has five screens to: look
up the status of a prescription (Screen 1); enter a new prescription to be filled (Screen 2);
fill and dispense the prescription with the appropriate medication (Screen 3); look up to
see if a medication is in inventory (Screen 4); and, order medications for inventory (Screen
5). The five screens could be linked by next and back buttons or could be five different
tabs on one screen. There are two types of users: pharmacy technicians that interact with
the customer to receive and enter the prescription; and, licensed pharmacists that have the
legal authority to fill and dispense the prescription. A pharmacy technician would be
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limited to Screens 1, 2, and 4, while a licensed pharmacist would have access to all five
screens. To achieve this in practice, access control policies can be adapted in order to grant
them the necessary permissions to view only the resources they need to work with in order
to avoid improper disclosure of information. Users that have access to data that does not
pertain to them could benefit from this. For example, in 2013, a billing technician at a
hospital spent several months looking for people that had recently been in car accidents
and then sold that information to an attorney. The attorney would then contact the
individuals who were involved in the car accident and offered them legal representation
(Wiech, 2013). This issue highlights the need for access control in systems that contain
highly sensitive information, such as hospitals and health insurance companies.
Mobile devices and computing are being improved on a daily basis in terms of
hardware and software, increasing capabilities, features, and capacity. This in turn has
resulted in the rise of new security risks. In the worst-case, a mobile device may be lost or
stolen; if there are available techniques to control and securely access highly sensitive data,
then damage can be mitigated. For example, healthcare data stored in a mobile device is
being created, retrieved, and manipulated from multiple sources and by varied applications
and this sensitive information must be protected from disclosure. This security requirement
is juxtaposed against a recent survey (West & Miller, 2009) where a strong majority of
people wanted to manage their healthcare electronically, including: email access with
providers (74%), diagnostic test results electronically (67%), and access to their EMR
(64%). These tasks require a great amount of security as the information to be shared is
highly sensitive and pertains to specific people from multiple sources and ultimately
resides in a patient’s mobile device.
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1.2.

Motivation for Mobile Healthcare Applications
Mobile computing devices and applications have exploded in the marketplace, with

the Gartner group forecasting worldwide shipments in 2015 (Gartner Newsroom, 2015) of
1.9 billion mobile phones and 230 million tablets, which is outpacing PC/laptop sales
significantly (300 million estimate). In the United States, a PEW Research Center report
of smartphone usage (Smith, 2015; PEW Research Center, 2015) found that as of October
2014, 64% of American adults own a Smartphone while as of January 2014, 42% own a
Tablet, and 32% own an e-reader. Predictive statistics project that tablet users will surpass
1 billion in 2015 worldwide (eMarketer, 2015) while the total of mobile devices will exceed
12.1 billion by 2018 (Radicati, 2014). In addition, Cisco reported (Cisco, 2014) in 2014
that 497 million mobile devices were added that year, and 88% of that growth is accounted
to smartphones and, predicted that by 2019, there will be approximately 1.5 mobile devices
per capita giving a total of 11.5 billion mobile devices around the world. As mobile devices
become more mainstream, they have begun to serve as a replacement for traditional PCbased computing in major consumer and industrial markets.
One such domain that is exploding is healthcare, where there is a growing desire
for an individual seeking to utilize his/her mobile device to monitor and track health
conditions and fitness that includes both protected health information (PHI) and personally
identifiable information (PII). For example, consider the proliferation of health and fitness
applications on multiple mobile platforms for: pharmacies and organizing medications
(myCVS (CVS Pharmacy, 2015), MEDWatcher (MedWatcher, 2012), Drugs.com
Medication guide and Pill Identifier Applications (Drugs.com, 2008), etc.); personal health
record (PHR) applications (CAPZULE PHR (Capzule, 2012), MTBC PHR (MTBC PHR,
2011), suite of WebMD Applications (WebMD, 2016), etc.); a wide array of fitness
7

applications that work with phones and wearables (Duffy, 2016; Cohen, 2015); Apple’s
HealthKit app (iOS 9 Health, 2014) and the Google Fit fitness tracker (Google Play, 2013),
where both companies have pushed strongly into the smartwatch market to track activity,
heart rate, blood pressure, etc. (Kelly, 2014); and, Apple’s ResearchKit, which is an open
source framework for mobile applications to support medical research (Apple, 2015).
Patients also seek to have access via their mobile devices to the electronic medical records
(EMRs) utilized by their medical providers, as well as various health information
technology (HIT) systems that contain medical testing results (Care360, 2014) or results
from imaging testing (My Imaging Records App, 2013). All of these systems must adhere
to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (HHs.gov, 2013) for
the security, availability, transmission, and release of a patient's medical information.
In this dissertation, our approach for a Configurable Framework for RBAC
(Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992), MAC (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994), and DAC (Department of
Defense, 1985) for Mobile Applications is presented and discussed by utilizing a healthcare
setting as a means to illustrate and demonstrate the concepts and ideas of this work. We
have chosen the healthcare domain since improper disclosure of data (both PHI and PPI)
can have serious impact on patients, which can include: personal embarrassment, prejudice,
ostracization from family and community groups, death, and issues with insurability
(Rindfleisch, 1997). Moreover, a report by Ponemon Institute (2009) revealed that the cost
of data breaches in the majority of the industries (e.g., communications, retail) per lost or
stolen record averages approximately $154 per record as shown in Figure 1.2 (Ponemon
Institute, 2015). This cost is even higher in the healthcare industry, as high as $363 per
record, which is more than double the cost to manage a data breach in comparison to other
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industries. While we utilize a healthcare setting as an appropriate and informative manner
to present the work in this dissertation, note that our proposed approach is generalized to
any mobile application as was illustrated in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.2. Per Capita Cost by Industry Classification.

1.3.

Mobile Healthcare Applications Requirements and Challenges
Mobile applications span a broad spectrum of complexity, including games, social

networking, email, web browsing, financial management, health and fitness,
pharmaceutical, etc. For both personal and business usage, there is a need to insure that
access to secure information is controlled, ranging from protected health information (PHI)
and personally identifiable information (PII) to confidential work product that is displayed,
accessed, modified, and stored. In support of such a scenario of usage for healthcare, one
motivation and justification factor for this dissertation involves the transition from paperbased to electronic health records (EHRs) systems which has greatly increased in the past
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decade with eight out of ten physicians in the U.S. utilizing EHRs in their practices
(Heisey-Grove & Patel, 2015). Despite this progress, there is still a need for a significant
next step to allow patients and medical providers to easily access healthcare data that is
distributed across multiple EHRs and other health information technology (HIT) systems.
To support these actions, health information exchange (HIE) for the interoperation across
sources has the potential to reduce healthcare data expenses where healthcare institutions
could save up to $77.8B in the U.S. (Walker et al., 2005). In addition, the Office of the
National Coordinator issued a report (Health and Human Services Department, 2015) in
2015 on certification rules for EHRs that has required that HIT vendors develop RESTful
APIs for EHRs and other systems so that patients and medical providers using mobile
health (mHealth) applications (apps) can easily access their healthcare data from multiple
sources.
Specifically, there is a diverse collection of stakeholders who are interested in
healthcare and medical data. From the patient side, stakeholders that directly interact on a
day-to-day basis include: patient (him/herself), family members (child care, elder care,
spousal care), nutritionists, personal trainers, therapists (physical, occupational,
pulmonary), home healthcare aides, etc. Accompanying mobile health (mHealth)
applications in healthcare and fitness for patients are numerous and diverse including:
tracking medications (myCVS (CVS Pharmacy, 2015), MedWatcher (MedWatcher, 2012),
etc.); personal health records (PHR) (CAPZULE PHR (Capzule, 2012), MTBC PHR
(MTBC PHR, 2011), etc.); fitness applications that work with phones and wearables
(Cohen, 2015); Apple’s HealthKit app (iOS 9 Health, 2014) and the Google Fit fitness
tracker (Google Play, 2013), to track activity, heart rate, blood pressure, etc. (Kelly, 2014);
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Apple’s ResearchKit (Apple, 2015), an open source framework for mobile applications to
support medical research, etc. Patients also seek to have access via their mobile devices to
the electronic health records (EHRs) utilized by medical providers and health information
technology (HIT) systems that contain medical testing results (Care360, 2014) or results
from imaging testing (My Imaging Records App, 2013).
From the medical provider side, stakeholders include: for daily care, internist,
family medicine, nurse practitioner, physician assistants, and pediatrics; for periodic care,
specialists, cardiologists, ENTs, orthopedic surgeons, etc.; for mental healthcare,
physiatrist, phycologist, therapist, etc.; and, for medical services, individuals at
laboratories, imaging centers, pharmacies, etc. The interest in all of these stakeholders in
mobile applications is evidenced by a report that found 43,700+ medical applications in
the Apple application store, with approximately 54% targeting healthcare with 69% of the
applications targeting consumers/patients and 31% for use by medical providers (Aitken,
2013); this was further summarized with emerging mobile devices and applications for
healthcare professionals (HIT Consultant, 2014). The aforementioned healthcare
professionals utilize diverse mobile apps and mHealth apps for: administrative purposes
(information management (e.g., write notes, organize information) and time management
(e.g., schedule appointments, schedule meetings, etc.)), health record maintenance and
access (e.g., EHRs, medical imaging apps), communications and consulting (e.g.,
multimedia messaging, social networking), reference and information gathering (e.g.,
medical textbooks, medical journals), patient monitoring (e.g., clinical decision-making,
monitor patient health, collect clinical data) and, for medical education (e.g., case studies,
continuing medical education) (Ventola, 2014). All of these systems must adhere to the
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (HHS.gov, 2013) for the
security, availability, transmission, and release of a patient's medical information.
Most of these health and fitness mobile applications that are centric to an individual
are accompanied by the desire by patients to be able to dictate and define the way that such
information can be shared with other individuals. One such effort has surveyed patients to
ascertain the degree that they wish to exert regarding the attainment of privacy control at
varying levels of granularity over their health and fitness information, which may be
present in electronic form in various locations (Caine & Hanania, 2013). For a given
patient, this effort highlights the potential recipients of the information (e.g., primary
physicians, spouse, family, emergency medical providers, etc.) and the type of information
to be controlled (e.g., contact info, current conditions, medications, recent test results,
genetic information, etc.). In such a setting, patients are also interested in actually defining
specific fine-grained access control (Sujansky et al., 2010) by designating access by role,
for example: a family member may view my medication list (but not all of them), a medical
provider may view my medication list and history of hospital visits (but not modify), my
personal physician may both view and modify my health care and fitness data, etc. These
efforts highlight a strong need to achieve fine grained role-based level of security to allow
patients to define who can see and/or modify what portions of their health/fitness data other
individuals can view/modify using mobile applications for health care, where the mobile
application itself can be customized based on role to meet the permission definition
provided by the patient (Peleg et al., 2008). In addition, one of the main challenges that
healthcare providers face when utilizing an EHR mHealth app is patient data privacy.
EHRs can contain patient data such as past medical history, medications, conditions, and
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insurance information. Depending on their area of work, users of the EHR could be limited
to only accessing certain parts of the patient data. For instance, a doctor has access to all
the data shown in the EHR but an administrative professional can only schedule
appointments and, view a patient’s demographics and a patient’s insurance information.
To fulfill these actions, we propose to protect the data of a user of a mHealth
application by applying the RBAC, MAC, and DAC models in order to allow the owner(s)
of the information to decide which data can be accessed/modified by other users. In support
of our efforts, the three dominant access control models (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994) that
could be utilized to secure highly-sensitive data are: role-based access control (RBAC);
discretionary access control (DAC); and, mandatory access control (MAC). RBAC has a
strong history in healthcare; a literature review (Fernández Alemán, Señor, Lozoya, &
Toval, 2013) identified access control models deployed by EHRs, where out of 45 articles
reviewed, 35 used access control methods, and 27 of these specifically utilized RBAC.
DAC has also been studied for EHRs in conjunction with RBAC (Alhaqbani & Fidge,
2008; Khan & Sakamura, 2012) in an attempt to combine the capabilities and advantages
of both approaches. There have been some very limited attempts to utilize MAC in the
health care domain; one study (Gajanayake, Ianella, & Sahama, 2014) considered the use
of MAC in EHRs; another (Hafner, Memon, & Alam, 2007) explored the combination of
MAC with RBAC and DAC; and, the HL7 vocabulary (HL7 v3, 2013) where the
confidentiality portion (HL7, 2013) defines sensitivity levels of low, moderate, normal,
restricted, unrestricted, and very restricted.
In order to provide the sharing and exchange of information, healthcare standards
have been developed including: Health Level Seven (HL7) v3 (Health Level Seven
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International, 2011) to manage, exchange, integrate, and retrieve electronic health
information; and, Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM, 2012) for
distributing and viewing medical images. In 2011, HL7 introduced the first draft of the Fast
Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) specification designed to enable
interoperability and integration with the newest and adopted technologies by the industry
with a particular focus on making healthcare data in different EHRs and other HIT systems
easily available to mHealth apps via RESTful APIs in the cloud. FHIR has a set of security
requirements (FHIR, 2016) that identifies the major topics (communications security,
authentication, authorization, access control, auditing, digital signatures, etc.). However,
FHIR lacks concrete mechanisms that would be capable of controlling access to the
services of RESTful APIs that manage sensitive healthcare data stored in the cloud.

1.4.

A High-Level View of Proposed Approach
The overall high-level focus of this dissertation is to propose and realize a

configurable framework for RBAC, MAC, and DAC for mobile applications that is capable
of supporting access control in different security layers. Security is controlled from three
perspectives. The first perspective is for the user interface in terms of which screens and/or
their components are accessible to a user under RBAC with optional delegation via DAC.
This security layer focuses on modifications to the UI. The second perspective is to control
the mobile application’s API services in order to define the API services that can be
invoked by a particular user based on RBAC and/or MAC permissions with optional
delegation via DAC. This security layer between the UI and mobile application API
replicates the mobile application’s API by creating a mirrored set of services that invoke
the original API services so that each call can be intercepted to add RBAC, MAC, and or/
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DAC security checks. The third perspective focuses on interactions between the services
of the mobile application’s API and server-side APIs for the various data servers, to again
control whether the user via the mobile application service is authorized to invoke specific
server-side APIs by RBAC and/or MAC with optional delegation via DAC. This security
layer between the two different APIs (mobile app and server-side) is accomplished through
the creation of a server interceptor API associated with a cloud computing infrastructure to
intercept invocations for RBAC, MAC, and DAC checks.
In support of the service level security in the second and third perspectives, we
evolve RBAC and MAC from permissions on objects/operations to an approach that can
control the services of an API that are available for usage, allowing each service to be
controlled by role (can a user by role access a service) or by sensitivity level (does a user
with a clearance level has the necessary permission to access a service with a classification
level). The intent is that for any mHealth app that needs to securely utilize services from
multiple HITs, each with their own specific RESTful API, will be controlled so that the
user is only allowed to invoke services to which they have permission. For example, a
mHealth app for patient data works differently depending on who is using the app. A patient
is able to invoke services to read all of his/her patient data, to invoke some services that
update basic information (e.g., demographics), but would be restricted from invoking
services that order medications or laboratory tests. These latter service invocations would
be appropriate for medical providers (e.g., physician, nurse, etc.) that have the authority to
change a patient’s medical record. Then, we can define a user (with a clearance level) with
a role (with permissions to invoke particular services) where each service has a
classification level, and have runtime enforcement to insure that a user with a particular
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role is allowed to invoke a service within the mobile app if the RBAC and/or MAC
permissions are met.
In support of RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC at the three perspectives of UI, mobile
application API, and server-side API, Figure 1.3 delineates the different ways that security
layers can be incorporated within the mobile application’s user interface (UI), application
programming interface (API), and server-side data source (database, cloud, server, etc.),
where permissions can be defined and enforced. The three locations are: the user interface
to change the look-and-feel by role; intercepting API calls to alter information
delivered/stored to the app; and/or by modifying the mobile app server. This leads to three
corresponding options for the inclusion of RBAC, MAC, and DAC corresponding to the
aforementioned three perspectives. The first option (perspective), direct UI modifications,
shown in the left side of Figure 1.3, would be to modify the mobile app itself with RBAC
and DAC permissions on screens, UI widgets, etc., which would involve code-level
changes so that the look-and-feel of the UI would change based on the defined access
control security policies. The second option (perspective), intercepting API calls, shown
in the middle of Figure 1.3, would be to define RBAC, MAC, and DAC permissions on the
API (REST, web, cloud) and/or database calls of the mobile app and intercept them in order
to include access control permission checks that determine the filtered information returned
to the mobile app or control information that can be stored in the mobile application's
server. This may require minimal changes on the way that the mobile app calls the backend
or the way that the backend calls are intercepted by the access control code. Finally, the
third option (perspective), server interceptor API, shown in the right side of Figure 1.3,
involves making changes to the backend of the original mobile app (e.g., server for
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database, cloud, web, etc.) in support of RBAC, MAC, and DAC enforcement that would
retain the view of the mobile application’s API to the mobile app and embed access control
policies on the server side. The end result for each of these options (perspectives) is a
revised mobile application, a revised mobile application API, and a revised server
interceptor API, respectively, as shown in the bottom box of Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3. Permissions and Three Options for Mobile Security.
Figure 1.4 presents a high-level view of the architecture of the configuration
framework, including the concepts of Figure 1.3 into this larger context. There are six
major components (outlined black boxes in Figure 1.4). Basically, the Mobile Application
(topmost component in Figure 1.4) consists of a UI, an API, and a data source (database,
cloud, server, etc.). The second component in Figure 1.4, Mobile Application Clients,
contains a set of users where each user is assigned a clearance (e.g., top secret, secret,
confidential, unclassified). In order to determine which resources of the mobile application
each user is allowed to access, the third component of Figure 1.4, Access Control Models
17

is utilized to allow the assignment to each user of: a role (RBAC approach), a clearance
(MAC), or a role (RBAC) and a clearance (MAC extension) in combination; DAC may be
optionally included. Access control is defined to involve the mobile application’s main
structure of UI, API, and Data Sources as was shown in the first component. These models
are realized against the mobile application’s user interface, API, and data sources, which
allow RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC to be defined on: the screens and components of the UI
to control who can do what; the services of the API to control which are secure and which
can be called; and the data sources to control the information that can be read/written. This
requires the definition of a unified mobile computing and security model to define and
enforce permissions in complementary and combinable ways.
For the application itself, the fourth component of Figure 1.4, Permissions and
Impact on Mobile App, contains the permissions on: the UI components of a mobile
application, the APIs of a mobile application, and/or the data source/server side.
Permissions involve: the look-and-feel of the UI per the allowable screens, their
components, and interactions; the ability to involve different services of the API; and, the
ability to control access to the data sources. These permissions can be based on a
combination of RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC. Assigning roles and clearances to users in a
system as well as identifying the permissions that are generated for certain parts of a mobile
application is part of creating a unified mobile computing and security model with access
control. Bringing together the mobile application’s UI, API, and data sources (first
component), its clients (second component), and the access control models RBAC, MAC,
and DAC (third component) allows for the realization of permissions for the three different
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options shown in Figure 1.3: Direct UI Modifications, Intercepting API Calls, and Server
Interceptor API.
Specifically, the first block in the fourth component, User Interface
Permissions/Direct UI Modifications, provides the ability to define permissions to modify
the existing mobile application itself with access control permissions (both RBAC and
DAC) on screens, UI widgets, etc., which would also involve code-level changes so that
the look-and-feel of the UI would change based on the enforcement of access control
policies. Permissions can be defined for a user by role on a UI screen, its components (text
fields, drop down, buttons, etc.), and interactions among screens; and, delegation
permissions can be defined as well. This can be accomplished through a human-assisted
process that outlines the way that mobile application code changes are made. The second
block in the fourth component, Mobile App API Permissions/Intercepting API Calls,
shown in the middle of the fourth component of Figure 1.4, would be to define access
control permissions on the API (REST, web, cloud) and/or database calls of the mobile
application and intercept them in order to include access control permission checks that
determine the filtered information returned to the mobile application or control information
that can be stored in the mobile application’s server. Permissions are defined on the mobile
application API that is partitioned into secure/unsecure services (RBAC) and
labeled/unlabeled services (MAC), with service permission assignment to roles and users.
In addition, delegation permissions can be established for secure and labeled services
(DAC). This can be accomplished through the automatic generation of security code.
Finally, the third block of the fourth component, Server-Side API Permissions/Server
Interceptor API, involves making changes to the backend or data source(s) of the existing
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mobile application (e.g., server for database, cloud, web, etc.) that would retain the view
of the mobile application’s API to the mobile application and embed access control policies
on the server side. This can also be accomplished through the automatic generation of
security code.
Once the permissions are defined, we can generate access control security policies
as shown in the fifth component of Figure 1.4 by combining different aspects of access
control models in the components of a mobile application by utilizing a single option or a
combination of the options presented in Figure 1.3. This is further discussed in Section 3.6
that covers all the allowable combinations of: access control models (RBAC, MAC, and
DAC), the mobile application (UI, API, and data sources), and the three options (Direct UI
Modifications, Intercepting API Calls, and Server Interceptor API). For example, a mobile
application for a pharmacy may only have RBAC, UI, and Direct UI Modifications, while
a more complex patient data mobile health app for medical providers (nurse, physician,
etc.) may use all capabilities in combination. Collectively, the human-assisted processes
and algorithms to automatically generate code results in the fifth component of Figure 1.4,
generation of security policies at the UI or between the UI and API or between the API and
data sources. After the policies are established, we can enforce the security policies (sixth
component of Figure 1.4) in the different portions identified of a mobile application which
lead us to an end result of a customized mobile application. The final sixth component,
Enforcement of Security Policies, at the bottom of Figure 1.4, is the resulting enforcement
code from the human-assisted processes and automatic algorithm. For example, the
modified code of the pharmacy app with RBAC, UI, and Direct UI Modifications.
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Figure 1.4. High-Level View of Configurable Access Control Framework for Mobile
Apps.

1.5.

Research Objectives and Expected Contributions
From the research perspective, the proposed Configurable Framework for RBAC,

MAC, and DAC for Mobile Applications has the following expected contributions.
A.

Software Architecture for a Configurable Access Control Framework for

Mobile Applications: The contribution is the specification, design, and description of a
software architecture for the configurable access control framework as given in Figure 1.4.
This allows the ability to insert role-based, mandatory, and discretionary access controls at
alternate and multiple locations throughout the architecture.
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B.

Unified Mobile Computing and Security Model with Access Control: The

contribution is a unified model (the first three components of Figure 1.4) that contains:
generalized structure of a mobile application as a user interface of screens, components
(text fields, drop down, buttons, etc.), and interactions among screens; roles, sets of roles,
users, and sets of users; allowable permissions defined on screens, components, and screen
interactions; permission assignments of users and roles on screens, components, and
interactions; mobile application API that is partitioned into secure/unsecure services
(RBAC) and labeled/unlabeled services (MAC); and service permission assignment to
roles and users. This allows the ability to model role-based, mandatory, and discretionary
access controls on the mobile application and its API.
C.

Dynamic Combination of Access Control Models and Configuration Options:

The contribution is the ability to combine different aspects of access control models
(RBAC, MAC, and DAC), of the mobile application (UI, API, and Data Source), and of
the configuration options (Direct UI Modifications, Intercepting API Calls, and Server
Interceptor API) into custom access control solutions for a mobile application. All of the
allowable combinations are defined as part of this contribution as shown in the third and
fourth components of Figure 1.4.
D.

Access Control Security Enforcement Code Generation and Interceptors: The

contribution is the generation of processes for the Direct UI Modifications option and
algorithms for the different configuration options for the framework that support the
interceptors for the Intercepting API Calls and Server Interceptor API options. Processes
for the Direct UI Modifications option are often human assisted and involve the need to
actually modify limited portions of the mobile application code, API, and/or server
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database. Algorithms for the Intercepting API Calls and Server Interceptor API options are
defined for those cases where actual code is generated. This is part of the fifth and sixth
components in Figure 1.4.
Throughout the remainder of the dissertation, these expected contributions are high-lighted
when relevant.

1.6.

Research Progress to Date
In support of the work presented in this dissertation, we summarize our 10

publications (9 published and 1 submitted) and their role in support of the material in this
dissertation: lead author directly related to the work are 2 published refereed book chapters,
2 published refereed full conference articles, and 1 submitted journal article; coauthor of 1
published refereed book chapter and 1 published refereed full conference article; and coauthor of three other papers as a REU student. First in this area initially focused on
authentication requirements for mobile apps (Rivera Sánchez & Demurjian, 2016) that was
expanded to define an approach for role-based access control (RBAC) for mobile
computing (Rivera Sánchez et al., 2016) that delineates security permissions on the screens
and components of a mobile app that customizes both the appearance and functionality
based on role which is the foundation of the Direct UI Modifications option.
●

Rivera Sánchez, Y. K., & Demurjian, S. A. (2016). Chapter 6: User Authentication
Requirements for Mobile Computing. Handbook of Research on Innovations in
Access Control and Management. IGI Global.

●

Rivera Sánchez, Y. K., & Demurjian, S. A., Conover, J., Agresta, T., Shao, X., &
Diamond, M. (2016). Chapter 6: An Approach for Role-Based Access Control in
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Mobile Applications. Handbook of Mobile Application Development, Usability,
and Security. S. Mukherja (ed.). IGI Global.
Using this as a basis, we expanded RBAC in (Rivera Sánchez, Demurjian, & Gnirke, 2017)
to control the services that are accessible by role for each mobile application with
intercepting API calls to check permissions before a service can be invoked; this is the
foundation of the Intercepting API Calls option. This was generalized in (Rivera Sánchez,
Demurjian, and Baihan, 2017a) to apply to services in a cloud computing setting using the
FHIR standard and RESTful APIs that facilitate ease of mobile health application
development. The combination of RBAC and MAC using the interceptor concepts (Rivera
Sánchez, Demurjian, & Baihan, 2017b) and the FHIR standard and its infrastructure allows
a mHealth app that is FHIR-compliant to exchange healthcare data that is in the cloud with
multiple EHRs/HIT systems. This is achieved by defining on a role-by-role basis and/or on
a sensitivity level basis (i.e., classification-clearance), the subset of the FHIR RESTful API
services that are available to users of a mHealth app to intercept calls that are not allowed,
thereby prohibiting access to the sensitive healthcare data associated with those calls; these
last two are the foundation of the server interceptor API option.
●

Rivera Sánchez, Y. K., Demurjian, S. A., & Gnirke, L. (2017). An Intercepting
API-based Access Control Approach for Mobile Applications. Proceedings of The
13th International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies
(WEBIST 2017), April 25 – 27, Porto, Portugal.

●

Rivera Sánchez, Y. K., Demurjian, S. A., & Baihan, M. (2017). Achieving RBAC
on RESTful APIs for Mobile Apps using FHIR. Proceedings of The 5th IEEE
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International Conference on Mobile Cloud Computing, Services, and Engineering
(IEEE Mobile Cloud 2017), April 7 – 9, California, United States.
●

Rivera Sánchez, Y. K., Demurjian, S. A., & Baihan, M. S. (2017). A ServiceBased RBAC & MAC Approach Incorporated into the Fast Healthcare
Interoperable Resources (FHIR) standard. Submitted to special issue on 2017 IEEE
Mobile

Cloud

Communications

Conference
and

submissions,

Networks,

Elsevier

journal

of

Digital

https://www.journals.elsevier.com/digital-

communications-and-networks/call-for-papers/special-issue-on-the-securityprivacy-and-digital-forensics.
The final two efforts involve collaboration on the shared HAPI FHIR Infrastructure to
support RBAC and MAC interceptors.
●

Baihan, M., Rivera Sánchez, Y. K., Shao, X., Gilman, C., Demurjian, S. A., &
Agresta, T. (2017). A Blueprint for Designing and Developing an mHealth
Application for Diverse Stakeholders Utilizing Fast Healthcare Interoperability
Resources. IGI Global.

●

Baihan, M. S., Demurjian, S. A., Rivera Sánchez, Y. K., Toris, A., Franzis, A.,
Onofrio, A., Cheng, B., & Agresta, T. (2017). Role-Based Access Control for Cloud
Computing Realized within HAPI FHIR. Proceedings of The 16th International
Conference of WWWINTERNET 2017, October 18 – 20, Vilamoura Algarve,
Portugal.

Other publications that I have participated in are:
●

De La Rosa Algarin, A., Ziminski, T., Demurjian, S., & Rivera Sánchez, Y. K.
(2014). Generating XACML Enforcement Policies for Role-Based Access Control
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of XML Documents. In Web Information Systems and Technologies, Revised
Selected Papers, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, SpringerVerlag, 189, 21-36.
●

De La Rosa Algarin, A., Demurjian, S., Ziminski, T., Rivera Sánchez, Y. K., &
Kuykendall, R. (2013). Chapter 13: Securing XML with Role-Based Access
Control: Case Study in Health Care. In Architectures and Protocols for Secure
Information Technology. A. Ruiz-Martínez, F. Pereñíguez-García and R. MarínLópez (eds.). IGI Global. 334-365.

●

De La Rosa Algarin, A., Ziminski, T., Demurjian, S., Kuykendall, R., & Rivera
Sánchez, Y. K. (2013). Defining and Enforcing XACML Role-Based Security
Policies within an XML Security Framework. Proceedings of the 9th Intl. Conf. on
Web Information Systems and Technologies (WEBIST2013).

1.7.

Dissertation Outline
The remainder of the dissertation has six chapters. In Chapter 2, we review

background on: the logical architecture of a mobile application, Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) (Bell & La
Padula, 1976), Discretionary Access Control (DAC) (Department of Defense, 1985), the
application programming interface (API) concept, and the Fast Healthcare Interoperable
Resources (FHIR) specification (FHIR DSTU2, 2015) and the HAPI FHIR reference
implementation (HAPI FHIR, 2014), Chapter 2 also introduces the Connecticut
Concussion Tracker (CT2) to be utilized in examples throughout the dissertation. In
Chapter 3, we primarily address Contribution B: Unified Mobile Computing and Security
Model with Access Control by defining a formal model to represent: the general structure
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of a mobile application; RBAC concepts including roles, sets of roles, users, and sets of
users; MAC concepts including classifications and clearances; permissions related to
RBAC and MAC; permission assignment to the user interface and to control the services
of the mobile application API; and, delegation for mobile applications. Chapter 3 also
addresses Contribution C: Dynamic Combination of Access Control Models and
Configuration Options to combine RBAC, MAC, and DAC, the mobile app’s UI, API, and
Data Source with the Direct UI Modifications, Intercepting API Calls, and Server
Interceptor API options (see Section 1.3 and Figure 1.4). Chapters 4, 5, and 6 detail the
realization of Contribution D: Access Control Security Enforcement Code Generation and
Interceptors via both human-assisted processes that modify limited portions of the mobile
application code and algorithms that automatically generate security enforcement code.
Chapter 4 focuses on the Direct UI Modifications option which supports the inclusion of
RBAC and DAC to control the screens, components, and interactions among screens on a
role-by-role basis. Chapter 5 focuses on the Intercepting API Calls option on the
interactions between the UI and the mobile applications’ API services to control by both
RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC permissions which services are allowed to be invoked for on a
user-by-user basis through the generation of an intercepting API that mirrors the original
mobile application’s API. Chapter 6 focuses on the Server Interceptor API option on the
interactions between the mobile application’s API services and their invocations to serverside APIs of data sources, with a server interceptor API defined using the HAPI FHIR
reference implementation to add access control mechanisms to the server-side API
services. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main points discussed throughout the
dissertation and what was achieved with the proposed approach.

27

Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides background information on the main concepts and topics that
support the discussion and explanation in the remainder of the dissertation in seven
sections. We have chosen the healthcare domain to support the explanation of our research
since healthcare data is highly sensitive, requires fine-grained security, and involves
multiple stakeholders. Section 2.1 presents the logical architecture of a mobile application
through a description of its different layers and their interaction. Section 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4
review, respectively, the three access control models that are the basis for our work: RoleBased Access Control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992), Mandatory Access Control
(MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976), and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) (Department
of Defense, 1985). Section 2.5 reviews the application programming interface (API)
concept that is instrumental in our approach that necessitates permissions based on which
user is authorized to which API service call. Section 2.6 introduces and explains the Fast
Healthcare Interoperable Resources (FHIR) specification (FHIR DSTU2, 2015) and the
HAPI FHIR reference implementation (HAPI FHIR, 2014), both of which are utilized to
support the proof-of-concept discussion in Chapter 6. Finally, section 2.7 introduces and
reviews the Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) mobile application, a collaboration
between the Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer Science &
Engineering at the University of Connecticut and Schools of Nursing and Medicine in
support of a new law passed to track concussions of children from kindergarten through
high school in public schools (CT Law HB6722) (Connecticut General Assembly, 2015).
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2.1.

Logical Architecture of a Mobile Application
In this section, the logical architecture of a client mobile application is explored, as

shown in Figure 2.1 (Microsoft Corporation, 2008). The architecture consists of four main
layers: the User Layer which symbolizes the users of the mobile application; the
Presentation Layer which consists of the UI components of the mobile application; the
Business Layer which contains the logic of the mobile application (e.g., libraries, APIs,
source code); and, the Data Layer which contains all of the data the mobile application
manages (e.g., retrieves, inserts). For the purposes of our work in this dissertation, the
logical architecture in Figure 2.1 can be organized as a set of higher-level mobile
application components, namely: the user interface (UI), the application programming
interface (API), and the data source (database, cloud, server, etc.). This was shown in the
first component in Figure 1.4 of Chapter 1. The intent of the work presented in this
dissertation is to explore the inclusion of security within and between the layers of Figure
2.1 as realized in the mobile application as given in Figure 1.3 of Chapter 1.

29

USER
LAYER

Individual User

UI Components

Data Access
Components

Business
Components
Data Helpers/
Utilities

Business
Entities

Security

Business
Workflow

Configuration

Application Facade

CROSS-CUTTING

Presentation Logic Components

Service
Agents

Communication / Connectivity

DATA
LAYER

BUSINESS
LAYER

PRESENTATION
LAYER

Mobile Client Application

Unreliable Networks
Data
Sources

Services

Mobile Support Infrastructure

Figure 2.1. Logical Architecture of a Client Mobile Application.

2.2.

Role-Based Access Control
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) was proposed by David Ferraiolo and Richard

Kuhn (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992) and transitioned to the National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2001) that was
adopted in 2004. The main concepts of the NIST RBAC standard (Sandhu, Ferraiolo, &
Kuhn, 2000) are conceptualized in Figure 2.2 (SlideShare, 2012) with four reference
models. RBAC0 in the middle portion of Figure 2.2 is comprised of: users that perform a
specific function within an organization, roles that are assigned to users based on their
responsibilities, and permissions (PRMS) that define which operations (OPS)/objects
(OBS) within a system/application a role can have access to. Users can have one or more
roles, and roles can contain one or more permissions to objects. RBAC1, shown in the upper
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middle portion of Figure 2.2, supports the ability of roles to be organized in a hierarchy.
RBAC2, shown in the upper left and on the lower right of Figure 2.2, provides the definition
of constraints, such as static (SSD) and dynamic (DSD) separation of duty. Lastly, RBAC3,
shown at the bottom part of Figure 2.2, captures the concept of sessions that represent the
lifetime of a particular user, role, and permissions in a dynamic runtime application.

Figure 2.2. General structure of the RBAC model (Slideshare, 2012).
The NIST RBAC standard (Sandhu, Ferraiolo, & Kuhn, 2000) controls the access
to system resources based on the roles available in an enterprise that a user can assume.
Each role contains different capabilities that allow a user with a particular role to complete
his/her tasks within the enterprise and nothing more (Rouse, 2012). Three key concepts are
utilized to complete this process (NIST Computer Security Resource Center, 2015): role
assignment allocates a role to a user based on what he/she is allowed to see, with each user
of the system having at least one role and being able to connect with one role per opened
session; role authorization to make sure the user was assigned the role necessary for
him/her to complete his/her tasks and nothing more; and transaction authorization where a
user can carry out a task if his/her role has permission to do so. Note that in RBAC,
permissions as defined are operations on objects, and for the purposes of this dissertation,
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this must be evolved so that permissions can be defined on services that are invoked (called
on objects).

2.3.

Mandatory Access Control
Different from RBAC, in the Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model (Bell & La

Padula, 1976; Biba, 1977), a security administrator assigns sensitivity levels (Top Secret
(TS), Secret (S), Confidential (C), and Unclassified (U)) to objects (classifications) and
users (clearances) to control who can see what. As with RBAC, the permissions are defined
on objects and the allowable access modes/operations (e.g., read, append, write, or readwrite). These levels are ordered hierarchically from most to least secure: TS > S > C > U.
Basically, each of the users in a system has a clearance; therefore, if the user has a clearance
of secret this means that he/she is allowed to access the files/programs that are either secret,
confidential, or unclassified. Notice that he/she can’t access the files/programs that are
classified as top secret since he/she has a lower clearance status. An example of this model
can be seen in Figure 2.3. In the example we have two users: user A that has a clearance of
secret and user B has a clearance of top secret. In this case, both users are trying to access
a data server that is classified as top secret, therefore the attempt to access the data for user
A is not successful while user B can retrieve the data successfully.

Figure 2.3. A MAC Example.
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The allowable interaction of a user with a clearance to an object with a classification
are governed by a set of security properties presented in the Bell-LaPadula model (Bell &
LaPadula, 1976) and in the Biba model (Biba, 1977): simple security, simple integrity,
liberal star, and strict star. The security properties are evaluated based on the access
mode/operations (read, append, write, read-write). Simple security (SS) allows a user to
read elements (read or read-write access mode) with a sensitivity level equal to or lower
than their clearance level, but not those elements with a higher sensitivity level; Simple
integrity (SI) allows a user to write elements (append, write, read-write access mode) of
equal or lower sensitivity level when compared to their clearance level, but not to those
elements with a higher sensitivity; Liberal star (LS) is the permission to write to equal or
greater levels; and Strict Star Write (SSW) and Strict Star Read (SSR), or write (read) equal,
is the permission to write (read) only to equal levels. Note also as similar to RBAC,
permissions for MAC need to be upgraded from objects and operations to services and
invocations.

2.4.

Discretionary Access Control
The Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model (Department of Defense, 1985;

Sandhu & Samarati, 1994) establishes security policies (e.g., read, write, execute
permissions) based on a combination of the objects and on the user’s identity and
authorization and can be delegated. In other words, a user has the ability to assign
permissions on the data that belongs to him/her. To illustrate, the example in Figure 2.4
has the case where User A owns the three files shown and gives read/write permissions to
User B and User C for each of the files. In a healthcare setting, a physician often sees
patients in his/her office weekdays (9am-5pm) with an on-call physician handling calls
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from patients at nights and on weekends. In this case, DAC can allow the physician to
delegate his/her responsibilities (some or all) to the on-call physician who would not
normally have access to those patients for a fixed period of time.

Figure 2.4. A DAC Example.
There exist several alternatives on the way that the owner of the information can
grant access to other users (Osborn, Sandhu, & Munawer, 2000). Two of the alternatives
that apply to our approach in this dissertation are:
•

Strict DAC: The owner of an object is the only one who has authorization to grant
access of the object to another user and this ownership cannot be transferred.

•

Liberal DAC: The owner of an object can delegate his/her access to the object with
other users. There are three alternatives of liberal DAC:
-

One Level Grant: The owner of an object can delegate his/her access to the
object to another user, which does not have access to further delegate the
permission.
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-

Two Level Grant: The owner of an object can delegate his/her access to the
object to another user, which has access to further delegate the permission
to another user but not further than this.

-

Multilevel Grant: The owner of an object can delegate his/her access to the
object to another user, this user can delegate the permission to another user,
and so on indefinitely.

Again, DAC concepts need to be upgraded in support of this dissertation for the ability to
delegate services that can be invoked.

2.5.

Application Programming Interface
In order to perform data transactions between a server/database and a mobile

application, many developers utilize the Application Programming Interface (API)
concept. This consists of different tools or libraries utilized to interface data to an
application. Figure 2.5 illustrates a general idea of the way that an API connects a data
source to an application. Basically, the client sends a request through the means of a URL,
the API receives the URL and interprets it, and then sends this to the data source. The data
source then executes the request and sends back a response to the API. The API encodes
the response in a human-readable format (e.g., JSON, XML) and sends the response in this
format to the client. An example of a JSON response is:
[{"state_id":"1","state_name":"Connecticut","state_code":"CT"}]
Some of the advantages of APIs is that one API can be utilized in several applications as
most of them are modular (e.g., Facebook Graph API) and, they demonstrate their
usefulness in applications that contain dynamic data (data that changes in a frequent
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manner). This concept originated with traditional desktop devices and is now being heavily
utilized in mobile applications.

Figure 2.5. General Idea of how APIs work.
One of the most widely utilized architectures to build APIs is REST
(Representational State Transfer). A web service that utilizes the REST architecture to
build the APIs is referred to as RESTful APIs. The REST architecture usually runs over
HTTP and is commonly utilized between the client and the server of a mobile application
to manage the requests and responses between both (Rouse, 2014). There are several
architectural constraints that characterize REST (WhatIsREST.com, 2012):
•

Client-Server: A web service needs to have a separation of concerns, which
consists of having an unambiguous separation between the consumers of a
system (who can request services) and the services the system provides (that
returns consumers a response to their request).

•

Stateless: Each request a user sends to a service must contain all of the
necessary information for the service to return a response.

•

Cache: The client, service, or middleware are able to cache the response for
reuse in later requests.

•

Interface/Uniform Contract: Services and consumers of these services must
share a technical interface (e.g., HTTP).
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•

Layered System: The web service must leverage a layered system. This
means that the interactions between a consumer and a service must remain
consistent regardless of the layer a consumer is communicating with.

Nevertheless, even though the constraints stated above are said to be required in order for
a web service to be considered as using a REST architecture, a great amount of services
lack at least one of these constrains, therefore, there are not many that are considered to be
fully utilizing the REST architecture (Bleigh, 2010).

2.6.

Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR)
The Fast Healthcare Interoperable Resources (FHIR) specification (FHIR DSTU2,

2015) is a standards framework created by the health language seven (HL7) organization
(Heath Level Seven International, 2011) with the intention of providing easier and quicker
implementation of interoperability in healthcare systems to facilitate access of mHealth
apps to healthcare data in the cloud as stored in multiple EHRs/HIT systems. One of the
main goals of FHIR is to represent the entities and procedures in healthcare as resources
(FHIR DSTU2, 2015). There are currently ninety-three resources that can be utilized to
map data from a healthcare system and the implementers of these resources claim that more
resources are going to be added in a future (FHIR Resources, 2015). Sample resources
include: for patients, Patient, FamilyMemberHistory, Condition, Observation, Diagnostic
Report, Medication, Immunization, AllergyIntolerance, AdverseEvent, etc.; and, for
insurance, Coverage, EligibilityRequest, Claim, PaymentNotice, etc. The available
resources can be accessed through the means of a RESTful API, which allows to connect
healthcare interfaces with data sources that exist in the cloud. Different from SOAP
(Simple Object Access Protocol) (W3C, 2007), which has been the dominant approach to
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manage web services interfaces over the past years and it is utilized in HL7 v2, RESTful
APIs are easier to understand and to implement as they rely on HTTP and on Create, Read,
Update, and Delete (CRUD) operations to develop services.
One popular open-source library that implements the FHIR specification is the
HAPI FHIR reference implementation (HAPI FHIR, 2014). HAPI FHIR was developed in
the Java programming language and offers the features of FHIR in addition to other
features such as the ability to intercept the server (by using Java servlets (Java, 2013)) that
processes the user’s requests. HAPI FHIR offers several server interceptor functions
(depicted in Figure 2.6) (HAPI FHIR Server Interceptors, 2016) that allow developers to
perform actions on the user’s request before it is executed and after its execution (before
the response is delivered to the user). The main interceptors the library provides are: the
incomingRequestPreProcessed interceptor which can be called before the request is
processed; the incomingRequestPostProcessed interceptor which can be called once the
request is classified (URL and request headers are examined in order to know this); the
incomingRequestPreHandled interceptor which can be called once the request has been
handled; and, the outgoingResponse interceptor, which can be called after the operation is
handled but before the response is returned. This intercepting feature is critical to support
our interception of RESTful API calls in order to check access control security permissions
to prevent unauthorized access to services that have not been assigned to a given
role/clearance/delegate for a mHealth app.
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Figure 2.6. HAPI FHIR Server Interceptors
(HAPI FHIR Server Interceptors, 2016).

2.7.

Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) Prototype
To evaluate and demonstrate the proposed approach, we utilize the Connecticut

Concussion Tracker (CT2) mobile application throughout the dissertation. CT2 is being
developed for both Android (Figure 2.7) and iOS (Figure 2.8) platforms and is a
collaboration between the Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer
Science & Engineering at the University of Connecticut and Schools of Nursing and
Medicine in support of a new law passed in the state of Connecticut to track concussions
of kids between ages 7 to age 19 in public schools (CT Law HB6722) (Connecticut General
Assembly, 2015). As shown in Figure 2.7, the Android version of the CT2 mobile
application consists of a UI of 7 tabs after the initial screen: ‘Home’, ‘List’, ‘Student’,
Cause’, ‘Symptoms’, ‘Follow-up’, and ‘Return’. As shown in Figure 2.8, the iOS version
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of the CT2 mobile application consists of a UI of 10 screens in which 5 of those are linked
with navigation actions (left swipe and right swipe to move through the aforementioned
five screens): ‘Student’, ‘Cause’, ‘Symptoms’, ‘Follow-up’, and ‘Return’ respectively, in
the bottom row of the figure. Briefly, we explain each of the 10 screens of the iOS version
in Figure 2.8; note that common screens of the Android version have the same
functionality. The ‘Login’ screen (second screenshot, top row) allows users to log in to the
application with a valid username/password combination. The ‘Registration’ screen (third
screenshot, top row) allows future users to create an account to be able to use the
application. The ‘User Information’ screen (fifth screenshot, top row), which is accessible
by pressing the ‘Home’ button found at the top of the List screen, allows the user to manage
his/her general information. The ‘List’ screen (fourth screen, top row) allows users to add
a new concussion; to search a student by name; and, contains the list of students the user
has permission to view and, for each student gives him/her the option to add a concussion,
edit the existing concussion, share the concussion, or close the concussion case (if he/she
has permission to access these components). The ‘Student’ screen, first screenshot in the
bottom row, allows the user to input the student’s general information (e.g., name,
birthdate, school). The ‘Cause’ screen, the second screenshot of the bottom row, allows the
user to insert the date that the incident occurred and, allows him/her via drop down options
to specify where the injury was caused, with what it was caused, etc. After the user saves
the data he/she entered in the ‘Cause’ screen, he/she can proceed to the ‘Symptoms’ screen
(third screenshot, bottom row), where the symptoms the student had within 48 hours and
other pertinent data are entered. To finish, the ‘Follow-up’ and ‘Return’ (fourth and fifth
screenshots, respectively, bottom row) screens allow users to record the status of the
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student over time (Follow-up) and when the student can return to various activities at
school (Return).
To illustrate the processing within CT2, Figure 2.9 depicts the general structure of
the mobile application and components. The CT2 mobile app allows users to manage
students’ concussion data from when the student got the concussion up to its resolution
(when the case is closed). The two boxes depicted on the top of Figure 2.9 represent the
databases utilized to store the data the mobile app manages. The CT2 mobile app DB
contains user account information, school data (school’s name and location), and other
non-sensitive data such as drop-downs, select lists, etc., in the mobile app (e.g., location of
incident, state, assessment tool used). Different from the CT2 DB, the OpenEMR DB stores
highly-sensitive data that is managed through the means of the CT2 mobile app. This
includes: students’ demographic data such as name and date of birth; concussion data such
as date of incident, contact mechanism, and symptoms; follow-up data such as lingering
symptoms, medical diagnosis, and post concussive syndrome diagnosis; and, return data
such as schedule modification, details of return, and date of returning to full participation.
In addition to the data sources, the CT2 mobile app utilizes an API in order to
retrieve/insert/update data as depicted in the CT2 Mobile Application API box in Figure
2.9. A subset of the services available in the CT2 API allow users to: view/insert/edit
students’ demographic data; manage their account information (name, password); search
for an specific student; and manage concussion, follow-up, and return data. While the data
that is retrieved/inserted from/to the CT2 DB is managed solely by the CT2 API, the data
that is retrieved/inserted from/to the OpenEMR DB requires an API (depicted in the
OpenEMR API box in Figure 2.9) that is positioned between the CT2 API and the
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OpenEMR DB, which contains the necessary services to handle the retrieval/insertion of
demographic data, concussion data, follow-up data, and return data. Finally, the bottom
box of Figure 2.9 indicates that there are two versions of the CT2 mobile app (as shown in
Figures 2.7 and 2.8): one for mobile devices that support Android OS and the other one for
mobile devices that support iOS.

Figure 2.7. CT2 Mobile Application - Android Version.
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Figure 2.8. CT2 Mobile Application - iOS Version.

Figure 2.9. CT2 Structure.
43

Chapter 3
Unified Model of Access Control for Mobile
Applications
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of a unified model of access control for
mobile applications in 8 sections. Specifically, we define a Unified Mobile Computing and
Security Model with Access Control, contribution B in our work (see Section 1.5, Chapter
1), that is meant to capture the generalized structure of a mobile application, the different
access control models (role-based access control - RBAC, mandatory access control MAC, and discretionary access control - DAC), and the permissions that can be assigned
at the user interface, API, and data source of the mobile application; the presentation is
logically partitioned into groups. Section 3.1 introduces the first group of definitions for
the generalized structure of a mobile application which consists of a user interface of
screens, components (text fields, drop down, buttons, etc.), and interactions among screens.
Section 3.2 reviews the second group of definitions for RBAC and MAC concepts
including: roles, sets of roles, users, sets of users’ clearances and classification for MAC.
Section 3.3 presents the third group of definitions for RBAC permissions on the user
interface, namely: permission assignments of users and roles on screens, components, and
interactions (RBAC). Section 3.4 presents the fourth group of definitions for RBAC and
MAC permissions on the mobile application API that is partitioned into secure/unsecure
services (RBAC) and labeled/unlabeled services (MAC); and discusses service permission
assignment to roles and users. Section 3.5 explores the fifth and final group of definitions
for DAC that includes the delegation of permissions from one user/group to another
user/group for RBAC permissions on the UI of a mobile application and RBAC and/or
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MAC permissions on the services of the mobile application API. Collectively, the model
presented in Sections 3.1 to 3.5, allows for the ability to model role-based, mandatory, and
discretionary access controls on the mobile application and its API and supports
contribution B: Unified Mobile Computing and Security Model with Access Control from
Section 1.5 of Chapter 1. Section 3.6 discusses the ability to take the model concepts as
given in Sections 3.1 to 3.5 and pick-and-choose in order to define and design a unique set
of security capabilities for each mobile application; this supports contribution C: Dynamic
Combination of Access Control Models and Configuration Options. Section 3.7 contains
an entity relationship diagram to store information programmatically from the Unified
Security model in Sections 3.1 to 3.5. Finally, Section 3.8 presents related work on access
control in mobile computing.

3.1.

Generalized Structure of Mobile Application
Table 3.1 contains assertions on mobile computing. The first assertion in Table 3.1

is that the mobile computing field is composed of mobile communication, mobile
hardware, and mobile software; corresponding assertions are 2, 3, and 4; the focus of our
work is on mobile software assuming that appropriate devices (hardware) exist and that
communication between these and the servers and/or databases and/or repositories is
secure. This is the fourth assertion in Table 3.1.
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Mobile computing is composed by three main fields: mobile communication, mobile hardware,
and mobile software.
Mobile communication consists of establishing an infrastructure to assure a seamless and reliable
communication (e.g., the use of protocols, services, etc. to assist the communication).
Mobile hardware comprises mobile devices or device components that involve mobility. These
could be laptops, smartphones, and tablets.
Mobile software represents the programs that run on a mobile device and handles the
characteristics and requirements of mobile applications.

Table 3.1. Mobile Computing Assertions.
Given the assertions in Table 3.1, the first group of Definitions 1 to 5 describe the
main content and structure of a mobile application:
Defn. 1: A service αj = <αID, αNAME, αCLS, αSIG> has a unique ID, a service name, a
classification level (MAC from Section 2.3 of Chapter 2), and a signature defined
as αSIG = <αTYPE, αURI, αPARAMS, αRETURN> with αTYPE ∈ {Create, Read, Update,
Delete, GET, POST, PUT, READ}, a unified resource identifier, a set of
parameters, and a return value.
Example: The CT2 mobile application has a detailed REST API that is utilized to
store concussion information on students to/from a MySQL database. Sample
services include:
•

Get the list of students of a specific school:
o αID = 26
o αNAME = /students/school/:schoolId
o αCLS = C
o αSIG:
§

αTYPE = GET

§

αURI = bmi10.engr.uconn.edu:10090/

§

αPARAMS (Service params) = school id
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§
•

αRETURN = Array

Update a student’s general information (first name, last name, school,
student number, etc.):
o αID = 34
o αNAME = /students/update/:studentId
o αCLS = TS
o αSIG:
§

αTYPE = POST

§

αURI = bmi10.engr.uconn.edu:10090/

§

αPARAMS (Service params) = student id

§

αPARAMS

(POST params)

= first name, middle name, last name,

suffix, email, student number, school id, date of birth, gender
§

αRETURN = Bool

Defn. 2: A mobile application, MA =<UIMA, βMA >, consists of:
• a user interface (UI) UIMA = <UIName, UIS> with a name UIName and a set of n
screens, UIS = {S1, S2, …Sn}, where each screen Si = < sID, sName > is defined as
a two-pair < sID, sName > with unique sID identifier and name sName, that are
organized as either tabs (users can click among tabs) or a sequence of interconnected screens which are linked with next and previous buttons, and
• an API βMA = {α1, α2, …, αk} where each αj is as given in Defn. 1 and services
are either web or cloud APIs.
Examples: The pharmacy application presented in Section 1.1 of Chapter 1 had
five screens while the CT2 mobile application from Section 2.7 of Chapter 2 is
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composed of eight screens with seven of them organized by tabs in the Android
version (see Figure 2.7 again). Meanwhile, the iOS version of the CT2 mobile
application (see Figure 2.8 again) is composed of ten screens and a subset of these
are linked through navigation actions (left swipe, right swipe).
Defn. 3: Each screen, Si, has a set of k screen components, SC, denoted, 𝑆𝐶#$ , that allow a
user to select, enter, and manipulate data in a MA.
Example: The ‘Cause’ screen which is depicted in the second screen shown at the
bottom of Figure 2.8 contains ten main screen components: three buttons (List,
Save, Cancel), one date picker (Date of Incident), five radio buttons (Location of
Incident, If Sport, Contact Mechanism, Impact Location on Head, Head Gear
Usage), and one text field (Others/Details).
Defn. 4: A component, Ci = < cID, cName > is defined as a two-pair < cID, cName > with
unique cID identifier and name cName, is a portion of a screen that can be displayed
and/or entered by users and includes but is not limited to: a text field (TF) to enter
information; a button (BN) to effect the state of the application (save, cancel,
next, previous, etc.); a drop down (DD) where one value is chosen; a set of
checkboxes (CB) where multiple values can be chosen; a set of radio buttons (RB)
to select only one of a number of options; a spinner (SP) to select values; and, a
date picker (DP) to enter calendar dates; note that this is not an exhaustive
component list.
Example: The ‘Student’ screen of the iOS version for the CT2 mobile application
in Figure 2.7 has: three buttons (List, Save, Cancel), three text fields (First Name,
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MI, Last Name), five drop downs (Gender, State, etc.), and one date picker (Date
of Birth).
Defn. 5: Each MA has a screen set, SS, which is classified as either:
●

A collection of tabs where each tab is a screen, where there is an order among
the tabs in the way that they are displayed left to right within the MA.

●

A collection of screens where each screen has an appropriate list of
buttons/actions to navigate among screens that is augmented with the screen
interactions, SI, necessary to switch among the various screens.

Example: The Android version of the CT2 mobile application, depicted in Figure
2.7, is composed of seven tabs while the iOS version of the CT2 mobile
application, depicted in Figure 2.8, is composed of six screens linked by
navigation actions (left swipe, right swipe).

3.2.

RBAC and MAC Model Definitions
The second group of definitions for the unified model of access control for mobile

applications involve the way that RBAC and MAC can be defined for the mobile
application. In support of these definitions, the relevant assertions are in Table 3.2. The
first assertion focuses on the three parts of an application upon which RBAC, MAC, and
optional DAC can be defined, specifically: the user interface, the API, and the data sources.
The second assertion defines the locations that permissions on RBAC and/or MAC can be
defined. The third and fourth assertions primarily relate to RBAC. The fifth assertion
introduces a clearance level for a user in support of MAC. The sixth assertion supports
constraint checking in MAC (Bell & La Padula, 1976), via a set of properties that define
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the conditions under which a user with a CLR can read and/or write an object with a CLS:
from Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, recall Simple Security (SS), Simple Integrity (SI), Liberal*
(L*), and Strict* (S*) that has both Read and Write capabilities.
A mobile application contains a user interface, an API, and data sources. Each of these can be
secured using RBAC and/or MAC with optional delegation (DAC).
The user interface, UI, has RBAC permissions defined on screens, screen components, and
their interactions, where relevant.
Each role for a mobile application defines permissions as related to UI, API, and data sources
in support of RBAC.
Each mobile application has a set of roles and a set of users, and the assignment of a role to a
user in support of RBAC.
Each user has a clearance and resources that need to be secured have a classification chosen
from a sensitivity level Unclassified (U), Confidential (C), Secret (S), Top Secret (TS), where
U < C < S < TS, meaning that users that have a clearance of TS can view all of the resources
(U, C, S, TS) while users that have a clearance of U are limited to only viewing the resources
that have a classification of U.
Each user is assigned a read and write property that constrains the conditions under which a
user is allowed to view objects.

Table 3.2. RBAC and MAC Assertions.
The usage of MAC to control access to objects has to be upgraded in support of this
dissertation to apply to the services of a mobile application. The aforementioned MAC
properties are defined to determine under which conditions a user with a CLR level can
read or write a given data item with a CLS level. These concepts need to be adapted to the
different types of services for read (read, GET) and write (Create, Update, Delete, POST,
DELETE, PUT). A user is given both a read and a write property for MAC; suppose we
have SS for read and SI for write. For read services, the SS property (or read-down, no
read-up) is interpreted as the permission to invoke a read service that has an equal or lower
CLS level. That is, a user is allowed to invoke a read service with a CLS level equal to or
lower than their CLR level, but not those read services with a higher CLS level. For write
services, the SI property (or write-down, no write-up) is interpreted as the permission to
invoke a write service that has an equal or lower CLS level. That is, a user can invoke a
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create, update, or delete service of equal or lower CLS level when compared to their CLR
level, but not to those create, update, or delete services with a higher CLS level. From a
definition and management perspective, an Information Security Officer (ISO) would set
the CLR level of users following the predefined sensitivity levels (e.g., TS, S, C, and U) to
establish the levels for both users and services. These levels are then augmented on a userby-user basis by assigning a read property (via SS or S* Read) to invoke a read service and
a write property (via SI, L*, or S* Write) to invoke a write service.
Given the assertions in Table 3.2 and the extension of MAC to be applied to
services, the second group of Definitions 6 to 12 support the concepts of roles, clearances,
and users with both RBAC and MAC characteristics for a mobile application:
Defn. 6: A role r is defined as a two-pair r = < rID , rName > with unique identifier rID
and name rName.
Example: The CT2 app has many roles, one of which would be for a parent: r =
<rID4 , Parent>.
Defn. 7: Let RMA = {r1, r2, … , rj} be defined as the set of j roles for a given application
MA where rj ∈ RMA and rj = <rIDj , rNamej >.
Example: The CT2 app has four roles: RCT2 = {r1 = <rID1 , AT>, r2 = <rID2 , Coach>,
r3 = <rID3 , Nurse>, r4 = <rID4 , Parent>} where AT is short for athletic trainer.
Defn. 8: A user u is defined as a tuple < uID, uName, uCLR >, with unique uID identifier,
name uName and optional clearance uCLR ∈ {TS, S, C, U} that signifies that a
user is limited to information (UI) in the GUI by RBAC and services (API) that
satisfy the established MAC properties (e.g., simple integrity, simple security,
liberal *, strict *, etc.).
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Example: The CT2 app has a user with top secret clearance <uID1, Karen, TS>.
Defn. 9: Let UMA = {u1, u2,…, uj} be defined as the set of j users for a given application
MA, where uj ∈ UMA and uj = < uIDj, uNamej, uCLRj >.
Example: The CT2 app has three users with different clearances:
UCT2 = { u1=<uID1, Karen, TS >, u3=< uID3, Joe, C >, u4=< uID4, Peter, S> }.
Defn. 10: A user u that has a clearance uCLR (Defn. 8) assigned has also a read property
and a write property assigned to control access to a service α (Defn. 1) as
follows:
•

Read Properties:
- Simple Security (SS-r): User u has read access on service α iff uCLR ≥ αCLS.
- Strict * (Read) (S*-r): User u has read access on service α iff uCLR = αCLS.

•

Write Properties:
- Simple Integrity (SI-w): User u has write access on service α iff uCLR ≥
αCLS.
- Strict * (Write) (S*-w): User u has write access on service α iff uCLR =
αCLS.
- Liberal * (L*-w): User u has write access on service α iff uCLR ≤ αCLS.

Given Defn. 10, we revise Defn. 8 as below:
Defn. 8 v2: A user u is defined as a tuple < uID, uName, uCLR, uMACRD, uMACWR >, where
uMACRD ∈ {SS, S*} and uMACWR ∈ {SI, S*, L*}.
Updated Example: The CT2 app has four users each with different clearances
and read/write properties: UCT2 = {u1=<uID1, Karen, TS, SS-r, L*-w >, u2=<
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uID2, Carmen, C, S*-r, S*-w >, u3=< uID3, Joe, C, SS-r, S*-w>, u4=< uID4,
Peter, S, SS-r, S*-w >}, where: nurse Karen can read down and write up and
has the most privileges, the parent Carmen is limited to one level secret; and,
the coach Joe an AT Peter can both read down and write equal.
Defn. 11: User Role Assignment (URA): Each user uj ∈ UMA can be assigned a role rj ∈
RMA for a user role assignment ura = <uIDi, rIDj> that signifies that a user is
limited to playing that and the authorized permissions. Note that a user can be
assigned multiple roles but only play one role in any session with the mobile
application.
Example: Karen is a nurse at a Connecticut middle school that utilizes the CT2
mobile application, therefore, she is assigned the role of Nurse and she is able to
access all of the screens/components that are allowed for that role: ura = < uID1,
rID3>.
Defn. 12: User Role Assignment Set (URAS) is the set of all user role assignments that
contains an entry for every user/role combination.
Example: Karen, Joe, Carmen, and Peter are associated with a Connecticut
middle school in different ways. Karen is the school’s nurse, Joe is the school’s
coach, Carmen is a parent of a student whom has had a concussion and attends
the school, and Peter is the school’s athletic trainer. In this case Karen is assigned
the role of Nurse, Joe is assigned the role of Coach, Carmen is assigned the role
of Parent, and Peter is assigned the role of Athletic Trainer. As mentioned
before, each of these users is able to see different features of the mobile
application depending on the permissions of their assigned role:
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URASMA = {<uID1, rID3>, < uID2, rID4>, < uID3, rID2>, < uID4, rID1>}

3.3.

RBAC UI Permission Definitions
The third group of definitions for the unified model of access control for mobile

applications establish the way that RBAC can be defined against the user interface elements
of a mobile application. In support of these definitions, the relevant assertions are in Table
3.3. The first assertion involves the fact that UI permissions can be defined in different UI
elements of a mobile application. The second assertion states the way that RBAC can be
assigned to the UI elements of a mobile application.
The UI of a mobile application can have RBAC permissions with optional delegation defined on
the screens, their components, and their interactions.
Each screen, component, or interaction of a mobile application can be assigned a set of roles that
have permission to access the screen in support of RBAC.

Table 3.3. RBAC UI Permission Assertions.
Definitions 13 to 16 formalize the concepts of permissions in a mobile application’s
user interface that involves RBAC control on screens, components, and screen interactions:
Defn. 13: A screen permission, sp = < sID , ps >, where sID ∈ SS is a screen identifier and
ps is a screen permission, is utilized to define whether a screen s in SS as given
in Defns. 2 and 5, that is part of a mobile application MA is allowable (ps = true)
or not (ps = false).
Example: The role of Coach in the CT2 mobile application can add a student,
add the student’s concussion information, and view the list of students the user
with the specified role has entered. Nevertheless, the Coach role is not able to
add symptoms, add follow up data and, is not able to add return data. Therefore,
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by looking at these permissions, for the Android version (Figure 2.7 of Chapter
2) a user that has the role of Coach has access to the Home, List, Student, and
Cause tabs in the CT2 mobile application as shown in Figure 2.7 (the role has
access to the second, third, and fourth screens at the top row of the figure as well
as the first screen of the bottom row of the figure). The Coach role has no access
to the Symptoms, Follow up, or Return tabs, which are depicted in Figure 2.7 as
the second, third, and fourth screens in the bottom row of the figure.
Defn. 14: A component permission, cp = < cID , pc >, where cID ∈ 𝑆𝐶#$ is a component
identifier (Defn. 3), is utilized to define permissions pc on various components
of each screen S (Defn. 4).
a. on/off permissions for button (BN), radio button (RB), drop down (DD),
checkbox (CB), date picker (DP), spinner (SP), or text field (TF). The
permission values for each component are: pc = enabled or disabled.
b. data permissions for text fields (TF). The permission values for a text field
are: pc = view, edit, or edit once.
Example: As we described in the example of Defn.13, the role of Coach in the
CT2 mobile application has access to the Home, List, Student, and Cause tabs
shown in Figure 2.7. Nevertheless, there are certain components in these screens
that a user with the aforementioned role does not have access to or, he/she has
limited access to such components. For instance, a user with the role of Coach
can add general information about a student as well as add the general
information of the student’s concussion but, he/she does not have permission to
edit this information once it is saved.
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Defn. 15: A screen interaction permission set, SIP = < si1 ,…, sie >, defines all permitted
screen interactions, where each si = [sIDx , sIDy] is a pair of screens that means
that screen sIDx interacts with screen, sIDy.
Example: After a user with the Coach role successfully logs in on the iOS version
of the CT2 mobile application, he/she has access to the fourth and fifth screens
of the top row of Figure 2.8 and, to the first and second screens at the bottom
row of Figure 2.8. In this case, SIP = < [sID3, sID4], [sID3, sID5], [sID3, sID6], [sID4,

sID3], [sID5, sID3], [sID5, sID6], [sID6, sID3], [sID6, sID5] >.
Defn. 16: A role, r ∈ RMA, is assigned a set of role permissions, rp = < γ, χ , λ > for: a
subset m ≤ n screens of SS in MA where γ = <sp1, … , spm> are the m screen
permissions (Defn. 13) assigned to the role r, χ = < cp1, … , cpj > are j component
permissions (Defn. 14) for all m screens, and λ = < si1, … , siq > are the screen
interactions (Defn. 15) for non-tabbed UIs. Note that if γ is null then χ and λ
must also be null. If γ is not null, then either χ or λ can be null. Other
combinations are possible.
Example: We can combine the examples given at Defns. 13, 14, and 15 to
generate the set of role permissions. The permissions for the Coach role are
summarized in Table 3.4 using the notation of our model, while Table 3.5
contains the permissions for the four roles available in the Android version of
the CT2 mobile app (Figure 2.7) along with clearance/classification permissions.
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Permissions for <rID2,Coach>
Screens
Screen
Permissions
Components

Component
Permissions

{<sID1,Home>,<sID2,List>,<sID3,Student>,<sID4,Cause>,<sID5,
Symptoms>,<sID6,Follow Up>,<sID7,Return>}
{<sID1,true>,<sID2,true>,<sID3,true>,<sID4,true>,
<sID5,false>,<sID6,false>,<sID7, false>}
{<cID1,’Enter Student’ BN>,<cID2,’Retrieve Open Cases’
BN>,<cID3,’Last Name’ TF>,<cID4,’First Name’ TF>,
<cID5,’Search’ BN>,<cID6,’Enter New Student’ BN>,
<cID7,’View Student Info’ BN>, <cID8,’Edit’ BN>,
<cID9,’Add’ BN>,<cID10,’First Name’ TF>,<cID11,’Middle
Initial’ TF>,<cID12,’Last Name’ TF>,<cID13,’Gender’ DD>,
<cID14,’Date of Birth’ DP>,<cID15,’Date of Past
Concussions’ DP>,<cID16,’State’ DD>,
<cID17,’City/Town/Region’ DD>,<cID18,’District’ DD>,
<cID19,’School’ DD>,<cID20,’Save’ BN>,<cID21,’Cancel’ BN>,
<cID22,’Location of Incident’ BN>,<cID23,’If Sport’ DD>,
<cID24,’Others/Details’ TF>,<cID25,’Contact Mechanism’ DD>,
<cID26,’Impact Location of Head’ DD>,<cID27,’Head Gear
Usage’ DD>,<cID28,’Save’ BN>,<cID29,’Cancel’ BN>}
{<cID1,Enabled>,<cID2,Enabled>,<cID3,View/Edit>,<cID4,View/
Edit>,<cID5,Enabled>,<cID6,Enabled>,<cID7,Enabled>,<cID8,
Disabled>,<cID9,Enabled>,<cID10,View/Edit
Once>,<cID11,View/Edit Once>,<cID12,View/Edit
Once>,<cID13,View/Edit Once>,
<cID14,View/Edit Once>,<cID15,View/Edit Once>,
<cID16,View/Edit Once>,<cID17,View/Edit Once>,
<cID18,View/Edit Once>,<cID19,’School’ DD>,<cID20,Enabled>,
<cID21,Enabled>,<cID22,View/Edit Once>,<cID23,View/Edit
Once>,<cID24,View/Edit Once>,<cID25,View/Edit Once>,
<cID26,View/Edit Once>,<cID27,View/Edit Once>,
<cID28,Enabled>,<cID29,Enabled>}

Table 3.4. Permissions for the Coach Role of CT2.
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Permissions for Role
Screens/Components
Nurse

Athletic Trainer

Coach

Parent

Home Tab
‘Enter New Student’ BN
‘Retrieve Open Cases’ BN
‘Last Name’ TF
‘First Name’ TF
‘Search’ BN

Show
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled

Show
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled

Show
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled

Show
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled

List Tab
‘Enter New Student’ BN
‘View Student Info’ BN
‘Edit’ BN
‘Add’ BN

Show
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled

Show
Enabled
Enabled
Disabled
Enabled

Show
Enabled
Enabled
Disabled
Enabled

Show
Enabled
Enabled
Disabled
Enabled

Student Tab
‘First Name’ TF
‘Middle Initial’ TF
‘Last Name’ TF
‘Gender’ DD
‘Date of Birth’ SP
‘Date of Past Concussions’ DD
‘State’ DD
‘City/Town/Region’ DD
‘District’ DD
‘School’ DD
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN

Show
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled

Show
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
Enabled
Enabled

Show
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
Enabled
Enabled

Show
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
Enabled
Enabled

Cause Tab
‘Location of Incident’ DD
‘If Sport’ DD
‘Others/Details’ TF
‘Contact Mechanism’ DD
‘Impact Location of Head’ DD
‘Head Gear Usage’ DD
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN

Show
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled

Show
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
Enabled
Enabled

Show
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
Enabled
Enabled

Show
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
Enabled
Enabled

Symptom Tab
‘Mild and Severe Symptoms’ BN
‘Hour(s)’ TF
‘Minute(s)’ TF
‘Second(s)’ TF
‘Were Parents Notified?’ DD
‘Removed From Activity’ DD
‘Removed by’ DD
‘Concussion Assessment Tool’ DD
‘Additional Comments’ TF
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN

Show
Enabled
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled

Show
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
View/Edit once
Enabled
Enabled

Hide
-

Show
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
Disabled
Disabled

Follow Up Tab
‘Lingering Symptoms’ BN
‘If Other, Please Specify’ TF
‘All Symptoms Resolved in’ DD
‘Concussion Diagnosed by’ DD
‘Post Concussive Syndrome’ DD
‘Medical Imaging’ DD
‘Additional Comments’ TF
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN

Show
Enabled
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled

Show
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
Disabled
Disabled

Hide
-

Show
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
Disabled
Disabled

Return Tab
‘Days Absent From School’ TF
‘Schedule/Activity Modification’ DD
‘504 Plan Required’ DD
‘Date of Return to Learn’ SP
‘Date of Return to Full Part.’ SP
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN

Show
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled

Hide
-

Hide
-

Hide
-

Table 3.5. Summary of Permissions for Roles in CT2 mobile app.
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To bring the concepts together on permissions, Table 3.5 contains detailed
permissions on the four user roles (Nurse, AT, Coach, and Parent) against all of the tabs of
the Android version of the CT2 mobile app (Figure 2.7 of Chapter 2). The four roles can be
defined in terms of their ability to access the UI of CT2 screens and the components (text
fields, spinners, date pickers, drop down boxes, and buttons) on a screen-by-screen basis
to establish both the on/off permissions and the data permissions as discussed in the prior
section. This information represents the privileges or permissions that are authorized to
each role, which when assigned to a given user, results in CT2 being customized in terms
of the screens that are displayed and the components that are enabled. In terms of
permissions, the entire screen can either be shown or hidden as a first level of control. For
screens that are shown, the different components can be enabled/disabled (button (BN),
radio button (RB), drop down (DD), checkbox (CB), date picker (DP), and/or spinner (SP))
or can be view, edit, or edit once (text field (TF)) via the on/off (values of enable and
disable) and data (values of view, edit, and edit once) permissions. The edit once data
permission means that the user can input data in the text field one time and, after he/she
saves such data, he/she cannot modify it. The edit once option also applies to buttons, drop
downs, and spinners, since there are cases where the user selects an option from one of
these and it can’t be modified later on by him/her. If a screen is hidden from the role, then
all of the components of the screen are hidden by default.

3.4.

RBAC and MAC API Permission Definitions
The fourth group of definitions for the unified model of access control for mobile

applications involve the way that the API of the mobile application is viewed from a
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security perspective in order to control who can call which service(s) of an API at which
times and the way that each service is viewed from a security perspective. In support of
these definitions, the relevant assertions are in Table 3.6. From a RBAC perspective, we
can partition the services of an API into two broad categories: secure and unsecure services.
Secure services are a subset of the API that require control from a security perspective and
can be assigned to individual roles. Not all of the API services need to be in the secure
category; for example, API services to load drop downs, display web content, etc., may not
need to be secure. The secure API services are the ones that lead to data that is
stored/edited/displayed that must be controlled by role. Unsecure services need not be
assigned and are available to any user. From a MAC perspective, there may be a subset of
the API where the services handle data that has different sensitivity levels (top secret,
secret, confidential, and unclassified) that must be controlled. These are referred to as
labeled services which can be given classifications to enforce the MAC model while
unlabeled services do not need to be classified due to the fact that they do not contain
highly sensitive data. To illustrate the labeling of API services with CLS levels, Table 3.7
lists all of the methods for the CT2 mobile app and their respective CLS levels.
Table 3.6 presents the assertions made related to API permissions in support of
RBAC and MAC. The first two assertions are related to the partitioning of the API to allow
different services to be assigned by role. The next two assertions are related to the
partitioning of the API that assigns classifications to services that are accessed by a user
with a clearance. The last assertion is related to the way that the data sources are accessed
in a mobile application.
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The API of a mobile application can have RBAC permissions defined on the services of the API
in order to control which services can be utilized by which role.
The API of a mobile application can be partitioned into two subsets – those that need to be
securely controlled by role and those that do not.
The API of a mobile application can have MAC permissions (classifications) defined on the
services of the API in order to control which services can be utilized by which user (by
clearance).
The API of a mobile application can be partitioned into two subsets – those that need to be
securely labeled by classifications and those that do not.
The data sources of a mobile application are accessed by the services of an API in which we can
incorporate access control permissions.

Table 3.6. RBAC and MAC API Permissions Assertions.
Classification
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Top Secret
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Top Secret
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Secret
Secret
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Confidential
Top Secret
Secret
Top Secret
Secret

Service Name
GET /user/:userId
GET /userAccounts/account/:userId
GET /useraccounts/:username/:password
GET /userRoleSchool/:userid
POST /userAccounts/add
GET /students/school/:schoolId
GET /student/:studentId
GET /students/:firstName/:lastName
GET /student/guardians/:studentId
POST /students/add
POST /students/update/:studentId
POST /students/guardian/add
POST /students/guardian/update/:guardianId
GET /concussion/:concussionId
GET /concussion/followups/:concussionId
GET /concussion/followup/symptoms/:recordId
GET /concussions/school/:schoolId
GET /concussions/student/:studentId
GET /concussions/user/:userId
GET /concussions/status/:incidentId/:status
POST /concussions/add
POST /concussions/update/:incidentId
POST /concussions/followup/add/:concussionEventId
POST /concussions/followup/update/:followUpId/:referenceId+
GET /concussion/symptoms/:referenceId+

Table 3.7. Classifications for Labeled Services of CT2.
Definitions 17 to 21 formalize the assertions in Table 3.6 and are utilized to control
policies to the API of a mobile application for the Intercepting API Calls option and the
Server Interceptor option of the configurable access control framework.
Defn. 17: The API βMA of a mobile application MA can be partitioned into two disjoint sets
Secure API σβ and Unsecure API µβ in regards to the services that are to be
assigned by role:
• Secure API σβ ⊆ βMA are the services of MA that need to be controlled.
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• Unsecure API µβ ⊆ βMA are the services of MA that do not need to be controlled
where βMA = σβ ∪ µβ and σβ ∩ µβ = ∅ (e.g., µβ = βMA - σβ).
Example: The following services are utilized in the API that provides and stores
data for the CT2 mobile application:
- GET /states – Gets the list of states available
- POST /concussions/followup/add/{concussionEventId} – Inserts follow up

data of a student into the database
The first service stated above does not need to be secured since all of the users of
the mobile application can view the list of states (this is not confidential data), nonetheless,
the second service needs to be secured since only a subset of the roles available are allowed
to add students’ follow up data. Table 3.8 summarizes the secure/unsecure services that are
partitioned from the REST API of CT2.
Secure/Unsecure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure

Service Name
GET /user/:userId
GET /userAccounts/account/:userId
GET /useraccounts/:username/:password
GET /userRoleSchool/:userid
POST /userAccounts/add
GET /students/school/:schoolId
GET /student/:studentId
GET /students/:firstName/:lastName
GET /student/guardians/:studentId
POST /students/add
POST /students/update/:studentId
POST /students/guardian/add
POST /students/guardian/update/:guardianId
GET /concussion/:concussionId
GET /concussion/followups/:concussionId
GET /concussion/followup/symptoms/:recordId
GET /concussions/school/:schoolId
GET /concussions/student/:studentId
GET /concussions/user/:userId
GET /concussions/status/:incidentId/:status
POST /concussions/add
POST /concussions/update/:incidentId
POST /concussions/followup/add/
:concussionEventId
POST /concussions/followup/update/
:followUpId/:referenceId+
GET /concussion/symptoms/:referenceId+

Secure/Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure
Unsecure

Service Name
GET /states
GET /regions/:stateId
GET /districts/:regionId
GET /schools/all
GET /schools/:districtId
GET /schools/:schoolId
GET /menu/assessmentTools
GET /menu/eventLocations
GET /menu/contactMechanisms
GET /menu/medicalimaging
GET /menu/diagnosingroles
GET /menu/headLocation
GET /menu/sports
GET /menu/symptoms
GET /menu/symptoms/within
GET /menu/symptoms/lingering
GET /menu/roles

Table 3.8. Secure/Unsecure Services of CT2.
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Defn. 18: The API βMA of a mobile application MA can be partitioned into two disjoint sets
Labeled API δβ and Unlabeled API θβ in regards to the services that are to be
controlled by classifications:
• Labeled API δβ ⊆ βMA are the services of MA that need to be controlled.
• Unlabeled API θβ ⊆ βMA are the services of MA that do not need to be
controlled.
where βMA = δβ ∪ θβ and δβ ∩ θβ = ∅ (e.g., θβ = βMA - δβ).
Example: The service GET /concussion/followups/:concussionId and the service
POST /concussions/followup/add/:concussionEventId can be placed in both the
secure API set and the labeled API set. Table 3.9 summarizes the
labeled/unlabeled services that are partitioned from the REST API of CT2.
Intercepting calls for unsecure and unlabeled services are automatically passed through
since there are no required security checks. A given mobile application can have a
partitioning of the API into: Secure/Unsecure in support of RBAC, Labeled/Unlabeled in
support of MAC, or both. In the CT2 API, labeled services have classifications as given in
Table 3.7. Note that a labeled service can have a sensitivity level of unclassified. In MAC,
data often moves from level to level, so what is unclassified today, could be confidential
or secret at a later point it time; this could be true of services. Only the labeled services in
Table 3.9 have classifications as was shown in Table 3.7. The unlabeled services in Table
3.9 are all related to the display of menu drop down values, selection values, etc.
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Labeled/Unlabeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled
Labeled

Service Name
GET /user/:userId
GET /userAccounts/account/:userId
GET /useraccounts/:username/:password
GET /userRoleSchool/:userid
POST /userAccounts/add
GET /students/school/:schoolId
GET /student/:studentId
GET /students/:firstName/:lastName
GET /student/guardians/:studentId
POST /students/add
POST /students/update/:studentId
POST /students/guardian/add
POST /students/guardian/update/:guardianId
GET /concussion/:concussionId
GET /concussion/followups/:concussionId
GET /concussion/followup/symptoms/:recordId
GET /concussions/school/:schoolId
GET /concussions/student/:studentId
GET /concussions/user/:userId
GET /concussions/status/:incidentId/:status
POST /concussions/add
POST /concussions/update/:incidentId
POST /concussions/followup/add/
:concussionEventId
POST /concussions/followup/update/
:followUpId/:referenceId+
GET /concussion/symptoms/:referenceId+

Labeled/Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled
Unlabeled

Service Name
GET /states
GET /regions/:stateId
GET /districts/:regionId
GET /schools/all
GET /schools/:districtId
GET /schools/:schoolId
GET /menu/assessmentTools
GET /menu/eventLocations
GET /menu/contactMechanisms
GET /menu/medicalimaging
GET /menu/diagnosingroles
GET /menu/headLocation
GET /menu/sports
GET /menu/symptoms
GET /menu/symptoms/within
GET /menu/symptoms/lingering
GET /menu/roles

Table 3.9. Labeled/Unlabeled Services of CT2.
Defn. 19: Secure API Role Permissions: Each role r can be assigned Secure API role
permissions φ = {ss1, ss2, ... , ssj} where each ssj ∈ σβ represents a subset of the
secure services in the Secure API σβ (Defn. 17) that denote those services that
can be invoked by a user playing role r.
Example: In Table 3.8, φ corresponds to all of the Secure services on the left
side. In the CT2 mobile application a user with the role of Nurse has access to all
of the Secure services as shown in Table 3.8.
Defn. 20: Labeled API Classification Permissions: Each user u with a clearance can be
assigned Labeled API classification permissions ψ = {ls1, ls2, ... , lsj} where each
lsj ∈ δβ represents a subset of labeled services in the Labeled API δβ (Defn. 18)
that denote those services that can be invoked by a user u playing clearance CLRi
under the read and write property conditions for that user.
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Example: In Table 3.9, ψ corresponds to all of the Labeled services on the left
side. From the CT2 mobile app, recall the four users: UCT2 = { u1=<uID1, Karen,
TS, SS-r, L*-w >, u2=< uID2, Carmen, C, S*-r, S*-w >, u3=< uID3, Joe, C, SS-r,
S*-w>, u4=< uID4, Peter, S, SS-r, S*-w > }. Karen with TS CLR has read
property SS-r and write property L*-w (see Defn. 8v2) and as a result can access
all read services as governed by SS-r (TS, S, C, and U) and all write services as
governed by L*-w (TS) (see Defn. 10). Carmen with C CLR has read property,
S*-r and write property S*w (see Defn. 8v2) and as a result can access all read
services as governed by S*-r (only C) and all write services as governed by S*w (only C) (see Defn. 10). The other two users (Joe and Peter) at S CLR can
access all read services as governed by SS-r (S, C and U) and all write services
as governed by S*-w (only C) (see Defn. 10).
Given Defns. 19 and 20, a version 2 of Defn. 16 can be defined to include secure API role
permissions for roles and Defn. 21 can be defined for user labeled API classification
permissions for users.
Defn. 16 v2: A role, r ∈ RMA, is assigned a set of role permissions, rp = < γ, χ , λ, φ> for:
a subset m ≤ n screens of SS in MA where γ = <sp1,…, spm> are the m screen
permissions (Defn. 13) assigned to the role r, χ = < cp1, … , cpj > are the j
component permissions (Defn. 14) for all m screens, and λ = < si1, … , siq >
are the screen interactions (Defn. 15) for non-tabbed UIs; and φ = {ss1, ss2, ...
,ssj}

where each ssj ∈

σβ are

the Secure API role permissions (Defn. 19)

assigned to the role r. Note that if γ is null then χ and λ must also be null. If γ
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is not null, then either χ or λ can be null. Note that if φ is null then there are
no Secure API role permissions. Other combinations are possible.
Example: For the role permissions, rp = < γ, χ, λ, φ>, < γ, χ, λ> corresponds
to all of the permissions defined in Table 3.5, while φ corresponds to the
secure services in Table 3.8.
Defn. 21: A user, u ∈ UMA, is assigned a set of user permissions, up = <ψ> where ψ =
{ls1, ls2, ... , lsj} and each lsj ∈ δβ are the Labeled API classification permissions
(Defn. 20) assigned to the user u.
Example: For the user permissions, up = <ψ>, ψ corresponds to the labeled
services in Table 3.9.
Figure 3.1 conceptualizes the permissions associated with services. The
secure/unsecure services are assigned by role with the user acquiring these services when
they choose a role for a given session (a user may have multiple roles but is limited to one
role per mobile application session). This allows RBAC to be used to control services
independent of MAC. The labeled/unlabeled services are accessible based on a user’s
clearance that dominates the classification of the services under the properties (simple
security, liberal-*, etc.). This allows MAC to control services independent of RBAC. In
addition, we can control services with both RBAC and MAC. This can be achieved by
classifying the services of an API as secure/unsecure in support of RBAC and then
extending security by classifying secure services even further as labeled/unlabeled services
in support of MAC. Note that secure services can be classified as either labeled/unlabeled
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but unsecured services can only be classified as unlabeled services (dashed arrows shown
in Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. Permissions for API Services.

3.5.

DAC Model Definitions
Discretionary access control and associated delegation (Department of Defense,

1985; Sandhu & Samarati, 1994) involves the ability of a user (the delegator) to delegate
his responsibilities to another user (the delegatee) for a period of time. For the purposes of
this dissertation, in support for discretionary access control, we are limiting our approach
to user-directed delegation where the user decides when and what to delegate to another
user. The initial model capabilities for DAC in our model has a two-fold focus in order to
delegate permissions defined on the user interface by role and on the secure and labeled
services by role and user. Specifically, for RBAC, we control the delegation of permissions
on screen, component, and screen interactions (Defns. 13, 14, and 15, respectively) for a
role assigned to a user that can be delegated to another user. In this case, the user delegates
his/her role to another user and as a result all of the screen, component, and interaction
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permissions associated with that role are delegated which is termed Full RBAC UI
Delegation. For RBAC, we also control the delegation of the secure API role permissions
assigned to a user by role where a subset of the secure services has been assigned to each
role. A user can delegate all of his/her assigned secure services to another user by
delegating the role to that user which is called Full RBAC Service Delegation. In addition,
a user has the option to delegate a subset of his/her assigned secure services to another user
which is called Partial RBAC Service Delegation. In an analogous manner, for MAC we
control the delegation of the labeled API classification permissions assigned to a user by
clearance where a subset of the labeled services has been assigned to each role. A user can
delegate all of his/her assigned labeled services to another user by delegating to that user
which also passes along the clearance which is called Full MAC Service Delegation. In
addition, a user could delegate a subset of his assigned labeled services to another user
which is called Partial MAC Service Delegation. In all three delegation possibilities, we
support the concepts of delegation authority and pass on delegation of authority.
Delegation authority states that a security officer can delegate the authority to delegate to
another user. In our case, a user can delegate his/her role or clearance permissions to
another user but cannot delegate the authority to delegate those permissions further to
another user. In order to delegate further, pass-on delegation authority can be defined
which allows a user to delegate the delegation authority along with the delegation of a role
or a clearance to a user. In turn, that delegated user can delegate those permissions to
another user. The remainder of the section on the DAC model capabilities for mobile
computing we utilize concepts from (Liebrand et al., 2003) on delegation.
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In support of this section, the fifth and final group of definitions for the unified
model of access control for mobile applications involve the way that Discretionary Access
Control (DAC) can be incorporated in a mobile application in order to extend the security
provided with RBAC and/or MAC definitions in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. In support of
these definitions, the relevant assertions are in Table 3.10.
A user with an assigned role and/or clearance can delegate his/her role (in support of RBAC)
and/or clearance (in support of MAC) at a given time/situation in support of DAC.
Users with the ability to delegate can pass on their allowed actions to delegable users.
A delegable user can pass his/her delegated permissions further if he/she has authority to do so.

Table 3.10. DAC Assertions.
Defn. 22: An original user, ou, is a user that owns a given role.
Defn. 23: An original role, or, is the role delegated by an original user ou.
Defn. 24: A delegated user, du, is a user to who a role will be delegated.
Defn. 25: A delegated role, dr, is the role delegated to the delegated user du.
Defn. 26: Delegation Authority (DA): A security officer determines which users in an
UMA can delegate their permissions to other users in the UMA.
Defn. 27: Pass On Delegation Authority (PODA) is a Boolean value assigned to a user
which determines if he/she can delegate his/her permissions to another user
(poda = true) or not (poda = false).
Example: Karen in the prior example can be an original user, ou, with the original
role, or, nurse. If a school needs substitute nurse Lois to cover for Karen, Karen
could delegate her original role or to Lois as the delegated user du.
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As previously discussed in Section 3.3, there are the permissions associated with
the screens, components, and screen interactions of the UI of a MA. From an RBAC
perspective, a particular user might have access by role to certain screens (screen can be
hidden from user) and components of screens with the ability to view (component is
enabled), edit, edit once, or hide (component is disabled). In this case, view allows a user
to view the component, edit allows a user to modify the contents of the component
(applicable to text fields, text boxes, etc.), edit once allows a user to add data through the
means of a component but after the data is saved the component cannot be edited
(component becomes disabled), and hide conceals the component from the user so that
he/she can’t have access to such. The following example is presented to demonstrate the
way that DAC can be utilized within the UI screens and components. In CT2, nurse Karen
could delegate all of her UI permissions via Table 3.5 to nurse Lois that is the substitute
nurse that day, but decides not to allow Lois to pass on that delegation. In this case, we
delegate the entire role's UI permissions from the original user Karen to the delegated user
Lois, with the exception of PODA. The following definition supports DAC in the UI of a
MA:
Defn. 28: A Full RBAC UI (FRUI) Delegation dFRUI = < ou, or, du, dr, < γ, χ , λ >, poda,

timePeriod > delegates all UI permissions < γ, χ , λ > ∈ rp (screens, component,
and screen interactions – Defn. 16v2) from an original user, ou, with an original
role, or, to a delegated user du with a dr = or with the potential to pass on (poda
is true or false) and timePeriod = {startTime, endTime} which represents the
period of time in which the du has access to the delegated permissions of dr.
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Example: The original user ou Karen < uID1, Karen, TS, SS-r, L*-w > seeks to
delegate her original role or nurse to the delegated user du Lois, a substitute
school nurse for one day: del = < uID1, rID3, uID5, rID3, < γ, χ, λ >, false, {201707-31T09:00:00+00:00, 2017-12-15T07:00:00+00:00} >. Note that < γ, χ, λ >
is as defined in the Nurse column in Table 3.5.
In the case of API permissions, there are two levels of delegations we define to
support DAC. The first level involves full and partial RBAC services delegation while the
second level involves full and partial MAC services delegation. Note that the services we
focus on delegating to du are those that are either secure or labeled services since all of the
users of a MA have access to unsecure/unlabeled services. For RBAC, when we delegate
the role from the original user to the delegated user, all or a subset of the authorized secure
services are delegated for the given role to the new user. Specifically: DAC delegates all
secure services authorized to a user/role for RBAC delegation from original to delegated
user in Full RBAC Services delegation and delegates a subset of secure services in Partial
RBAC Services delegation:
Defn. 29: A Full RBAC Services (FRS) Delegation dFRS = < ou, or, du, dr, φ, poda,

timePeriod > delegates all of the assigned secure service permissions φ ∈ rp
(Defn. 16v2) from an original user, ou, with an original role, or, to a delegated
user, du, with a dr = or with the potential to pass on (poda is true or false), and

timePeriod = {startTime, endTime} which represents the period of time in which
the du has access to the delegated permissions.
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Example: The original user ou Karen < uID1, Karen, TS, SS-r, L*-w > seeks to
delegate original role or nurse and all of the secure assigned services of her Nurse
role the delegated user du Lois, a substitute school nurse for one day: del = <

uID1, rID3, uID5, rID3, φ, false, {2017-07-31T09:00:00+00:00, 2017-1215T07:00:00+00:00} >. Note that φ are the labeled services in Table 3.9.
Defn. 30: A Partial RBAC Services (PRS) Delegation dPRS = < ou, or, du, dr, φ’, poda,

timePeriod > delegates a subset of the assigned secure service permissions φ’ ∈
rp and φ’ ⊆ φ (Defn. 16v2) from an original user, ou, with an original role, or, to
a delegated user, du, with a dr = or with the potential to pass on (poda is true or
false) and timePeriod = {startTime, endTime} which represents the period of time
in which the du has access to the delegated permissions.
Example: The original user ou Karen < uID1, Karen, TS, SS-r, L*-w > seeks to
delegate original role or nurse and only a subset of the secure services assigned
to her Nurse role the delegated user du Lois, a substitute school nurse for one day
to only log on and be able to read (GET services) information on students (first
nine secure services on left portion of Table 3.8): del = < uID1, rID3, uID5, rID3, φ’,
false, {2017-07-31T09:00:00+00:00, 2017-12-15T07:00:00+00:00} >, where
φ’=

{GET/user/:userid,

…

,

GET

/userRoleSchool/:userid,

POST

/userAccounts/:add, … , GET /student/guardians/:studentID}.
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For MAC, if we choose to delegate, then we are delegating a combination of the clearance
of the user and the read and write properties for the user; this allows the delegated user to
access the appropriate labeled services by classification. In Full MAC Services Delegation,
a user delegates all of labeled services authorized to a user/CLR/read-write properties for
MAC delegation from original to delegated user in Full MAC Services Delegation. In
Partial MAC Services Delegation, a user delegates his read-write properties and a CLR
that is less secure that his current level, thereby automatically resulting in a subset of
methods that is at most the same of the original clearance level but is more often less.
Defn. 31: A Full MAC Services (FMS) Delegation dFMS = < ou, oclr, oprops, du, dclr, dprops,
Ω, poda, timePeriod > delegates all of the assigned labeled service permissions Ω
∈ up (Defn. 21) from an original user, ou, with an original clearance, oclr, and
original read/write properties, oprops, to a delegated user du with a delegated
clearance dclr = oclr and delegated read/write properties, dprops = oprops with the
potential to pass on (poda is true or false) and timePeriod = {startTime, endTime}
represents the period of time in which the du has access to the delegated
permissions.
Example: The original user ou Karen < uID1, Karen, TS, SS-r, L*-w > seeks to
delegate her MAC privileges (CLR and read/write properties) and all of the
labeled services from Table 3.9 to the delegated user du Lois, a substitute school
nurse for one day: del = < uID1, TS, SS-r, L*-w, uID5, TS, SS-r, L*-w, Ω, false,
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{2017-07-31T09:00:00+00:00, 2017-12-15T07:00:00+00:00} >. Note that Ω
are the labeled services in Table 3.9.
Defn. 32: A Partial MAC Services (PMS) Delegation dPMS = < ou, oclr, oprops, du, dclr,

dprops, Ω’, poda, timePeriod > delegates a subset of the assigned labeled service
permissions Ω’ up ⊆ Ω and Ω’ ∈ up (Defn. 21) from an original user, ou, with an
original clearance, oclr, and original read/write properties, oprops, to a delegated
user du with a delegated clearance dclr = oclr and delegated read/write properties,

dprops = oprops with the potential to pass on (poda is true or false) and timePeriod
= {startTime, endTime} represents the period of time in which the du has access
to the delegated permissions.
Example: The original user ou Karen < uID1, Karen, TS, SS-r, L*-w > seeks to
delegate her MAC privileges (CLR and read/write properties) and only the GET
services from Table 3.9 to the delegated user du Lois, a substitute school nurse
for one day: del = < uID1, TS, SS-r, L*-w, uID5, C, SS-r, L*-w, Ω’, false, {201707-31T09:00:00+00:00, 2017-12-15T07:00:00+00:00} >, where Ω’ = { GET
/user/:userid,

GET

/userAccounts/account/:userid,

…

,

GET

/concussion/symptoms/:referenceID + }.
Defn. 33: The Delegation Collection, DC= <FRUI, FRS, PRS, FMS, PMS> for a given
mobile application, MA, are five sets (possible null) of active delegations for
Full RBAC UI, Full RBAC Services, Partial RBAC Services, Full MAC

74

Services, and Partial MAC Services (Defns. 28-32, respectively), where each set
contains elements di where i ∈ {FRUI, FRS, PRS, FMS, PMS}.

Figure 3.2. DAC Permissions.
Figure 3.2 depicts a summary of Defns. 22-33. Basically, a delegation authority
(top box of Figure 3.2) is in charge of assigning which users are allowed to delegate their
permissions (second box of Figure 3.2), which are the original users (delegators). Note that
for our model, we assume that a delegation authority has already established the delegation
permissions and therefore do not go into detail about this process and other security policy
definition and administration processes. Depending on which permissions the system has
enforced (UI, API), a delegator can either delegate a full set of his/her UI permissions (first
box shown in the middle vertical box of Figure 3.2), a full or partial set of his/her RBAC
API permissions (second and third boxes shown in the middle vertical box of Figure 3.2),
and/or a full or partial set of his/her MAC API permissions (last two boxes shown in the
middle vertical box of Figure 3.2) to a delegated user (last box of Figure 3.2). In addition,
the delegator can choose whether he/she wants to grant their role/clearance to the delegated
user (delegatee) or if they want to grant them a role/clearance with less privileges
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(delegated role/clearance) and, he/she can choose the period of time the delegatee has
access to the delegated permissions. Finally, a delegatee can pass their delegated
permissions to another delegatee if he/she has pass on delegation value set as true (fourth
box of Figure 3.2).

3.6.

Combining Access Control Models and Options
In this section, we discuss the different ways in which the access control models

(RBAC, MAC, and DAC), the mobile application (UI, API, and data sources), and the
options (Direct UI Modifications, Intercepting API Calls, and Server Interceptor API) of
the unified model of access control for mobile applications can be combined in meaningful
ways in order to define a specific type of security on a mobile-app-by-mobile-app basis.
This supports contribution C: Dynamic Combination of Access Control Models and
Configuration Options. The different combinations of (RBAC, MAC, and DAC) vs. (UI,
API, and Data Sources) vs. (Direct UI Modifications, Intercepting API Calls, and Server
Interceptor API) that are chosen by a security engineer are based on the type of security
that a subject is seeking to attain and may be dictated by whether the source code of the
mobile app, API, and/or data source is available. Combinations are shown in Table 3.11.
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Combination
C1
C2
C3

Access Control
Model(s)
RBAC
RBAC, DAC
RBAC

C4

MAC

C5

RBAC, MAC

C6

RBAC, DAC

C7

MAC, DAC

C8
C9
C10
C11
C12
C13
C14
C15
C16
C17
C18
C19
C20
C21
C22

RBAC
MAC
RBAC, MAC
RBAC, DAC
MAC, DAC
RBAC
RBAC, MAC
RBAC, DAC
RBAC, MAC, DAC
RBAC
MAC
RBAC, MAC
RBAC, DAC
MAC, DAC
RBAC, MAC, DAC

Mobile App

Options

UI

Direct UI Modifications*

API

Intercepting API Calls

Data Source

Server Interceptor API

UI, API

Direct UI Modifications*,
Intercepting API Calls

API,
Data Source

Intercepting API Calls,
Server Interceptor API

Table 3.11. Combinations of Access Control Configurations.
Note that the ‘*’ after Direct UI Modifications signifies that code level changes may be
required. To illustrate, we enumerate some combinations of access control for different
applications:
•

Combination C1: A mobile application for the pharmacy as previously described
would utilize a RBAC approach to represent capabilities of licensed pharmacist and
pharmacy technician roles. The mobile application had different screens for
different roles – all screens for the licensed pharmacist and only screens 1, 2, and 4
for the technician. This would necessitate the use of the Direct UI Modifications
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option to set permissions on which screen is available to which role (see Defn. 13).
In addition, for screens 1, 2, and 4 of the technician, all of these screens would be
further constrained so that all of the text fields are read only (see Defn. 14.b).
•

Combination C22: A mobile application for patient data to be used by medical
professionals would utilize a combination of access control: RBAC to define
different roles for internists, family practitioners, physiatrists, psychologists, etc.;
MAC to allow the use of top-secret sensitivity level for all mental health data, secret
for the majority of medical data, confidential for certain patient info, and
unclassified for demographics/contact info; and DAC to allow for the delegation
from a physician to the on-call physician for nights and weekends. There would be
no screen permissions in this case, since the control is on data delivered to the
mobile application. In this case, to control access to data for RBAC and MAC, the
API is partitioned into secure and unsecure APIs (see Defn. 17) while all services
for patient data is labeled (see Defn. 18) to control the data returned to users. The
Intercepting API option would support RBAC, MAC, and DAC in terms of API
control, while the Server Interceptor option may be necessary to filter the mental
health data from the data source.

3.7.

Relational Database Design for the Unified Security Model
This section presents a relational database design to store the content unified

security model as presented in Sections 3.1 to 3.5 realized via an entity-relationship
diagram as shown in Figure 3.3. The diagram in Figure 3.3 contains 44 entities and to assist
the discussion in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, Table 3.12 contains a list of all 44 entities including:
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o Entity Name: Name of the entity.
o Table Content: Tuples stored in the entity.
o Primary Related Entities: Other related entities.
o Primary Definition(s): A mapping to the one or two primary definitions of the
unified security model corresponding to the entity.
o Secondary Definition(s): A mapping to the secondary definitions of the unified
security model corresponding to the entity.
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, when discussing the three different options, Direct UI
Modifications, Intercepting API Calls, and Server Interceptor API, respectively, a subset
of the ER diagram in Figure 3.3 is presented and discussed.
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Figure 3.3. Entity-Relationship Diagram for Unified Security Model.
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Table 3.12. Entities and Explanations.

3.8.

Related Work on Access Control in Mobile Computing
In this section, we compare and contrast the unified model of access control for

mobile applications from Sections 3.1 to 3.5 to other related work that utilizes and extends
access control models to provide secure authorization in mobile computing. To begin, the
work of (Abdunabi, Sun, & Ray, 2014) proposed a spatio-temporal access control
framework to enforce spatio-temporal policies in mobile applications. Basically, the
authors utilized the RBAC model as a basis for their approach and then extended this to
provide the spatio-temporal feature. To apply the proposed approach in a mobile
application, there are three modules that are needed: one that needs to be installed in the
mobile device and the other two are placed server-side. One drawback in this approach is
the fact that users need to install a module on their mobile devices in order to utilize the
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proposed approach, which is similar to our drawback from code-level changes in the
mobile app for the Direct UI Modifications option. In our Intercepting API Calls and Server
Interceptor options, users do not need to modify their mobile devices since we are enforcing
access control policies server-side. Another approach, which involves utilizing user
attributes to provide access control for business processes in mobile computing, consists
of utilizing RBAC in combination of context-aware access control mechanisms (ScheferWenzl & Strembeck, 2013). Basically, the approach identifies the tasks that are available
in a system, assigns roles to the users of that system and, establishes which roles have
permissions of which tasks and under what context. Our approach can augment their work
by including additional RBAC, MAC, and DAC capabilities. A third approach (SantosPereira et al., 2012) focuses on securing healthcare data by proposing an architecture that
combines the RBAC model with personal/technical characteristics as well as with
capabilities of a smartphone in order to deliver patients a way to exercise safe discretionary
online access permissions on their EHR. This approach utilizes the mobile device as a token
in order to verify a user’s identity and give him/her access to the EHR data he/she has
access to manage. However, this approach is not for mobile applications but to use with a
web-browser. While our approach is targeted at native mobile applications for the Android
and iOS platforms, the Intercepting API Call option could be utilized between the web app
and the mobile app API while the Server Interceptor API option could be utilized between
the mobile app API and the server-side API. A fourth approach (Fadhel et al., 2016)
proposed a model that extends RBAC to generate RBAC conceptual policies. Nevertheless,
the aforementioned effort does not provide details of which specific application domains
the approach could support.
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The next two related efforts, address the way that the mobile application itself (UI,
API, Server/Database) is impacted depending on the role that a user assumes for a
particular mobile application session or relevant MAC capabilities. The first effort utilizes
MAC to provide security in mobile computing (Bugiel, Heuser, & Sadeghi, 2013) by
proposing and implementing FlaskDroid, a security architecture that provides mandatory
access control in both middleware and kernel layers of Android OS. The purpose of this
work is to apply fine-grained MAC security policies to Android OS services such as
LocationManager and Audio Services. The end result is that the applications that form part
of the device conforms to these finer-grained security policies rather than utilizing the ones
the device provides. Our approach contrasts to their work since we do not rely on modifying
the default services of a mobile OS and it is mobile application-specific. The second effort
that involves modifying the Android OS consists of applying context-based access control
restrictions in mobile devices (Shebaro, Oluwatimi, & Bertino, 2015). The intent is to allow
a user of a mobile device to create a security policy that establishes which
resources/services of his/her mobile device their installed mobile applications should have
access to. This is occurring at a much higher level of granularity (i.e., entire mobile
application) than our approach which is focusing on specific services of APIs. Both of these
efforts are targeted towards modifying Android OS in order to provide finer-grained
security for the permissions that mobile devices offer. They operate at a much higher
conceptual level than our work which focuses on applying access control security policies
to individual mobile applications; their work is on changing device permissions and this
determines what mobile applications can access as a whole.
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In terms of DAC, to our understanding, there are no approaches that directly
implement the access control mechanism in a mobile computing setting. Nevertheless,
there are several works that state that DAC mechanisms can be incorporated in a system
through the means of RBAC (Hansen & Oleshchuk, 2003; Baracaldo & Joshi, 2013) by
referring to (Osborn, Sandhu, & Munawer, 2000). However, these proposed approaches
focus on extending RBAC and only mention that such access control model can be
configured to enforce mandatory and discretionary access control mechanisms. In other
words, they do not provide details on the way that MAC or DAC can be applied in an
RBAC setting. On another note, Android OS uses the traditional Linux Discretionary
Access Control to manage filesystem access (Morris, 2013). This is different to our
approach since it does not enforce this mechanism on the data that is handled within a
mobile application but on the files that a user creates/handles in the storage of the mobile
device itself.
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Chapter 4
Direct UI Modifications Option
This chapter reviews the security policy definition and generation process for the
screens, components, and interactions of the user interface in order to explore and explain
the Direct UI Modifications option (see Section 1.4 and Figure 1.3 again) to change the
look-and-feel of the UI according to RBAC and/or DAC permissions. The specific
objective is to allow the capabilities of the mobile application’s UI to be dynamically
customized based on a user’s role and delegation permissions. This both permits a user by
role to perform needed tasks using the mobile application while simultaneously limiting
and/or disabling and/or removing capabilities and features that are not allowed at certain
times or in certain situations to that user/role combination. In our approach, the components
of a mobile application UI will be treated as “objects” to which we can apply access control
mechanisms to. The main focus of this chapter is to present and discuss an approach for
role-based access control (RBAC) with optional delegation (DAC) for the UI of mobile
applications that allows permissions established by the information owner to be defined for
other authorized users by role, thereby allowing the mobile application to be dynamically
customized to deliver only authorized information, and defined view and/or modify
capabilities. To demonstrate the feasibility of our work, we utilize the CT2 mHealth
application (see Section 2.7 of Chapter 2).
The chapter provides a detailed discussion of the Direct UI Modifications option in
5 sections. Section 4.1 briefly reviews a subset of the model and permissions from Chapter
3 for the mobile app UI that define which screens and components can be
viewed/edited/viewed once/enabled/hidden in order to customize the look-and-feel of the
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UI by role. Section 4.2 reviews a subset of the ER diagram for the unified security model
in Figure 3.3 of Section 3.7, focusing on the subset of the unified model involving UI,
screens, components, screen interactions, roles, and optional delegation in support of the
Direct UI Modifications option. The section also provides an example on the way that the
CT2 mobile app will be displayed to users depending on their role. Section 4.3 explains the
programmatic changes that must be made to the mobile application itself to allow for the
screens and their components to be customized. Section 4.4 provides a guide that states
which programmatic changes need to be done in a mobile app in order to apply the Direct
UI Modifications option. Finally, Section 4.5 presents related work on the customization
of user interfaces via adaptive UIs and the usage of RBAC.

4.1.

Reviewing the Unified Model and Permissions
In this section, we discuss the features and characteristics of the UI of a mobile

application using the unified model from Chapter 3 in order to define what is viewable
and/or modifiable on a role-by-role basis. Recall that, a mobile application’s user interface
will be comprised of a series of inter-connected screens. Each screen will have a set of
different components that could have: information that is displayed (cannot be changed);
information that can be entered by a user (text fields, drop downs where one value is
chosen; checkboxes where multiple values are chosen, etc.); and, buttons that are utilized
to effect the state of the application (save, cancel, next, previous, etc.). Users will be
authorized to access a subset of the screens (that may occur in a particular sequence) with
defined permissions for the various components that comprise each screen defining access
(view/modify) depending on role. For a given mobile application with these capabilities,
the RBAC approach that we present in this chapter can enable/disable the components
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based on a user’s role. In the concussion app, a user with a Nurse role has access to the full
capabilities of the CT2 mHealth application, while other users with different roles would
be limited; this was illustrated in the examples for screen, components, and screen
interactions definitions in Chapter 3. These different users with different roles receive a
dynamically customized version of the CT2 mHealth application. The advantage of this is
that user permissions can be configured based on role; therefore, the application does not
need to be configured for each individual user, but will operate by role against the user
instance (e.g., nurse or athletic trainer) that has been authorized.
Given this overview, this chapter explores the way that permissions on screens,
components, and screen interactions (see Defns. 13, 14, and 15, respectively, in Section
3.3 of Chapter 3) can be defined and enforced. A mobile application’s UI will be comprised
of a series of inter-connected screens where each screen contains a portion of the
functionality (Defns. 2 and 5). Each screen of the UI will have a set of different components
(Defns. 3 and 4) consisting of information that is displayed (cannot be changed) and
information that can be entered by a user including: text field (TF), button (BN), drop down
(DD), checkboxes (CB), radio buttons (RB), spinner (SP), date picker (DP), etc. A mobile
application can have one or more screens and screens can have one or more of the
aforementioned components.
Utilizing these definitions as a basis, users will be authorized by role to access a
subset of the screens (screen permissions in Defn. 13) with defined permissions for each
screen in order to limit and control the access to each screen’s components, where our
approach can enable/disable the components based on a user’s role (component
permissions in Defn. 14). In addition, the interactions of screens (flow from one screen to
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another) can be controlled by a user’s role (screen interaction permissions in Defn. 15). As
result, a user as owner by his/her role could have full access to the application, say Karen
with Nurse role has access to all of the screens, while a user with a parent role is limited to
the ‘List’, ‘Home’, ‘Student’, ‘Cause’, and ‘Symptoms’ screens of the iOS CT2 app in
Figure 2.8. The end result is the ability to control which components of the application’s
UI users can have access to (view/edit) depending on their role. The advantage of this is
that user permissions can be configured based on his/her role; therefore, the application
does not need to be configured for each individual user, but will operate by role against the
user instance that has been authorized.
Permissions, as presented in Section 3.3, can be defined against a generalized
structure of a mobile application’s UI screens and their components to customize which
screens and their respective components are available in the mobile application, depending
on the role a user assumes. The screens and the components are the objects that will be
authorized as screen, component (text fields, dropdown box, date picker, radio buttons,
check boxes, buttons), and screen interaction permissions to a particular role. This
essentially defines what a role can and cannot do in terms of screen, component, and screen
interaction permissions and determines whether the user with such role can access and/or
view a certain component. As an example, the screens shown in Figure 4.1 from CT2 (see
Figure 2.8) has the ‘Student’ screen (left) customized on the right side of Figure 4.1 where
all of the fields are disabled. In this case, the user with the role would be able to view
information but would not be able to make any changes to the aforementioned disabled
components. The permissions that are defined on the components of a screen are placed in
two main categories: on/off permissions that are for components that can be ‘on’ (enabled)
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or ‘off’ (disabled); and, data permissions that are for components that can be ‘view’, ‘edit’,
or ‘edit once’. On/Off permissions are defined for the different components: button (BN),
radio buttons (RB), drop down (DD), checkboxes (CB), date picker (DP), spinner (SP),
and text fields (TF), while data permissions are defined for text fields (TF). A text field has
to be On in order for view/edit/edit once to be defined. As a further example, the three
screens shown in Figure 4.2 show full access to all components (first screen) and then the
edit button is restricted by disabling the button (second screen) or by hiding the button
(third screen).

Figure 4.1. A Screen with Components (left) that are Customized (right) in CT2.

89

Figure 4.2. A Screen with the Edit button enabled (screen 1), disabled (screen 2), and
hidden (screen 3).
To utilize as an example, the Nurse role permissions as given in Table 3.5 have
been augmented with a new Sub_Nurse role as shown in Table 4.1. The Sub_Nurse role is
also a role that could be held by a nurse user such as Karen, and is intended to be for those
nurses that are substituting at the school for one day. As a result, the role set for CT2 now
contains: RCT2 = {r1 = <rID1, AT>, r2 = <rID2 , Coach>, r3 = <rID3 , Nurse>, r4 = <rID4 , Parent>,
r5 = <rID5 , Sub_Nurse>} (see Defn. 7 in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 again) and a new user role
authorization can be added for Karen, ura = <uID1, rID5>, which means that Karen can play
either the Nurse or Sub_Nurse role, and is able to delegate both roles. The permissions for
the Sub_Nurse role are given in Table 4.1; notice that the role is no longer allowed to
modify any information (only View) and has limited buttons enabled. An example of the
way that the ‘Student’ screen would look like to a user with a Sub_Nurse role is depicted
on the right screen in Figure 4.1.
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Screens/Components
Home Tab
‘Enter New Student’ BN
‘Retrieve Open Cases’ BN
‘Last Name’ TF
‘First Name’ TF
‘Search’ BN
List Tab
‘Enter New Student’ BN
‘View Student Info’ BN
‘Edit’ BN
‘Add’ BN
Student Tab
‘First Name’ TF
‘Middle Initial’ TF
‘Last Name’ TF
‘Gender’ DD
‘Date of Birth’ SP
‘Date of Past Concussions’ DD
‘State’ DD
‘City/Town/Region’ DD
‘District’ DD
‘School’ DD
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN
Cause Tab
‘Location of Incident’ DD
‘If Sport’ DD
‘Others/Details’ TF
‘Contact Mechanism’ DD
‘Impact Location of Head’ DD
‘Head Gear Usage’ DD
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN
Symptom Tab
‘Mild and Severe Symptoms’ BN
‘Hour(s)’ TF
‘Minute(s)’ TF
‘Second(s)’ TF
‘Were Parents Notified?’ DD
‘Removed From Activity’ DD
‘Removed by’ DD
‘Concussion Assessment Tool’ DD
‘Additional Comments’ TF
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN
Follow Up Tab
‘Lingering Symptoms’ BN
‘If Other, Please Specify’ TF
‘All Symptoms Resolved in’ DD
‘Concussion Diagnosed by’ DD
‘Post Concussive Syndrome’ DD
‘Medical Imaging’ DD
‘Additional Comments’ TF
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN
Return Tab
‘Days Absent From School’ TF
‘Schedule/Activity Modification’ DD
‘504 Plan Required’ DD
‘Date of Return to Learn’ SP
‘Date of Return to Full Part.’ SP
‘Save’ BN
‘Cancel’ BN

Nurse
Show
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled
Show
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Show
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Show
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Show
Enabled
View/Edit
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Show
Enabled
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Show
View/Edit
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled

Sub_Nurse
Show
Enabled
Enabled
View/Edit
View/Edit
Enabled
Show
Enabled
Enabled
Disabled
Disabled
Show
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
Disabled
Disabled
Show
View
View
View
View
View
View
Disabled
Disabled
Show
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
Disabled
Disabled
Show
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
Disabled
Disabled
Hide
View
View
View
View
View
Disabled
Disabled

Table 4.1. Screen and Component Permissions for Nurse and Sub_Nurse roles.

4.2.

ER Diagram Subset for Unified Model
This section discusses a subset of the entity relationship diagram of Figure 3.3 in

Section 3.7 of Chapter 3 that realizes the subset of the unified security model from Sections
3.1 to 3.5 that supports the Direct UI Modifications option. To support the security
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enforcement generation process for the Direct UI Modifications option, a subset of Figure
3.3 is shown in Figure 4.3 and is able to represent screen, component, and screen interaction
permissions (see Defns. 13, 14, 15, and 16 in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3), for each role (see
Defns. 6 and 7 in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3). As needed, revisit Table 3.11 for an explanation
of each entity and its relationship to other entities and the unified security model. Figure
4.3 represents the generalized structure of the mobile application (via the entities
mobile_apps, screens, screen_components) and the permissions (via the entities
users, roles, user_roles, delegation_permissions, screen_permissions,
component_permissions, and screen_interactions).

In support of RBAC and as shown in Figure 4.3, the mobile_apps entity contains
the name and unique identifier of the mobile app, and the users entity contains the name
and identity of all users. Next, the roles entity contains the name of the roles (role_name
field in the roles entity shown in Figure 4.3) that are available as well as a unique
role_id assigned to each one of these. To keep track of the roles for each user, the
user_roles entity is utilized; remember a user can have multiple roles but be restricted

to a single role per session. This role_id is utilized to determine if a role has access to a
specific screen of a UI, to a component in that UI screen, and the sequence of screens it is
allowed to access. If a role by role_id has access to a specific screen (the role is within
the subset of roles allowed to access the screen), then the second step of the permission
process would be to define components of the screen that such role can access; otherwise,
if role_id is not assigned to a screen, the screen and its components are hidden.
In this model, users can only have one role per session, and roles can have one or
more permissions. In order to capture permissions, the entities screen_permissions,
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screen_components_permissions, and screen_interactions are utilized,

where: the screen_permissions entity supports the definition of the permission for a
role with respect to the entire screen (Defn. 13 in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3), the
component_permissions entity supports the definition of the permissions for a role

with respect to the components of a screen (Defn. 14 in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3), and the
screen_interactions entity supports the definition of the permissions for a role with

respect of allowable screen sequences (Defn. 15 in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3). To bring the
concepts together, Figure 4.4 illustrates the authorization process that assigns a user one or
more roles (while limiting a user to one identified role per session) and optional delegation
permissions and then defines screens, their components, and their interactions on a roleby-role basis against all mobile application screens/components/screen interactions. Note
that both the on/off and data permissions are for the components that are captured in the
screen_components_permissions entity.
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Figure 4.3. A Subset of the ER Diagram from Figure 3.3. for Supporting the Unified
Security Model for the Direct UI Modifications Option.
In support of DAC and as shown in Figure 4.3, there are three entities that hold the
necessary data required for delegation permissions. First, the original_users_roles
entity holds the original user’s identifier (user_id) and the role (role_id) the user is
allowed to delegate (Defns. 22 and 23 in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3). Second, the
delegated_users_roles entity holds the delegated user’s identifier (user_id) and

the role (role_id) that the delegated user can receive as part of their delegated
permissions (Defns. 24 and 25 in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3). Third, the frui_delegation
entity holds the permission rules for Full RBAC UI (FRUI) Delegation (Defn. 28 in Section
3.5 of Chapter 3). Basically, ou_or_id and du_dr_id act as foreign keys for the data
stored in the original_users_roles entity and the delegated_users_roles
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entity, respectively, in order to determine which original user (ou_or_id) is delegating
his/her role, screen permissions, component permissions, and screen interactions to which
delegated user (du_dr_id). The poda field is a Boolean value that determines whether
the delegated user can pass on the delegated permissions to another delegated user (poda
= true) or not (poda = false) (Defn. 27 in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3). The last two fields of
the frui_delegation entity, represent when the delegated user can start to have access
to the delegated permissions (start_time) and when the access to such permissions end
(end_time). Moreover, the full_rbac_ui_perm_screens, full_rbac_ui_perm_
screen_components, and full_rbac_ui_perm_screen_interactions entities

hold the delegated screens permissions, delegated screen components permissions, and
delegated screen interactions permissions, respectively, for delegated users.

Figure 4.4. Authorization Process with respect to Screens and Components.
The authorization policies for a generalized mobile application as defined via the
process in Figure 4.4 are then enforced as shown in Figure 4.5. The enforcement process
begins with the mobile application authenticating the user, verifying the credentials, and
then retrieving the user’s access control attributes to customize the mobile application
(Defns. 11, 12, and 28 in Sections 3.2 and 3.5 of Chapter 3). The right hand side of Figure
4.5 (red box) utilizes the data in the screen permissions, screen components permissions,
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and delegation permissions entities (see Figure 4.3 again) to determine a custom version of
the UI of the mobile application by role and optional delegation permissions (Defns. 16
and 28 in Sections 3.3 and 3.5, respectively). Notice that the screen access instances are
shown for a role and delegation with screens 1, 2, and 4 authorized. The Accessible Screens
part of Figure 4.5 illustrates a basic idea of the screen permissions (Defn. 13 in Section 3.3
of Chapter 3). Also, the Component Access table on the right side of Figure 4.5 illustrates
the components of the aforementioned screens that have been authorized to a specific role,
thereby realizing the component permissions (Defn. 14 in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3). There
are no screen interaction permissions in Figure 4.5, since we assume the mobile application
consists of a set of tabs.

Figure 4.5. Enforcement Process for a Mobile Application.

4.3.

Access Control API and Programmatic Changes to UI
The final part of the direct UI modifications option explains the programmatic

changes that must be made to the mobile application itself to allow for the screens and their
components to be customized. This involves the definition of an API for access control
enforcement using the database of Section 4.2 coupled with programmatic changes that are
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made just one time. Since the permissions are taken from the database of Figure 4.3, these
can be changed and the mobile application’s UI will adjust the look-and-feel based on the
defined role/delegation permissions without any additional code-level changes. The entityrelationship diagram in Figure 4.3 was realized as a relational database using MySQL. To
support interactions from the mobile application to the MySQL database of permissions,
an Access Control Application Programming Interface (API) as given in Table 4.2 was
created which can be utilized to support the application wrapper for the direct UI
modifications option as illustrated in Figure 1.4. Moreover, additional API calls were
created in order to retrieve general information about the available access control policy as
given in Table 4.3. The Access Control API calls are invoked within the mobile
application’s source code and return data from the queries in JSON format.
There are four main API calls that will constitute the wrapper that has been defined
against the entities in Figure 4.3 and realized in the MySQL database, which are briefly
described along with the incorporation of their usage within the code of the mobile app.
The first API call, GET

/screenPermissions/:roleID/:screenID, returns a

Boolean value true (JSON format: [{"access":"1"}]) if the role represented by role_id
has the permission to display a particular UI screen screen_id, and false otherwise
(JSON format: [{“access":"0"}]). This first API call in Table 4.2 queries the
screen_access entity of Figure 4.3 which was illustrated in Figure 4.5, and would return

true for screens 1, 2, and 4, and false for screens 3 and 5. This requires a change to the
mobile application code to include a conditional statement that only displays a particular
screen of the UI based on the screen_id and role_id if there is permission defined in
the screen_access entity.
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The second API call in Table 4.2, GET
roleID/:screenID,

returns

a

table

of

/allowableComponents/:

component

permissions

for

the

role_id/screen_id combination that identifies the on/off and data permissions on

buttons, spinners, date spinners, radio buttons, checkboxes, drop downs, and text fields.
The API call begins by querying the component_access entity of Figure 4.3, which was
illustrated in Figure 4.5 by the three permission tables for screens 1, 2, and 4 (Component
Access table in the figure). Then, the API call retrieves the component permissions for a
single screen of the UI that is authorized to that role. As part of the process to display the
components of an allowable screen s, the mobile application’s code is modified with
conditional statements for the various components of each screen. Specifically, for the
on/off permissions, the button (BN), radio button (RB), drop down (DD), checkbox (CB),
date picker (DP), and/or spinner (SP) components are disabled for all non-allowed actions
which are the ‘no’ entries as shown in the Component Access table of screen 1 for Figure
4.5. For the data permissions, each text box is set accordingly based on View, Edit, or Edit
once. Note that the APIs are not called in sequence rather are utilized in multiple locations
throughout the mobile application’s source code.
The third API call in Table 4.2, GET /screensequences/:roleID, utilizes a
role_id to look up all of the allowable screens (via a database query to the
screen_access entity for role_id) and using this information, returns the sequences

of permissible movement/interactions among all allowable screens of the UI. First, the API
call utilizes the screen_interactions entity in Figure 4.3 in order to find all of the
allowed interactions among screens of the UI for role_id and only enable those
interactions that occur among the allowable screens. The API call is then utilized to set
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behavior related information to buttons (BN) on a particular screen. For a button that is
enabled, the information in screen_interactions for the given role and its allowable
screens will allow the button to cause the screen to be reached; a button not enabled will
not link to another screen.
The fourth API call in Table 4.2, GET /delegationPermissions/:userID,
takes the user’s id as a parameter in order to determine if the user in session is a delegated
user. If the user has been delegated with permissions, then the API call will return the
delegated role the user can assume; the screen permissions, component permissions, and
screen interaction permissions of the original user (user who delegated his/her permissions
to the delegated user); and, the period of time the delegated user is allowed to access the
delegated permissions.
Access Control

RBAC

Service Name
GET /screenPermissions/:roleID/
:screenID
GET
/allowableComponents/:roleID/:screenID
GET /screensequences/:roleID

DAC

GET /delegationPermissions/:userID

Description
Returns if a role has permission to access a screen
or not
If the specified role has access to the specified
screen then this service returns the components the
role has access to of the screen
Gets the allowed screen sequences for an specific
role in a mobile application
Checks if user has delegated permissions and, if so,
returns such permissions (delegated role, screen
permissions, component permissions, and screen
interaction permissions).

Table 4.2. API Services for RBAC & DAC Security Enforcement.
Service Name
GET /screens
GET /screens/:screenId
GET /screens/:screenname
GET /screenobjects
GET /screenobjects/:screenId
GET /screenobjects/:objectName
GET /screenobjects/:objectID
GET /screenobjectslabels/:screenID
GET /screensequences
GET /screensequences/:objectID
GET /screensequences/:screenID
GET /delegationPermissions/ou
GET /delegationPermissions/du

Description
Gets all of the screens of a mobile application
Gets a screen of a mobile application by screen id
Gets a screen of a mobile application by screen name
Gets all the components of all screens in a mobile application
Gets the components of a screen by screen id
Gets a component by component name
Gets a component by component id
Gets the names of all the components of a screen in a mobile application
Gets all of the possible screen sequences in a mobile application
Gets the allowed screen sequences for an specific component action in a
mobile application
Gets the allowed screen sequences for an specific screen action in a mobile
application
Gets the user id and role id of all the original users of a mobile application
Gets the user id and role id of all the delegated users of a mobile application

Table 4.3. Additional API Services for the Direct UI Modifications Option.
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For RBAC, the permissions as captured in Figure 4.3 support the first three API
calls presented in Table 4.2 and are executed in the CT2 mobile application’s code to
enforce the permissions of each role to determine the screens and their components for
each user by role. CT2 utilizes a MySQL database to store its data and relies on API
commands to retrieve data for display on the UI and to store new concussion incidents (or
changes) into the database. Figure 4.6 illustrates the result of the screen and component
permissions for the Nurse, Parent, and Coach roles. The Nurse role has all of the tabs active
(first screen of figure 4.6). The Parent role has limited access to the tabs and also, although
users with the Parent role can view the ‘Symptom’ and ‘Follow Up’ tabs, they are not
allowed to update that information (second screen of figure 4.6). Finally, the Coach role
has the first four tabs active and has limited access to the information it can view/modify
(third screen of figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6. Result of RBAC in Connecticut Concussion Tracker (Nurse, Parents, and
Coach view).
For DAC, the permissions as captured in Figure 4.3 support the last API call
presented in Table 4.2 and is executed in the CT2 mobile application’s code to enforce
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delegation permissions a user has. Delegation is a process that is initiated by a user in order
to pass on credentials to another user for a restricted period of time. From the DAC model
definitions in Section 3.5, in support of DAC for the UI, the relevant definitions are: Defns.
22-27 for original user, original role, delegated user, delegated role, delegation authority,
and pass on delegation authority, respectively. Only Full RBAC UI Delegation, as given
in Defn. 28, is supported, which means that an original user must delegate all of the
permissions associated with his/her original role, to a delegated user with delegated role
with possible pass on delegation authority for a given time period. Assume that the original
user ou Karen < uID1, Karen, TS, SS-r, L*-w > has two user role authorizations ura = {<uID1,
rID3>,<uID1, rID7>} for her Nurse and Sub_Nurse role and is interseted to delegating the
nurse or to the delegated user du Lois, a substitute school nurse for one day: del = < uID1,
rID7, uID5,

rID7, < γ, χ, λ >, false, {2017-07-31T09:00:00+00:00, 2017-12-

15T07:00:00+00:00} >. Note that < γ, χ, λ > is as defined in the Sub_Nurse column in
Table 4.1. Karen is interested in only giving Lois the ability to review information on
current students and not be able to enter new students that have concussions that day at the
school.
To this point, we have shown the different components that our approach contains
and the way that these are incorporated in a mobile application in support of the direct UI
modifications option via an application wrapper. Next, we review the way that a mobile
application maintains its functionality after adding these direct changes. First, we identify
the screens and the objects of a screen of the mobile application to which RBAC is to be
applied. Then, we assign a unique id to each of these components and store them as tables
in a database as shown in Figure 4.3. The role of the user is retrieved and stored in a secured
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session variable (passed over https) through the means of an API call (part of the
application wrapper) and, the identity of the user is verified at each action the user makes.
Using this as a basis, to enforce the policies established in the database with the mobile
application, we create a set of API calls. These calls will return if a component can be
shown/edited or if it needs to be disabled/hidden. Each call will check if the component
that we are trying to apply the policy to exists in the database; if it doesn’t, then the API
call will return that the component is enabled for the role that is in session as no RBAC
permissions were found in the created policy. In support of DAC, if the user is a delegated
user, we assign him/her the role of the original user and grant him/her access to all the
permissions of the original user for the specified period of time by the original user. By
making these changes, the functionality of the mobile application will not be affected since
the API calls that are being added to the source code of the mobile application always
return a value regardless if the component does not have a policy stored in the database
anymore. In addition, storing the role of users in a secured session variable will prevent a
user from tampering its role and it does not require any changes in the source code.
Note that the approach presented in this section supports the Direct UI
Modifications option that was part of the Figure 1.4 configurable framework for RBAC
and DAC. The direct UI modifications option focuses on RBAC (with optional DAC) of
the UI of a mobile application’s screens and their components, and then customizes the
look-and-feel by role that is defined with varied screen, component, and screen interaction
permissions stored in a database. When permissions change, only the database needs to be
changed, and the mobile application will adjust appropriately. However, one disadvantage
of the direct UI modifications option is that programmatic changes are required in the
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mobile application itself through the addition of condition statements and calls to APIs that
return allowable screens and permissions on components in order to adjust the look-andfeel of the mobile application (via the application wrapper).

4.4.

A Guide for Programmatic Changes in a Mobile App
In this section, we discuss the programmatic changes that need to be performed in

a mobile app that is utilizing our Direct UI Modifications option to include permission
checks at the code level. The programmatic changes require:
1)

Identification and storage of security policies in a ER Diagram of Figure 3.3

and subset as given in Figure 4.3: The first step requires the designer(s)/developer(s) of
the mobile app to identify the screen(s) that are to be securely controlled that includes the
respective

components

on

each

screen.

The

second

step

requires

the

designer(s)/developer(s) to define a set of roles/delegation capabilities that are available in
the mobile app and assign one of the defined roles/delegation permissions to each of the
users of the mobile app. The third step is for the designer(s)/developer(s) to define and
generate the permissions by set of roles for each of the screens/screen components/screen
interactions (see Defns. 13-16 in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3) and to store these permissions
in the data source accessible to the mobile app.
2)

Implementation of the Access Control API Calls: Developer(s) need to

incorporate the RBAC and DAC API calls server-side as shown in Table 4.2 in order to
allow the source code of the mobile app to access the security policies stored in the data
source via these calls.
3)

Retrieval of the security policies utilizing the source code of the mobile app:

These programmatic changes require the developer(s) to obtain the security policies in the
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source code of the mobile app and utilize them throughout the code by adding the API
services into the mobile application code-base so that they may be called by sending
requests in JSON format. The response of the JSON request will also be in JSON format.
4)

Enforcement of the security policies throughout the source code of the mobile

app: After the developer(s) add the code that allows the communication between the
security policies stored in the data source and the mobile app, the next step is to enforce
the obtained security policies throughout the mobile app. The security policies can contain
screen permissions, screen component permissions, screen interaction permissions, and
delegation permissions. Each one of these permissions must be carefully inserted in
specific locations of the mobile app code:
•

Screen permissions: These permissions need to be retrieved after a user
manages to log in successfully into the mobile app and before the screens of the
app are displayed. The screens are obtained using a for loop and, if the user
does not have access to a screen based on his/her role, then that screen is hidden.
If he/she does have access to a screen, then the screen id will be stored in an
array to be utilized at a later point to obtain the screen component permissions
for those allowable screens.

•

Screen Component permissions: Once the array of allowable screens is defined,
the developer must create a file that maps the components that are found
throughout the source code with the components stored in the database by
assigning the same id to both. Then, for every component that has a permission,
the developer needs to insert if/else conditions that determine what actions a
user can do with his/her role. The conditions can be performed as follows:
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Ø if the user has permission to edit/click the component, then display the
component in the mobile application;
Ø if the user can edit the component once, then display the component
once and afterwards send a flag to the database indicating that the
specified user cannot edit the component anymore;
Ø if the user can only view the contents of a component, then such
components needs to be disabled permitting the user to view but not
modify the component;
Ø otherwise, if the user does not have permission to access the
component, then the developer can either disable the component (and
don’t show the contents) or hide the component.
•

Screen Interactions permissions: These type of permissions are utilized when a
user is requesting to access another screen through the means of a button. To
support screen interactions, the developer needs to call the screen interaction
service using the component id of the button and the role of the user as
parameters when the user clicks the button (in the function that determines the
action to be done when the button is clicked). This will return to which screen
the user can move on as a result of clicking a navigation button.

•

Delegation permissions (Optional): When a user logs in successfully to the
mobile app, we need to verify if he/she is a delegated user. If the user is in fact
a delegated user, we assign the delegated role to such user and continue
verifying the remaining permissions with this assigned role.
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Sample programmatic changes related to screen permissions for the CT2 mobile app are
given in Appendix A.

4.5.

Related Research on Customizing UIs
This section reviews related research in the customization of user interfaces in a

number of different areas: adaptive UIs (Eisenstein, Vanderdonckt, & Puerta, 2001; Aikiki,
Bandara, & Yu, 2012) that are characterized by the ability to change based on the needs of
different users, similar to our approach to customize the UI by role; two efforts (Lin &
Speedie, 2003; Aikiki, Bandara, & Yu, 2013) that create roles and modify the UI software
in an automated process via specialized IDE; and, the work of Stormpath (Hazelwood,
2012) for code level modifications to support RBAC. The two efforts in adaptive UI
(Eisenstein, Vanderdonckt, & Puerta, 2001; Aikiki, Bandara, & Yu, 2012) are targeting a
versatile modifiable UI. The first work (Eisenstein, Vanderdonckt, & Puerta, 2001) focuses
on changing the UI and capabilities depending on three components: on the platform model
(computer systems that can run the UI), on the presentation model (visual appearance of
the UI), and on the task model (representation of the tasks a user may want to perform in
the software) of the mobile device. While the aforementioned proposed approach is able to
change the components of a software depending on the three components mentioned, it
does not enforce access control meaning that all users of the software have access to all of
the features different to our work which changes the look-and-feel of a mobile application
depending on a user’s role/delegation permissions. The second work (Aikiki, Bandara, &
Yu, 2012) attempts to modify the UI per user needs of usability; to achieve this, the work
introduces a tool controlled by a developer in which he/she can add code and modify the
UI’s components. In addition, the approach mentions RBAC to secure resources (which in
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this case is the UI) but does not go into details about the way that the UI would look like if
access control was applied. Our proposed approach is automatic meaning that the developer
need to place the security checks throughout the source code of the mobile app only once
and after that a security administrator could modify the UI permissions through the means
of a separate UI and, our approach addresses the way that the UI of the mobile app will
look after access control mechanisms have been enforced.
The next two efforts combine and use adaptive UIs in mobile devices in conjunction
with RBAC (Lin & Speedie, 2003; Aikiki, Bandara, & Yu, 2013). The first work (Lin &
Speedie, 2003) has proposed an approach that establishes roles and permissions for those
roles in order to show a user only the features he/she has access to. Nevertheless, the
approach is more concerned about only showing the features that users might use instead
of showing the user all of the features he/she has access to like our proposed approach does.
The second work (Aikiki, Bandara, & Yu, 2013) is an extension of (Aikiki, Bandara, &
Yu, 2012). Basically now, instead of allowing users to see all of the features of the software,
the approach focuses on creating roles and modifying the UI of the software according to
these through the means of an IDE the authors developed. Apart from this, the approach
also focuses on how the components of the software would look like depending on the
user’s role. For example, a software has two roles: the Sales Officer and the Novice. Both
roles can view the same features but they will have access to them in a different way since
one user is more experienced than the other. We consider that while the aforementioned
approach contains adaptive UI capabilities based on role it creates additional overhead
since they need to determine which UI to show a user at runtime in addition to determining
which components the role of the user has access to.
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In terms of related work in RBAC in UI on mobile apps, an article presented by
Stormpath (Hazelwood, 2012) consists of modifying code in an application in order to
decide who has access to a specific resource. For example, suppose we have a mobile app
that contains two roles: teacher and student. An implicit way of saying that these roles have
access to a specific resource would be to do an if condition that states that if the user has
the role of teacher or if he/she has the role of student then the resource is available,
otherwise the resource (API) is hidden. Nevertheless, this approach does not handle the
case where the owners of the application decide to add a new role (parent) that also has the
permission to access that specific resource. In that case, the developers would need to go
back to the source code and add to the condition that the role of parent is also allowed to
view the resource. One solution to this problem would be to create an if condition that takes
the username/role of the user as well as the id of the resource. This information gets
processed against a security policy, and, depending on which permissions are defined, that
specific user/role combination will be granted/denied permission to the resource.
Therefore, the article argues that utilizing explicit access control is a better approach than
to utilize implicit access control. In other words, instead of hard coding which roles have
permission to a certain resource, the resource itself will be the one checked. This leads to
a number of benefits: the amount of coding can be reduced, the security model is more
flexible, the security policies can be modified without making changes to the code, and,
the resource is more protected. However, despite of that, the proposed solution intends to
basically enforce RBAC capabilities in the UI of a mobile application it does not consider
DAC which can be utilized to augment security as we do in our approach.
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Chapter 5
Intercepting API Calls Option
Health Information Exchange (HIE) provides a more complete health record with
the aim to improve patient care with relevant data gathered from multiple health
information technology (HIT) systems. In support of the emergence of cloud computing in
healthcare, the Meaningful Use Stage 3 (Himss, 2016) guidelines require all health
information technology (HIT) systems (e.g., electronic health records (EHR), personal
health records (PHR), etc.) to have API services to access, modify, and exchange healthrelated data. If services are the primary means of access, there must be a way to control
who can invoke which service at which time. This necessitates the consideration of the
usage of RBAC, MAC, and DAC to control access to the services that are utilized by a
mobile application. To address the aforementioned, this chapter presents the Intercepting
API Calls option of our configurable framework for controlling access to the API of the
mobile app. Remember, from Section 1.4 of Chapter 1, there were two levels of API
control: a security layer between the UI and mobile application API replicates the mobile
application’s API by creating a mirrored set of services that invoke the original API
services so that each call can be intercepted to add RBAC, MAC, and or/ DAC security
checks as presented in this chapter; and, a second security layer between the two different
APIs (mobile app and server-side) is accomplished through the creation of a server
interceptor API associated with a cloud computing infrastructure to intercept invocations
for RBAC, MAC, and DAC checks, to be presented in Chapter 6. We have evolved RBAC
and MAC to support permissions on services (as opposed to the usual object view) at a
model level applied to a setting where a mobile application is using RESTful APIs and, by

109

adding delegation permissions to services in support of DAC. The resulting RBAC, MAC,
and DAC service-based model as presented in Sections 3.1 to 3.5 of Chapter 3 for the
unified security model can be incorporated by creating mirrored APIs with intercepting
calls from the mobile app to the mobile app API. The work in this chapter on the interceptor
supports Contribution D: Access Control Security Enforcement Code Generation and
Interceptors.
The remainder of the chapter has seven sections. Section 5.1 motivates the
Intercepting API Calls option by explaining the important role of the API in accessing
information, especially PPI and PHI. Section 5.2 presents the high-level processing of the
Intercepting API Calls option using the classic architecture of the User Layer, Presentation
Layer, Business Layer, and Data Layer. Section 5.3 explores the underlying processing of
the Intercepting API Calls option by examining the way that API services are categorized.
Section 5.4 examines the interactions and infrastructure for the Intercepting API Calls
option. Section 5.5 explores the algorithm generation process for the Intercepting API Calls
option. Section 5.6 illustrates the Intercepting API Calls option via the CT2 mHealth
application. Finally, Section 5.7 discusses related work in security and access control
mechanisms for mobile applications.

5.1.

Motivating the Intercepting API Calls Option
The idea behind the Intercepting API Calls option is to secure highly-sensitive

information that is present in mobile applications and is accessible via an API. To support
this focus, we assume that data transactions between a mobile app and a server are
performed via an API. Through this mobile app API, we seek to provide a means for a user
playing a role, and possibly contain a clearance, to be constrained to deliver/store data
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when utilizing the mobile app via the interception of the API calls. According to Cobb
(Cobb, 2014), every API call should be verified to ensure that the user accessing the mobile
app has the necessary permissions to manage the requested data. The Intercepting API
Calls option makes use of the ability to define permissions on the services of the API in
three different ways. First, the API can be partitioned into Secure/Unsecure services (see
Defn. 17 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3) where the Secure services can be assigned on a roleby-role basis (see Defn. 19 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3), thereby supporting RBAC. Second,
the API can be partitioned into Labeled/Unlabeled services (see Defn. 18 in Section 3.4 of
Chapter 3) where each Labeled service has a classification and Labeled services can be
assigned based on a user’s clearance (see Defns. 20 and 21 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3),
thereby supporting MAC. Third, if an API is partitioned by using either RBAC or MAC,
an original user (Defn. 22 in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3) or a delegated user with pass-on
delegation authority (Defns. 24 and 27 in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3) can delegate a full
(Defns. 29 and 31 in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3) or a partial (Defns. 30 and 32 in Section 3.5
of Chapter 3) set of their services to a delegated user, thereby supporting DAC.
The Direct UI Modifications option reviewed in Chapter 4 required custom
programmatic changes that include conditional checks (user/role) and an access control
security API, and as a result may not be possible in cases when the source code of the
mobile app is unavailable. The Intercepting API Calls option requires minimal or no
changes to the UI of the mobile application other than for the need to identify a given role
for a session being initiated by a user. In this case, we incorporate the functionality of API
calls into REST or API services that are utilized to intercept the API calls to disable the
delivery of content to the user. Recalling the pharmacy example, the pharmacy technician
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could see all five screens, but information on screens 3 and 5 would be blocked in the
display of data. For the case where the pharmacy technician attempts to utilize screens 3
and 5, if they do attempt to make a positive action to search or insert information, this
would be intercepted at the server side to disallow the attempt. Basically, the access control
checks on defined permissions that have been discussed for the approach in this chapter
would be before the REST/API calls in the case of the Intercepting API Calls option and
after the REST/API calls for the Server Interceptor API option (discussed in Chapter 6).
In addition, we acknowledge one of the most recognized options to display (deliver)
and manage (store) dynamic data in a mobile app is to utilize the concept of API. However,
before attempting to implement an API, one must evaluate their security risks and their
effective management (Collet, 2015). For example, consider the recent security breaches
in Snapchat and Instagram APIs. Snapchat, a mobile app that enables users to view and
send self-destructive pictures and videos (Snapchat, 2011), had a data breach that affected
4.6 million users (Snapchat, 2013). The company quickly posted a statement revealing that
the vulnerability allowed individuals to compile a database that contained usernames and
phone numbers of users of the mobile app and, that this problem came from their private
API. To address this issue, Snapchat is attempting to identify which third-party applications
offered in the iTunes store and Google Play store are accessing their private API and any
application that uses it is accessing Snapchat’s information without their permission
(Zeman, 2015). Instagram, a mobile app that allows users to take pictures and share them
with family and friends (Instagram, 2010), had a password breach in 2015 (Dellinger,
2015). The breach allowed a third-party application to steal more than 500,000 usernames
and passwords, and used the information to post spam on Instagram accounts without
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permission. To remedy this, Instagram is now reviewing all of the applications that utilize
their API and adding new usage policies (Larson, 2015). Clearly both public and private
APIs need to be continuously secured and monitored to prevent disclosure of restricted
information from occurring. To address this issue, a number of companies have added
security and associated management mechanisms to APIs.

5.2.

High-Level Processing of Intercepting API Calls Option
This section explores the high-level processing of the Intercepting API Calls option

with an emphasis on the way that calls from the mobile application to the mobile app API
are intercepted. The Intercepting API Calls option defines a new API that mirrors the
original mobile app API (in terms of signatures) and serves as a wrapper and includes calls
to the original mobile app API to proceed based on access control checks that control the
data that is displayed (delivered) and managed (stored). In this section, the Intercepting
API Calls option is explored in detail; this option offers the versatility of intercepting
original API calls that have no impact on the source code of the mobile application. We
differentiate between three different APIs in the discussion: the mobile app APIs that are
used by the mobile app (original mobile app APIs); the intercepting mobile app API that
has the same signatures as the mobile app APIs to replace these and provide permission
checks; and the renamed mobile app APIs (former original mobile app APIs) that are
wrapped by the intercepting mobile app API.
For the general architecture of a mobile app, we employ a client mobile app
(Microsoft Corporation, 2008) augmented with the intercepting API-based approach. We
focus on client applications since these are easier to maintain and assume that the app is
always fully connected to the Internet. This assumes that all of the data is processed server-
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side and does not contain cache and local data. The architecture consists of four main layers
as shown in the left side of Figure 5.1: the User Layer which symbolizes the users of the
mobile application; the Presentation Layer which consists of the UI components of the
mobile application; the Business Layer which contains the logic of the mobile app (e.g.,
libraries, APIs, source code); and, the Data Layer which contains all of the data the mobile
app manages (e.g., retrieves, inserts). The right side of Figure 5.1 details the architecture
of the intercepting API-based approach across the four layers in three groups. The first
group, Role/Clearance/Delegation Assignment, involves the user layer and contains the
users of the mobile app and their assigned roles/clearance/delegations. The second group,
Define Access Control Permissions on API Services, spans the presentation and business
layers and contains the original mobile app API services to retrieve/insert data from/into
the data source. This group is utilized to define access control permissions on a role-byrole, clearance, and optional delegation basis on which mobile app API services are
authorized to each role/clearance/delegation, which in turn is assigned to different users.
Once access control permissions are defined on the mobile app API, our approach can
intercept API services utilized by the mobile app in order to perform security and
permissions checks. To transition from the second to third group, our intercepting API
based approach utilizes the data layer as a pass via the renamed API service calls, and as a
result, does not require modifying the source code of the mobile app in order to achieve.
Lastly, the third group, Enforce Access Control Permissions on API Services, contains the
RBAC, MAC, and DAC policies that need to be incorporated in the original data source(s)
so that they can be enforced. This includes a new set of intercepting API services that must
be defined and then utilized to replace the original mobile app API services to enforce the
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defined access control policies to control the data that is displayed (delivered) and managed
(stored) on a user/role/clearance combination.

Figure 5.1. Intercepting API-Based Approach Architecture.
To illustrate the third group, Figure 5.2 details the modifications of the original API
services that are needed for interception. Specifically, for a mobile app, there is a set of
original mobile app API services, as shown in the left side of Figure 5.2. To maintain the
functionality of the mobile app and provide an ability to continue to invoke services by
name, the original mobile app API services are renamed (as shown on the right side of
Figure 5.2) in order to reuse the original name of the original service for the new
intercepting API services so that services from the mobile app remain unchanged (would
now be occurring against the intercepting services). For each original mobile app API
service, we define a corresponding intercepting API service, as shown in the bottom
(middle) part of Figure 5.2, that is able to: perform RBAC, MAC, and DAC security checks
for the user/role/clearance/delegation combination; call the corresponding mobile app API
service (if it is allowed); and then return either filtered data (retrievals) or success/failure
(inserts, updates, or deletes) status.
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The mobile app is still able to invoke the same APIs by name and signature, which
are now the intercepting API services (with the same signature) that are able to step in and
interrupt the process. As a result, the intercepting API services act as a wrapper that adds
a security layer to the original API services. The dashed arrows in Figure 5.2 indicate that
the process of renaming the original API services as well as the process of creating the
intercepting file needs to be done only once. Therefore, the developer only needs to create
these files once and after that security administrators can manage the RBAC, MAC, and
DAC policies without modifying the server-side portion of the mobile app through the
means of a separate user interface. The solid arrow indicates the way that the API behaves
when a user makes a request through the mobile app; first, the request is intercepted in
order to be evaluated with the pertinent access control policies and then, depending on the
result, we either proceed to execute the request or send an error message to the user who
sent the request.

Figure 5.2. Conceptual API Process.
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5.3.

Categorizing Services of APIs
This section discusses the way that the API of a mobile app is viewed from a RBAC,

MAC, and DAC security perspective in order to control who can invoke which service(s)
of an API at which times, and the way that each service is viewed from a security
standpoint. In support of this process, we categorize the services on and API in different
ways. From a RBAC perspective, we partition the services of an API into two broad
categories: secure and unsecure services (Defn. 17 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3). Secure
services are a subset of the API that require control from a security perspective and can be
assigned to individual roles (Defn. 19 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3). Not all of the API
services need to be in the secure category; for example, API services to load drop downs,
display web content, etc., may not need to be secure. The secure API services are the ones
that lead to data that is stored/edited/displayed that must be controlled by role. Unsecure
services need not be assigned and are available to any user. On the other hand, from a MAC
perspective, we partition the services of an API into two other categories: labeled and
unlabeled services (Defn. 18 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3). Labeled services are a subset of
the API that require control from a security perspective and can be assigned to clearances.
As mentioned in the RBAC perspective for the secure category, not all of the API services
need to be in the labeled category. The labeled API services are the ones that lead to data
that is stored/edited/displayed that must be controlled by classifications (Defn. 20 in
Section 3.4 of Chapter 3). Unlabeled services need not be assigned and are available to any
user. In addition to these categories, the mobile app API services can be delegated by an
original user or a delegated user with pass on delegation authority (Defns. 22, 24, 26 in
Section 3.5 of Chapter 3) in four different ways: delegate all of his/her allowed Secure
services to a delegated user (Defn. 29 in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3), delegate a portion of
117

his/her allowed Secure services to a delegated user (Defn. 30 in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3),
delegate all of his/her allowed Labeled services to a delegated user (Defn. 31 in Section
3.5 of Chapter 3) and, delegate a portion of his/her allowed Labeled services to a delegated
user (Defn. 32 in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3). To illustrate the aforementioned definitions,
Figure 5.3 depicts an extension of Figure 3.1 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3 by including
delegation capabilities.

Figure 5.3. RBAC, MAC, and DAC Permissions for API Services.

5.4.

Interactions and Infrastructure
This section discusses the interactions and infrastructure of the Intercepting API

Calls option. To begin, Figure 5.4 depicts the detailed interactions of the Intercepting API
Calls option within the configurable framework (see Figure 1.3 of Chapter 1 again). The
steps from the user’s perspective from left to right are: login to his/her mobile app account;
for successful login, extract the user’s role/clearance that is part of the login credentials;
store the extracted user role/clearance in a secure access token in order to use it in future
API calls; utilize the mobile app which results in multiple mobile app API calls and are
intercepted (data processing in top of Figure 5.4); and, the intercepted API call interacts
with the access control permissions and policies to enforce the defined security before
invoking the original mobile app API call. There are two possible requests that can occur
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as an end result of the interactions: insert/update/delete requests where the data that the
user is trying to insert/update/delete is not allowed if the user/role/clearance combination
does not have permission to do so; and, retrieve requests where the data that the
user/role/clearance combination is trying to retrieve is filtered according to his/her
role/clearance.
In the insert/update/delete request (via an intercepting mobile app API call in the
upper portion of the Access Control API oval in Figure 5.4), the request is intercepted to
perform the access control checks, and depending on the response, the action is either done
(the original mobile app API call is allowed) or not. In the retrieve request the user is trying
to retrieve data (via an intercepting mobile app API call in the lower portion of the Access
Control API oval in Figure 5.4), the data source performs this action but the mobile app
API is intercepted to allow access control checks to be performed. This allows the
intercepted API call to determine if the user has access to all/some/none parts of the data
with the resulting original API call returning data (all/some case) or null/error message
(none case).
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Figure 5.4. Interactions for Intercepting API Calls.
To manage which resources a specific role and/or clearance can access, we
store the access control policy in a database, a subset of the main entity relationship
diagram shown on Figure 3.3 of Chapter 3, represented in Figure 5.5 as an entityrelationship diagram to support our service-based RBAC, MAC, and DAC approach.
Once the user’s role and/or clearance has been verified, we can access the specific
permission we want to evaluate through the means of an API service as stated in the
previous paragraph. The database would hold the roles and/or clearances for each user
of each mobile app along with the permissions for each role and/or clearance to each
HIT system supported with the HAPI FHIR server. Specifically, to track which
services of which FHIR RESTful APIs for each HIT are authorized by role and/or
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clearance

to

a

user

of

a

particular

mHealth

app.

Moreover,

the

secure_unsecure_services and the labeled_unlabeled_services entities

provides details of whether a user has access to the resource he/she requested or not
by his/her role or clearance, respectively. In addition, the security policy tables store
information about the available CRUD services, resources, roles (RBAC), clearances
(MAC), classifications (MAC), read and write constraints (MAC), and delegations
(DAC). Note that this ER diagram also applies to the Server Interceptor API option
of the configurable framework, which is discussed in Chapter 6.
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Figure 5.5. A Subset of the ER Diagram from Figure 3.3 for Supporting the Unified
Security Model for the Server Interceptor API option.

5.5.

Algorithm Generation of Intercepting API Calls Option
This section reviews the algorithm that is able to automatically generate the

intercepting API in support of the Intercepting API Calls option. The primary changes to
support the Intercepting API Calls option are made in the backend of the mobile app
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(server-side – bottom portion of Figure 5.1) and include the addition of RBAC, MAC, and
DAC security policies in a permission database to create the mapping from the original
mobile app API calls to the corresponding new intercept API calls as shown in Figure 5.5.
Each new intercepting API call has the same signature (same address and parameter) as its
original mobile counterpart, so that the intercepting API call can substitute for the original
API call of the mobile app to allow the aforementioned security checks for retrieve and
insert/update/delete requests. As a result, the intercepting API calls effectively wrap the
original mobile app calls. The mobile app now seamlessly invokes the intercepting API
calls. These intercepting API calls contain the appropriate RBAC, MAC, and DAC security
checks, adding a layer of security to enforce the policies. The renamed mobile app API
calls are invoked based on the outcomes of the security checks. The end result is that the
mobile app appears differently based on the user/role combination, to limit information
that is delivered (retrieve request) or that impacts the data that is stored
(insert/update/delete requests).
The Intercepting API Calls option utilizes an algorithm to automatically generate
the intercepting code in support of Contribution D: Access Control Security Enforcement
Code Generation and Interceptors. Pseudo-code for the algorithm is shown in Figure 5.6.
In order to automatically generate the code for the Intercepting API Calls option, we need
to create a file that contains the same API calls as the original mobile app API via the
generate function Access_Control_API_Generator which has a parameter that
contains an array of all the API calls available in the mobile application (line 1 of Figure
5.6). For each of the API calls in the array, we obtain the parameters (if any), which are
stored in a database and store these (line 5 of Figure 5.6). Once we obtain the parameters
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of the API call that is being evaluated, we can generate the heading of the intercepting API
call function by using the current API call as well as its parameters (if any) (line 6 of Figure
5.6). After generating the heading for the intercepting API call function, we then generate
the body of the API call, which contains the security policies for that specific call and
invokes the original mobile app API call if the user has access to it (line 9 of Figure 5.6).
The resulting heading and body of the current API call is stored in an array (line 11 of
Figure 5.6). Once all of the intercepting calls have been created, we traverse the array in
which they are stored in order to generate the intercepting file (line 13 of Figure 5.6).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Access_Control_API_Generator(API_Calls)
{
foreach(API_Calls as currentAPICall)
{
params = getParams(currentAPICall);
API_Call_Heading = generateHeading(currentAPICall, params);
/*API_Call_Body - Contains security policies and a call to the original API
service. */
API_Call_Body = generateBody(currentAPICall);
API_Calls_Array = insert(generateAPICall(API_Call_Heading, API_Call_Body));
}
GenerateFile(API_Calls_Array);
}

Figure 5.6. Pseudo Code Algorithm for Generating Code of the Intercepting API Calls
Option.
To demonstrate the algorithm in Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7 contains the actual PHP
code that we implemented in order to generate our approach to the API of the CT2 mobile
app. The function presented in Figure 5.7 is utilized to generate the services in the
intercepting API. In order to create a renamed API call for each of the original mobile app
API calls, we need the name of the service we are going to generate, if the service needs to
be secured by adding permissions and, the name of the file in which we add the generated
service (line 1 of Figure 5.7). Note that the permissions we add in each of the intercepting
services (if needed) are a layer of security that is not part of the original API services (lines
3-13 of Figure 5.7). Basically, there are three different types of security permissions we
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can enforce: permissions based on a user’s role, permissions based on a user’s clearance
and MAC properties and, permissions based on delegations. To verify if the user has access
to the requested service, we access the security policy stored in the database which contains
entities

(secure_unsecure_services,

labeled_unlabeled_services,

frs_delegation, prs_delegation, fms_delegation, pms_delegation entities

shown in Figure 5.5 of Section 5.4) that specify the requested service’s role/classification
(lines 3-7 and lines 11-13 of Figure 5.7). If the role/clearance that is been verified does
have permission to perform the requested action, then the service proceeds to access the
service in the renamed API file (lines 8-10 of Figure 5.7); otherwise, the intercepting API
service returns a null value (line 12 of figure 5.7). Nonetheless, if the renamed service does
not need to verify a user’s role in order to be executed then the intercepting service calls it
directly, in other words, the intercepting API service does not add security permissions in
this case (lines 8-10 of Figure 5.7). Finally, the generated API service gets written in the
file that serves as the intercepting API (line 15 of Figure 5.7). Appendix B contains the
complete code utilized to generate the intercepting API file and for generating a renamed
version of the original API file, which were generated for the CT2 mobile app.
1 function echoInterceptBody($serviceName, $need_permission, $write_file){
2

$wrapper_string = "public function ".$serviceName."{";

3

if($need_permission){

4

$wrapper_string = $wrapper_string."

5

\$permission = \$this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);

6

if(\$permission == 1){";

7

}

8

$wrapper_string = $wrapper_string."

9

\$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();

10

return \$renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMED".$serviceName.";";

11

if($need_permission){

12
13
14
15

$wrapper_string = $wrapper_string.”} else{return NULL;}";
}
$wrapper_string = $wrapper_string."}";
fwrite($write_file, $wrapper_string);

16 }
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Figure 5.7. Code for Generating the Body of the Services in the CT2 API.
The code given in Figure 5.7 generates, for each original services of the CT2 API,
a REST API for generating an intercepting API file in support of the Intercepting API Calls
option. This is shown in Figure 5.8 for the original CT2 API service updateStudent while
Figure 5.9 shows the renamed CT2 API of the aforementioned service.
1 public function updateStudent($studentObject, $studentId){
2
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
3
if($permission == 1){
4
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
5
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
6
RENAMEDupdateStudent($studentObject, $studentId);
7
} else{return NULL;}}

Figure 5.8. Portion of Generated Code for the Intercepting API.
public function RENAMEDupdateStudent($studentObject,$studentId){
$sqlGeneralStudent = "UPDATE students SET first_name =
'" . $studentObject->firstName . "',
middle_name = '" . $studentObject->middleName . "',
last_name = '" . $studentObject->lastName . "',
suffix = '" . $studentObject->suffix . "',
email = '" . $studentObject->email . "',
student_number = '" . $studentObject->studentNumber . "',
school_id = '" . $studentObject->schoolId . "'
WHERE student_id = " . $studentId;
$recordId = $this->updateRecord($sqlGeneralStudent);

if($recordId){
$sqlStudentDemo = "UPDATE student_demographics date_of_birth = '" .
$studentObject->dateOfBirth . "',
gender = '" . $studentObject->gender . "'
WHERE student_id = " . $studentId;

if($this->updateRecord($sqlStudentDemo)) return 1;
else return 2;
}
else{return 0;}
}

Figure 5.9. Portion of Generated Code for the Renamed API.
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5.6.

Example of the Intercepting API Calls Option
To evaluate the Intercepting API Calls option, the Connecticut Concussion Tracker

(CT2) mobile application, database, and its server are utilized as an example. As currently
designed, the CT2 app supports RBAC, MAC, and DAC that allows for the different
screens and the content of different screens to be available by role, clearance, and
delegations. There are four roles: the Nurse role, which has access to all tabs for a school
nurse to manage a student’s concussion incident from its occurrence to its resolution; the
Athletic Trainer (AT) role which has access to home, list, student, cause, and symptoms
tabs to do a limited preliminary assessment if a concussion incident occurs at the event; the
Coach role, which has access to home, list, student and cause tabs to report a concussion
incident at an athletic event with very limited information on the student; and, the Parent
role, which has access to home, list, student, cause, and symptoms tabs to both report a
concussion incident on his/her child while attending the athletic event or to track the current
status of his/her children that have ongoing concussions. In addition, each of the users of
the mobile app have a clearance assigned and delegation permissions.
Programmatically, we have source code for the Android version of the CT2 app and
a REST API that accesses the concussion MySQL database. The source code of the mobile
app is organized by tabs that are loaded for a given user/role combination, and each tab is
augmented with if/else conditions that either display the data on a tab if it was available in
the database or display an error message stating that the contents couldn’t be retrieved. The
realization of the Intercepting API Calls option is achieved without any modification to the
mobile app UI and is intended to allow fine-grained access control on the information that
is displayable and/or storable of the authorized tabs for each user/role/clearance
combination. There is a very clear mapping from the process described in this section and
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the accompanying figures to its realization in CT2. The database is augmented with a table
that contains a list of all the API calls available along with a service_id, and tables that
contain the security policies that determine which calls the available roles/clearances have
access to (secure_unsecure_services and labeled_unlabeled_services
entities in Figure 5.5 of Section 5.4). Given these database changes, we then take the
original CT2 REST API calls and rename as shown in Figure 5.2. Then a set of new CT2
intercepting REST API calls are defined that perform a series of RBAC, MAC, and DAC
checks and if successful, invoke the corresponding renamed original CT2 REST API calls.
From a process perspective, the steps follow the top portion of Figure 5.4. The user
logs on to the CT2 mobile app and his/her role/clearance is stored in a global variable in
order to support the class that manages the API calls. Figure 5.10 illustrates the impact of
the Intercepting API Calls and associated process for a user with the role of Coach and a
clearance of Confidential which has access to only the home, list, student, and cause tabs.
This role-clearance combination can add basic information on the ‘Student’ tab and can
add information in the ‘Cause’ tab and, after adding the information, can view but not edit.
The original mobile app CT2 API calls support the insert of information in the database and
the intercepting API call in this case allows that first save to occur. At a later point in time,
if the user attempts to edit and perform another save, the intercepting API call in this case,
performs the access control check that does not allow the edit. As a result, when a user with
the role of Coach that is using the ‘Cause’ tab attempts to save, the intercepting API call
alerts that he/she does not have permission to perform that action. The other tabs of CT2,
‘Symptoms’, ‘Follow-Up’ and ‘Return’, are still visible within the app. However, when a
user with the Coach role and Confidential clearance attempts to access one of these tabs,
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the application tries to obtain the pertinent data via the former original CT2 API call that
has been replaced by a new CT2 intercepting API call that checks for permissions and
returns that the specified role-clearance combination does not have permission to retrieve
the data for those screens.

Figure 5.10. ‘Cause’ screen for the role of Coach in CT2.

5.7.

Related Work
There are many efforts that propose access control mechanisms to secure mobile

applications by limiting the permissions and resources a mobile app can access in different
areas of the mobile device/app. In this section, we discuss several existing proposed
approaches that attempt to apply access control mechanisms on different locations on a
mobile device and, we explain the way our approach compares and contrasts. The first area
of related work involves sensor management on smartphones that is commonly addressed
by applying access control mechanisms to the sensors of a mobile device so that mobile
apps obtain fine-grained permissions. This facilitates the managing of sensor data in mobile
apps (e.g., user’s location, use of Bluetooth) (Cappos et al., 2014; Xu & Zhu, 2015).
BlurSense (Cappos et al., 2014) and SemaDroid (Xu & Zhu, 2015) allow users to define
and add privacy filters to sensor data, through the means of a user interface, that is being
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used on their mobile applications. In contrast to these efforts, our work presented in this
chapter focuses on API access control management for the API services that are utilized
within a mobile app to populate data in the app and to add/edit data and store it in a data
source. In other words, instead of focusing on modifying the operating system to filter
sensor data we modify the backend of a specific mobile app and filter the data that a user
can have access to according to his/her role/clearance/delegation permissions, which can
include sensor data as well if there was an API service included in the intercepted API that
managed this.
The second area of related work involves permission control in Android in which
access control can be applied on the mobile device itself. There are many existing
approaches (Beresford et al., 2011; Benats et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2014; Jin et al., 2015;
Hao et al., 2013; Backes et al., 2014) that focus on applying fine-grained access control
policies to mobile devices that contain Android as their operating system. This is due to
the fact that Android contains a coarse-grained access control mechanism when it comes
to allowing permissions in mobile applications. In other words, in order for a user to install
a mobile app he/she needs to accept all of the permissions that the app requires. This may
disregard the fact that some permissions may not be necessary for the app to function and
that some of the permissions may not make sense for app that is being downloaded and
could result in using the allowed component for malicious purposes (e.g., a flashlight app
tells user it needs permission to get the user’s location). Adding fine-grained access control
to the APIs that Android uses for the device and apps to function properly has been
addressed by: mocking the values that an app receives in order to function (Beresford et
al., 2011) (e.g., mocking latitude and longitude coordinates); extending the security
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policies of the mobile device (Benats et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2014; Jin et al., 2015); by
rewriting the bytecode of the mobile device (Hao et al., 2013); and by adding security
modules to the mobile device (Backes et al., 2014). In contrast to this effort, our work
presented in this chapter focuses on applying access control mechanisms to the APIs that
are not part of the mobile system itself. In addition, most of these works are specific for
Android OS/API while ours can be implemented for any type of application (even though
we focus on the mobile setting) since our access control approach is enforced server-side.
The third area of related work involves role-based access control and extensions
that expand RBAC with context-aware techniques in order to provide finer-grained access
control security policies to those systems that contain highly sensitive data. One effort does
this by proposing an RBAC model with a spatiotemporal extension for web applications
(Aich et al., 2009) and another effort proposes a similar approach but for mobile
applications (Abdunabi et al., 2013). The proposed access control system made for web
applications (Aich et al., 2009) can be applied to an existing system as a dll component.
Another approach proposes a dynamic RBAC approach for Android devices (Rohrer et al.,
2013). That approach focuses on modifying the Android framework to provide a uniform
security policy to mitigate security risks in mobile devices that are utilized by users who
are part of an enterprise. Finally, an effort (Fadhel et al., 2016) proposed a model that
extends RBAC to generate RBAC conceptual policies. Nevertheless, the aforementioned
effort does not provide details of which specific application domain(s) the approach could
support. Our framework could easily be extended to support other types of access control,
can be applied to mobile web applications and, it is not domain-specific; this contrasts to
the discussed related work.
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Chapter 6
Server Interceptor API Option
Health Information Exchange (HIE) provides a more complete health record with
the aim to improve patient care with relevant data gathered from multiple health
information technology (HIT) systems that provide APIs for interactions. In support of
HIE, the Health Level Seven (HL7) (HL7, 2013) XML standard was developed to manage,
exchange, integrate, and retrieve electronic health information. In 2011, the Fast Healthcare
Interoperable Resources (FHIR) (FHIR DSTU2, 2015) standard, based on HL7, was
proposed to facilitate the development of mobile health (mHealth) apps with HIT data
sharing via a common modeling format. FHIR utilizes RESTful APIs enabled with a FHIR
server for information usage and exchange in the cloud. FHIR has a security specification,
but does not define actual security mechanisms for secure data exchange via service
invocations. In support of the interaction of the mobile app API services with multiple HIT
systems (data sources) operating on the server side, this chapter presents the Server
Interceptor API option of our configurable framework for controlling access. In Chapter 5,
we intercepted the API service invocations to the mobile app. In this chapter, we intercept
the API service invocations between the mobile app API and services of the APIs of the
HIT data sources. This second security layer between the two different APIs (mobile app
and server-side) is accomplished through the creation of a server interceptor API associated
with a cloud computing infrastructure to intercept invocations for RBAC, MAC, and DAC
checks, to be presented in this chapter. The resulting RBAC, MAC, and DAC service-based
model as presented in Sections 3.1 to 3.5 for the unified security model is incorporated into
the FHIR standard to control access of who can invoke which services of FHIR RESTful
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APIs that manage sensitive healthcare data; work is demonstrated via a mHealth
application that interacts with the OpenEMR HIT system via the HAPI FHIR server. The
work in this chapter on the interceptor supports Contribution D: Access Control Security
Enforcement Code Generation and Interceptors.
This chapter provides details about the Server Interceptor API option that controls
the service invocations from the mobile app API services to the server-side APIs of the
data sources in five sections. Section 6.1 motivates the way that the Intercepting API Calls
option as given in Chapter 5 is adapted and evolved to the Server Interceptor API option.
Section 6.2 reviews the HAPI FHIR reference implementation capabilities with a focus on
the intercepting process. Section 6.3 presents a set of modifications that incorporate RBAC,
MAC, and DAC into the FHIR specification and its realization within the HAPI FHIR
reference implementation. To demonstrate the inclusion and realization of RBAC, MAC,
and DAC for a mHealth app within HAPI FHIR, Section 6.4 provides an implementation
of the service-based access control approach by using the Connecticut Concussion Tracker
(CT2) mHealth app and the OpenEMR HIT system (OpenEMR, 2002). Finally, Section 6.5
reviews related works and compares and contrasts these to the work of this chapter.

6.1.

Motivating the Server Interceptor API Option
As discussed in Chapter 5, the Intercepting API Calls option performs security

checks to determine whether the API service call can occur based on the role and/or
clearance of a user with optional delegation capabilities and perhaps also limit what is
returned to the user. The approach as described in Sections 5.2 to 5.5 of Chapter 5
essentially creates a replica of the API that the mobile app uses so that the mobile app calls
our intercepting API which can perform security checks and then pass the call through to
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the original mobile app API if the security permissions are met. Originally and as discussed
throughout Chapter 5, this was accomplished by renaming the calls to the services of the
original mobile app API. There are two possible issues with this approach. First, we may
not have access to the mobile app API. Second, even if we do, then the renaming would
require changes to the service names of the original mobile app API. As a result, we believe
that it is possible to realize a solution to eliminate these two issues by proposing a Server
Interceptor API option that does not modify the original mobile app API file but contains
the original service calls that the mobile app has access to and then forwards each call from
the intercepting API call of the same name to the original API call; this option operates
between the mobile app API and the APIs of the server-side data sources.
Figure 6.1 illustrates an alternate approach for the Intercepting API Calls option
that establishes an intercepting server that has an API that mimics what the mobile app is
expecting but is our intercepting API (second box from the left in Figure 6.1). The
intercepting API server must also be able to mimic multiple APIs since the mobile app may
interact with multiple APIs (depicted in third box from the left in Figure 6.1). The original
and intercepting servers would need to be run on different ports if on the same host with
the intercepting server being accessible publicly while the original might only be accessible
locally, then the intercepting server(s) could forward any allowed calls to the original
server(s) and filter the results as needed before returning to the client. This is facilitated by
utilizing the login credentials (user/role/clearance combination) in order to determine the
security level in each of the API Calls. Currently, we manage to pass on the user’s id, role,
clearance, and delegation permissions between calls by storing these server-side in a JSON
Web Token (JWT) (JWT, 2015). This is done to secure the user’s data and to verify that
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the user has access to the action he/she requested by utilizing his/her role, clearance, and/or
delegation permissions. However, the need to operate multiple servers on different ports in
order to fool the mobile app into calling the mimicked services is not necessarily easy to
accomplish.

Mobile
Application

Request

Response

Intercepting
Server(s)
with
Intercepting
API Calls

Request

Response

Original
Server(s) with
Original API
Calls

Request

Data Source
Response

Point to the same server(s)
but reside in different ports

Figure 6.1. Intercepting Server Original Idea.
In support of HIE and multiple HIT systems having their APIs called by the mobile
app API services, we want to provide a way to intercept the calls to the APIs of data sources
without having to modify the original API services as we did for the approach presented in
Chapter 5 nor adding a server that contains the same signatures as the original server that
hold the original mobile app API calls (as shown in Figure 6.1). Instead, we focus on
intercepting services on the server APIs without making modifications to the original
server API services through the means of Java servlets (Java, 2013) and HAPI FHIR (HAPI
FHIR, 2014). Figure 6.2 depicts a general idea of the intended process to be explained in
the remainder of this chapter.

Figure 6.2. Server Interceptor API Option General Idea.
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6.2.

Access Control in FHIR
This section reviews the HAPI FHIR reference implementation capabilities with a

focus on the intercepting process that can support our service-based access control
approach. The FHIR security specification does not yet include explicit security
capabilities, but does define different exchange protocols and models that could be utilized
with security policies created by an organization (FHIR, 2016). To handle security, FHIR
suggests several points including: securing data exchange with TLS/SSL (e.g., HTTPs);
authenticating users with an authentication method (e.g., OAuth); and utilizing digital
signatures. In addition, FHIR defines security labels to support access control management
based on (HL7 v3, 2013 ; HL7, 2013). The security labels were done with the purpose of
restricting access on resources based on security policies established by security
administrators of the data that is being exchanged. Nevertheless, there is very little
documentation on the way that role-based, mandatory, or discretionary access control
policies could be both defined and enforced through the means of these labels.
In addition to suggesting security labels, the FHIR security specification provides
a notion of where security needs to be placed in the logical layout of a system in order to
handle users, user authentication, and user authorization. The FHIR security specification
also assumes that a security system exists and that is positioned before or after the FHIR
API (FHIR, 2016). Figure 6.3 illustrates three possible scenarios on the locations where a
security system can be deployed on the logical layout of a system, where the layout is
composed of clients, of a client (mHealth) app, of data sources (EHRs and other HIT
systems), and of FHIR layers. The first scenario applies security mechanisms between two
layers of FHIR where the first layer would be a security system. The second scenario places
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security on the client application. Lastly, the third scenario places security server-side
(FHIR, 2016). For the purposes of this chapter we focus on applying RBAC, MAC, and
DAC by using a similar idea to the one exposed in the first scenario. In the remainder of
the chapter, we make two assumptions: a mobile app needs to obtain information from one
or more data sources (e.g., EHRs or HITs) which are connected by a cloud server; and, the
cloud server that connects the mobile app with the data sources is a FHIR sharing
infrastructure.

Figure 6.3. Security system placement in deployment architecture (FHIR, 2016).
In addition, HAPI FHIR developers are in the process of implementing
authentication and authorization interceptors (HAPI FHIR Server Security, 2016). The
authorization interceptor attempts to apply security to FHIR by creating a set of rules via
rule-based access control within the function and utilize if/else statements in order to
whitelist/blacklist requests. In our case, instead of utilizing rule-based access control, our
service-based approach involves the use of RBAC, MAC, and DAC. Further, instead of
modifying the code of the intercepting function every time we want to add/modify a
permission to/in the policy (e.g., change a role or a permission on a role), we implement
an interceptor function once that consults RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC permissions and
privilege definitions by role/clearance/classification in a database. When changes to the
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security policies stored in a repository are made, the RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC interceptor
functions continue to work to check intercepted RESTful API calls.

6.3.

Access Control Server Interceptor
This section introduces the Access Control Server Interceptor that supports the

Server Interceptor API option as a combination of the RBAC, MAC, and DAC interceptor
functions that were introduced in Section 6.2, along with an associated architecture in
Figure 6.4 that is used to evaluate which FHIR resources users are allowed to access by
role, clearance/classification, and/or delegation permissions via the corresponding FHIR
RESTful API. In Figure 6.4, when the user makes a request using the mobile application,
this request is handled by a Mobile App HAPI FHIR Server. The Mobile App HAPI FHIR
Server is implemented with the HAPI FHIR reference implementation library with
programmatic access to the server interceptor class, which is explained in more detail in
the discussion of Appendix C-2. This class intercepts the user’s request and retrieves access
control policies from the Access Control Security Policy through the means of the Server
Interceptor API as shown in Figure 6.4. After retrieving the pertinent access control
policies, the class performs access control checks to ensure that the user has access to the
requested resource, i.e., can invoke the requested service. Currently, we focus on enforcing
RBAC, MAC, and DAC security policies on the requested services; in a future, we plan to
enforce security policies of other access control mechanisms such as attribute-based access
control (ABAC) (Coyne & Weil, 2013). In order for the interceptor class to enforce RBAC,
MAC, and DAC in the services, the class retrieves security policies from a data source
through the means of API services we implemented for this purpose. More details on the
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way that the security policy would operate for the access control server interceptor are
discussed later on and are depicted in Figure 6.5.

Figure 6.4. Server Interceptor API Option Architecture.
The Server Interceptor API shown in Figure 6.4 contains the API services to
retrieve the security policies from the Access Control Security Policy DB and then send
these to the Server Interceptor Class which calls a service of the Mobile App HAPI FHIR
RESTful App. The Server Interceptor Class shown in Figure 6.4 can be explained utilizing
pseudocode of our service-based access control approach as shown in Appendix C-1 as
implemented within the incomingRequestPostProcessed function, which is within
the Server Interceptor class available in HAPI FHIR. Appendix C rewrites HAPI’s
incomingRequestPostProcessed interceptor function to obtain details of the request

(e.g., HTTP method used) and the resource that is being evaluated before an object can be
obtained. Next, we explain and review the processing of the code presenting and
explaining excerpts from Appendix C-1. The Mobile App HAPI FHIR Server interacts
with the Mobile App HAPI FHIR RESTful API via the FHIR Resources with the Data
Source HAPI FHIR Server which is FHIR RESTful API that maps to/from the HIT Serverside API of the Data Source. The HIT System HAPI FHIR RESTful API of the Data
Source is able to map/to from the HIT System Server-Side API of the Data Source. When
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the incomingRequestPostProcessed interceptor function determines that a service
of the Mobile App API is allowed to call a Data Source HAPI FHIR Server service, the
call proceeds via the common FHIR Resource mapping to the HIT System HAPI FHIR
RESTFul API of the Data Source HAPI FHIR Server.
The remainder of this section explores the incomingRequestPostProcessed
interceptor function in detail. Note that we repeat the line numbers in the code from
Appendix C-1 so the reader can easily determine where the excerpt has come from. In
addition, the pseudo code of Appendix C-1 is applicable to other cloud frameworks in
addition to FHIR. The first segment of code from Appendix C-1 retrieves the authorization
header passed with the request which contains an access token that is used to verify the
user’s identity by calling an API service; obtains the HTTP method of the request, the
name of the requested resource, the id of the requested service; and, sets the permission to
access the requested resource to false in the following code:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

//Serves as Access Control Interceptor function
public boolean incomingRequestPostProcessed(requestDetails, request, response){
authToken = requestDetails.getHeader(“Authorization”);
//Retrieves the user’s id, clearance and, read and write MAC properties
[userId,userRole,userClearance,readP,writeP] = verifyUser(authToken);
httpMethod = request.getMethod();
resourceName = requestDetails.getResourceName();
serviceId = getServiceId(httpMethod, resourceName);
acPermission = false;

If the user passes the verification, the API service returns the user id as proof that
the user was successfully verified as well as the user’s role id, clearance id, and MAC read
and write properties assigned to the user. If the user id is not a valid one, an error message
is returned to the user stating that he/she could not be verified. Otherwise, if the user id is
valid (condition on line 10 is true) and, if the requested resource is secured and/or labeled,
we proceed to enforce security checks. If a resource does not have any RBAC and/or MAC
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security involved, true is returned meaning that the service can be called without security
checks. Otherwise, the requested resource is secured or labeled.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

if(userId > 0){
//Check if requested resource is secured/labeled
[secured,labeled] = getResourceSecurity(httpMethod,resourceName);
if(!(secured || labeled)){
return true; //Continue with request processing
}
//Analyze MAC policies (if any)
if(userClearance > 0 && labeled){
acPermission = checkAndEnforceMAC(userId, userClearance, serviceId, readP,
readW);
}
//Analyze RBAC policies (if any)
if((roleId > 0 && secured) && (acPermission || !labeled)){
acPermission = checkAndEnforceRBAC(userId, userRole, serviceId);
}
}
else{//Error Message: User could not be verified}

If there are MAC policies defined (condition in line 17 is true), we call the
checkAndEnforceMAC function in line 18 invoking function in line 50. In the function,

we first check if DAC delegations are available and if the user has delegated MAC
permissions:
50 private boolean checkAndEnforceMAC(userId, userClearance, serviceId, readP, readW){
51
acPermission = false;
52
//MAC services delegation
53
if(dacPermission() && checkIfDacMac(userId)) {
54
delClr = delClrDAC(userId, serviceId);
55
if(delClr>0) { userClearance=delClr; } //Delegated clearance_id
56
}

If the user has delegated permissions (condition in line 53 is true), we determine if
he/she has a delegated MAC permission for the requested service through the means of the
delClrDAC function:
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

private int delClrDAC(userId, serviceId) {
//Check if delegated user has a delegated clearance for the requested service
if(currentTime>getStartTimeMAC() && currentTime<getEndTimeMAC()) {
if(serviceId in service_permissions_mac(userId))
{return delegatedClearance;}
}
return 0;
}

The delClrDAC function returns 0 if the user does not have any delegated
permissions for the requested service and the user’s clearance remains the same.
Otherwise, if the user have has delegated permissions for the requested service, then the
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function returns the delegated clearance and we replace the original user’s clearance with
this one. Afterwards, we proceed to obtain the classification and the http method of the
requested service through the means of an API service that has the service id of the service
the user is trying to access as a parameter (line 36). This is done to verify if the user’s
assigned clearance has access to the requested resource per Definitions 8v2 (clearance
assignment), 18 (Labeled services), and 20 (labeled API permissions). If the requested
service consists of retrieving data from a data source, we evaluate using the MAC read
properties simple security and strict * shown below:
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

//Retrieve MAC read or write property for pertinent user
if(httpMethod == “GET”){
//Simple security property
if(readP == simpleSecurityProperty){
if(userClearance >= serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}
//Strict * property
elseif(readP == strictStarProperty){
if(userClearance == serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}

In the case where the requested service consists of modifying data (e.g., creating,
updating, or deleting) from a data source, we evaluate utilizing the MAC write properties
simple integrity, strict *, and liberal * given in:
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

else{

//Simple integrity property
if(writeP == simpleIntegrityProperty){
if(userClearance >= serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}
//Strict * property
elseif(writeP == strictStarProperty){
if(userClearance == serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}
//Liberal * property
elseif(writeP == liberalStarProperty){
if(userClearance <= serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}

}
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Finally, in the case where the role is a valid one and the request contains RBAC
checks and, if the checkAndEnforceMAC function returns that the user has access to the
requested resource (acPermission = true) or MAC policies were not established for the
requested resource, we move on to analyze the requested resource against the available
RBAC policies in the checkAndEnforceRBAC function (invocation on line 22 and
function on line 97). First, the function checks if DAC delegations are available and if the
user has delegated RBAC permissions. If the user has delegated permissions, we determine
if he/she has a delegated permission for the requested service through the means of the
delRoleDAC function given in:
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

private int delRoleDAC(userId, serviceId) {
//Check if delegated user has a delegated role for the requested service
if(currentTime>getStartTimeRBAC() && currentTime<getEndTimeRBAC() {
if(serviceId in service_permissions_rbac(userId))
{return delegatedRole;}
}
return 0;
}

The delRoleDAC function returns 0 if the user does not have any delegated
permissions for the requested service and the user’s role remains the same. Otherwise, if
the user has delegated permissions for the requested service then the function returns the
delegated role and we replace the original user’s role with this one. If this is the case, then
we retrieve the role of the requested service and verify if the user’s role is one of the roles
that has access to the requested service (lines 106-108 of Appendix C-1) per Definitions
11 (role assignment), 17 (Secured services) and 19 (secure API permissions). The function
returns whether the user passed the RBAC security checks (acPermission = true) or not
(acPermission = false). Once we evaluate the requested resource against the available
permissions, the function returns true if the user does have access to the requested resource
and we move on to perform the request (acPermission = true):
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97 private boolean checkAndEnforceRBAC(userId, userRole, serviceId){
98
acPermission = false;
99
//RBAC services delegation
100
if(dacPermission() && checkIfDacRbac(userId)) {
101
delRole = delRoleDAC(userId, serviceId);
102
if(delRole>0) { userRole=delRole; } //Delegated role_id
103
}
104
//Get service set of roles
105
serviceRoles = getRoleSet(serviceId);
106
if(roleId in serviceRoles){
107
acPermission = true;
108
}
109
return acPermission;
110 }

Upon return to incomingRequestPostProcessed, line 2 above, if the user
does not have access to the requested resource (acPermission = false), an error message
to the user states that he/she does have access to the request:
26
27
28
29
30

if(acPermission == false){
//Error message: User does not have permission to access the
//requested resource
}
return acPermission;

To manage which resources a specific role and/or clearance can access, we store
the access control policy in a database, represented in Figure 6.5 as an entity-relationship
diagram to support our service-based RBAC and MAC approach, which is a subset of the
main entity relationship diagram shown on Figure 3.3 of Chapter 3. Once the user’s role
and/or clearance has been verified, we can access the specific permission we want to
evaluate through the means of an API service as stated in the previous paragraph. The
database would hold the roles and/or clearances for each user of each mHealth mobile app
along with the permissions for each role and/or clearance to each HIT system supported
with the HAPI FHIR server. Specifically, to track which services of which FHIR RESTful
APIs for each HIT are authorized by role and/or clearance to a user of a particular mHealth
app.

Moreover,

the

secure_unsecure_services

and

the

labeled_unlabeled_services entities provides details of whether a user has access

to the resource he/she requested or not by his/her role or clearance, respectively. In
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addition, the security policy tables store information about the available CRUD services,
resources, delegations (DAC), roles (RBAC), clearances (MAC), classifications (MAC)
and, about read and write constraints (MAC). Sample access control policies will be
provided on Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 of Section 6.4.

Figure 6.5. A Subset of the ER Diagram from Figure 3.3 for Supporting the Unified
Security Model for the Server Interceptor API option.
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6.4.

Implementation
To evaluate the incorporation of RBAC, MAC, and DAC into FHIR, which is the

realization of the Server Interceptor API option, the Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2)
mHealth app, database, and server are connected to an instance of the OpenEMR
(OpenEMR, 2002) electronic health record via HAPI FHIR as reviewed in Section 2.7 of
Chapter 2. The CT2 app is for Android and iOS devices and uses a FHIR server to manage
its data, which is stored in an instance of OpenEMR (OpenEMR, 2002) (accessed through
a FHIR server as well and located in a cloud server). The CT2 mHealth app utilizes four
FHIR resources in order to Create (POST), Read (GET), and Update (PUT) subsets of the
data (Delete is not allowed in this app): Patient to track demographics and other basic
information of patients (students that suffer concussions); Condition to track a medical
condition, in our case a concussion; Observation to track symptoms of patients (students);
and CarePlan to track the planned treatment for a condition (concussion). The CRU
services defined on these four FHIR resources are the ones that are authorized by role
(Secure and Unsecure services from Defn. 17) and controlled by sensitivity levels (Labeled
and Unlabeled services from Defn. 18). In our case, the services that need to be controlled
are secured and labeled since all of them manage highly-sensitive data.
To begin, Figure 6.6 shows the mapping of resources and the location of the access
control server interceptor of Section 6.3 and Figure 6.4 within the FHIR instance of the
CT2 mHealth app. Note concepts in Figure 6.4 can be mapped to Figure 6.6 as follows:
Mobile App maps to CT2 mHealth App; Mobile App API maps to CT2 RESTful API;
Mobile App HAPI FHIR Server maps to the CT2 HAPI FHIR Server; Mobile App HAPI
FHIR RESTful API maps to CT2 HAPI FHIR RESTful API; Data Source HAPI FHIR
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Server maps to the OpenEMR FHIR Server. HIT System Server-Side API maps to
OpenEMR RESTful API; and, HIT System (Data Source) maps to OpenEMR. Each of the
FHIR Resources (Patient, Condition, etc.) for both CT2 and OpenEMR have a FHIR
RESTful API with CRU services (no delete), CT2 HAPI FHIR RESTful API and
OpenEMR HAPI FHIR RESTful API, respectively. We incorporate the access control
server interceptor as a security layer (Server Interceptor API and Access Control Server
Interceptor class shown in Figure 6.6) before the requested resource attempts to
retrieve/insert/update data from the OpenEMR system, similar to the first option in Figure
6.2, where the first FHIR layer consisted of a security layer. If the requested resource
successfully passes the security checks in the server interceptor function, then the CT2
HAPI FHIR RESTful API receives the request which is then sent to the appropriate service
of OpenEMR HAPI FHIR RESTful API class along with any parameters by using another
instance of FHIR. In this case, both of CT2 HAPI FHIR RESTful API and OpenEMR HAPI
FHIR RESTful instances were implemented using the HAPI FHIR library. Specifically,
FHIR requires that information in the CT2 database is mapped to/from FHIR resources and
information in the OpenEMR repository is mapped to/from FHIR resources and,
exchanged through shared resources via the CRUD FHIR APIs defined for each resource
for both CT2 HAPI FHIR RESTful API and OpenEMR HAPI FHIR RESTful APIs. We
have reported extensively on this mapping process in (Baihan, et al., 2017).
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Figure 6.6. CT2-OpenEMR FHIR Mapping.
To determine the type of action a user of CT2 can perform on these FHIR resources,
we defined four roles: Nurse which has access to all of the services of the resources (CRU
for the CT2 HAPI FHIR RESTful API) to manage a student’s concussion incident from its
occurrence to its resolution; Athletic Trainer (AT) which is allowed to do a limited
preliminary assessment if a concussion incident occurs at the event and hence some U
services are not allowed; Coach which can report a concussion incident at an athletic event
with very limited information on the student with no access to U services; and, Parent
which can report a concussion incident on his/her child while attending the athletic event,
update his/her concussed child’s demographics, or track the current status of his/her
children that have ongoing concussions but with no U services for the Condition,
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Observation, and CarePlan resources. In addition, we assigned clearances and MAC
properties to users and classifications to services in support of MAC. Table 6.1 defines the
permissions for CRU (POST, GET, PUT) for all of the resources for all four roles in support
of RBAC as well as their assigned classification in support of MAC (see Defns. 8v2 and
10). Note that the services listed in Table 6.1 are both Secure and Labeled services of CT2.
These policies are stored in a security policy database (as shown in Figure 6.5 and Figure
6.6) and is accessed through the use of the incomingRequestPostProcessed function which
is part of the server interceptor class the HAPI FHIR library offers. Notice that in Table
6.1, a user with a Nurse role and/or a user with clearance TS has access to all CRU services
of all resources; at the other extreme, a Coach role and/or a user with clearance C is limited
to reporting and reading the basic information on the concussion by having only access to
CR for the Patient and Condition resources. The creation of the RBAC and MAC
permissions to FHIR services by role and clearance in Table 6.1 allows fine-grained access
control of the FHIR RESTful APIs for the services of the four Resources utilized by the
CT2 mHealth app. Table 6.2 depicts a subset of the users of the CT2 mHealth app as well
as their assigned role, clearance, and read and write MAC properties. Note that CT2
mHealth app has many unsecure and unlabeled services for populating drop downs and
select options of the UI, which have been omitted from the discussion in order to focus on
services that need control.
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Service
GET /Patient/
POST /Patient/
PUT /Patient/:pid
GET /Condition/
POST /Condition/
PUT /Condition/:cid
GET /Observation/
POST /Observation/
PUT /Observation/:oid
GET /CarePlan/
POST /CarePlan/
PUT /CarePlan/:cpid

Classification
C
C
TS
C
C
TS
C
S
TS
C
TS
TS

Roles
{AT, Coach, Nurse, Parent, Sub_Nurse}
{AT, Coach, Nurse, Parent}
{Nurse, Parent}
{AT, Coach, Nurse, Parent, Sub_Nurse }
{AT, Coach, Nurse, Parent}
{Nurse}
{AT, Coach, Nurse, Parent, Sub_Nurse }
{AT, Nurse}
{Nurse}
{AT, Coach, Nurse, Parent, Sub_Nurse }
{Nurse}
{Nurse}
2

Table 6.1. Service permissions of CT FHIR resources.
User
Peter
Joe
Karen
Carmen
Lois

Role
AT
Coach
Nurse
Parent
Sub_Nurse

Clearance
S
C
TS
C
C

MAC Read
SS
SS
SS
SS
S*-r

MAC Write
SI
SI
SI
L*
S*-w

Table 6.2. Permission assignment of CT2 users.

The access control server interceptor pseudo code as given in of Appendix C-1 is
transitioned to the access control server interceptor source code given in Appendix C-2.
There are five functions in the access control server interceptor. The main function
(incomingRequestPostProcessed function), verifies the user’s identity:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

public boolean incomingRequestPostProcessed(RequestDetails theRequestDetails,
HttpServletRequest theRequest, HttpServletResponse theResponse) {
String jwt = theRequest.getHeader("Authorization");
Boolean acPermission = false; //Initially, the user does not have access to the
resource
String identifiers = "";
JSONObject object = null;
HttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
HttpContext localContext = new BasicHttpContext();
// Verify if the user is a valid one
HttpGet httpGet= new HttpGet(serviceLink+"/verifyUser/"+jwt);
try {
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
identifiers = EntityUtils.toString(entity);
//Returns user_id, role_id, clearance_id, write_property, and read property
object = new JSONObject(identifiers); //Convert String to JSON Object
} catch (Exception e) {/*throw new UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
//If the user's identity could be properly validated then it returns the user's
//role, clearance, and an indicator that the request was successful

If the user’s identity is valid, the function proceeds to verify if the requested resource is
secure and/or labeled (lines 28-38), if not, the request continues to be processed (no further
security checks are required):
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19 try {
20
int user_id = Integer.parseInt(object.getString("user_id"));
21
int mac_read = Integer.parseInt(object.getString("mac_read"));
22
int mac_write = Integer.parseInt(object.getString("mac_write"));
23
if(user_id>0) {
24
JSONObject securedResource = null;
25
String httpMethod = theRequest.getMethod();
26
String resourceName = theRequestDetails.getResourceName();
27
//Check if requested resource is secured/labeled
28
httpGet = new
HttpGet(serviceLink+"/resourceSecurity/"+httpMethod+"/"+resourceName);
29
try {
30
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
31
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
32
identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
33
securedResource = new JSONObject(identifiers);
34
} catch (Exception e) {/*throw new UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
35
boolean secured = securedResource.getBoolean("secured");
36
boolean labeled = securedResource.getBoolean("labeled");
37
if(!(secured||labeled)){
38
return true; //Continue with request processing (resource can be accessed by
anyone)
39
}

If the requested resource is labeled, we do checks for enforcement for MAC by calling the
checkAndEnforceMAC function (lines 90-153 in Appendix C-2). In the function, we first

verify if the user has delegated clearance permissions for the requested resource by calling
the delClrDAC function:
187 private int delClrDAC(int user_id, int service_id) {
188
Integer delclr_id = 0;
189
HttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
190
HttpContext localContext = new BasicHttpContext();
191
//MAC Service Delegation
192
//Check if delegated user has a delegated clearance for the requested service
193
JSONObject userDelegation = null;
194
HttpGet httpGet = new
HttpGet(serviceLink+"/userClrDelegation/"+user_id+service_id);
195
try {
196
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
197
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
198
String identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
199
userDelegation = new JSONObject(identifiers);
200
delclr_id = userDelegation.getInt("du_dclr_id");
201
return delclr_id;
202
} catch (Exception e){/*throw new UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
203
return 0;
204 }

For GET and read operations, we verify the user’s clearance and the classification of the
service against MAC read properties within the checkAndEnforceMAC function:
116
117
118
119
120
121

if(httpMethod=="GET") {
macProperty = mac_read;
//Simple security property
if (macProperty == 1) {
if (clearance_id > class_id) {
acPermission = true;
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122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

}
}
//Strict * property
else if (macProperty == 2) {
if (clearance_id == class_id) {
acPermission = true;
}
}
}

For all PUT, POST, and write operations, where the request is to modify the data shown in
the app, we evaluate the user’s clearance and the service’s classification against the
corresponding MAC write property within the checkAndEnforceMAC function (lines 90153 in Appendix C-2):
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

else{
macProperty = mac_write;
//Simple integrity property
if (macProperty == 3) {
if (clearance_id >= class_id) {
acPermission = true;
}
}
//Strict * property
else if (macProperty == 4) {
if (clearance_id == class_id) {
acPermission = true;
}
}
//Liberal * property
else if (macProperty == 5) {
if (clearance_id <= class_id) {
acPermission = true;
}
}
}

If the requested resource is secured, we do checks for enforcement for RBAC, by calling
checkAndEnforceRBAC function (lines 155-185 of Appendix C-2). In the function, we

first verify if the user has delegated role permissions for the requested resource by calling
the delRoleDAC function:
206 private int delRoleDAC(int user_id, int service_id) {
207
Integer delrole_id = 0;
208
HttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
209
HttpContext localContext = new BasicHttpContext();
210
//RBAC Service Delegation
211
//Check if delegated user has a delegated role for the requested service
212
JSONObject userDelegation = null;
213
HttpGet httpGet = new
HttpGet(serviceLink+"/userRoleDelegation/"+user_id+service_id);
214
try {
215
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
216
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
217
String identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
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218
userDelegation = new JSONObject(identifiers);
219
delrole_id = userDelegation.getInt("du_drole_id");
220
return delrole_id;
221
} catch (Exception e){/*throw new UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
222
return 0;
223 }

Then, we verify if the user’s role has access to the service request within the
checkAndEnforceRBAC function (lines 155-185 of Appendix C-2):
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

//Get service set of roles
HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(serviceLink+"/roleSet/"+service_id);
try {
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
String identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
JSONObject rs = new JSONObject(identifiers);
role_set = rs.getJSONArray("");
Integer role = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < role_set.length(); i++) {
role = role_set.getInt(i);
if(role_id == role) {
acPermission = true;
break;
}
}
} catch (Exception e) {//throw new UnprocessableEntityException();}

The main function outputs an error message if the user could either not be verified or, if
the user does not have access to the requested resource (if either the MAC or RBAC
functions return false):
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

if(!acPermission) {
try {
theResponse.setContentType("application/json+fhir");
PrintWriter out = theResponse.getWriter();
out.println("{");
out.println("\"status\": \"403\",");
out.println("\"errorMessage\": \"User does not have permission to access
the requested resource.\"");
out.println("}");
out.close();
} catch (IOException e) {e.printStackTrace();}
return false;
}
return true;

65
66
67
68
69
70
71 }
72 else {
73
try {
74
theResponse.setContentType("application/json+fhir");
75
PrintWriter out = theResponse.getWriter();
76
out.println("{");
77
out.println("\"status\": \"400\",");
78
out.println("\"errorMessage\": \"User Verification failed. Please try to do
the request again...\"");
79
out.println("}");
80
out.close();
81
} catch (IOException e) {
82
e.printStackTrace();
83
}
84
return false;
85
}
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The incomingRequestPostProcessed function (lines 1-88 of Appendix C-2)
is

included

within

a

class

(shown

in

Appendix

C-3)

that

extends

the

InterceptorAdapter class (line 15 of Appendix C-3), which is part of the server

interceptor feature HAPI FHIR offers. In addition, in order for the server to recognize the
existence of the intercepting class, the access control server interceptor is registered in the
2

RestfulServer instance of the FHIR server, namely, on the CT FHIR server, by making

reference to the class by calling registerInterceptor (line 16 of Appendix C-3).
The CT2 mHealth app was tested with two accounts: user Karen (third row of Table
6.2) and user Joe (second row of Table 6.2). In the test, both Karen and Joe attempt to
utilize the CT2 mHealth app to update a student’s concussion (the UPDATE/PUT
operation). As we can see in Table 6.1, the classification of the requested service both users
are attempting to access is TS and the only role who has access to this particular service is
the Nurse role (shown in the sixth row and third column of Table 6.1). Taking these details
into consideration, we move on to evaluate each of the users’ assigned clearance and role.
Karen has a clearance of TS and the Nurse role assigned therefore, she has access to
perform the aforementioned request since uCLR ≥ uCLS (satisfies the Simple Integrity MAC
write property, see Defn. 10) and, her role is within the roles that the requested service
combination allows (see Defn. 11). On the other hand, Joe has a clearance of C and C<TS
(does not satisfy the Simple Integrity MAC write property, see Defn. 10), therefore, the
first security check fails meaning that we do not proceed to verify the user’s (Joe’s) role as
both security checks (in the case of there being RBAC and MAC checks) need to return
true. Therefore, he obtains an error message informing him that he does not have
permission to access the requested resource (lines 58-69 of Appendix C-2). In addition,
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Nurse Karen has the ability to delegate her RBAC and MAC permissions. Nurse Karen can
delegate a subset of her allowed Secure API services to the substitute Nurse, Lois (see
Defn. 30 on Section 3.5 of Chapter 3) by assigning Lois the Sub_Nurse role. In this case,
we are not considering Labeled API services, so we only evaluate Lois’ request with the
checkAndEnforceRBAC function (lines 155-185 of Appendix C-2). If Lois attempts to

modify the data for a student, she’d be prevented since she only has permission to read data
from the app (see substitute Nurse Lois’ permissions on Tables 6.1 and 6.2). As a result,
the RBAC security check fails and Lois receives an error message that informs her that she
does not have permission to perform such an action (lines 58-69 of Appendix C-2).
Programmatically, in the case of Coach Joe and substitute Nurse Lois, the
incomingRequestPostProcessed function located within the CT2 FHIR server java code
aborts the execution of the request and returns an error message to inform the user that he
does not have permission to the requested resource as shown in the top image of Figure
6.7. In the case of Nurse Karen, the request is performed successfully as shown in the
bottom image of Figure 6.7. Another situation that is also supported in the access control
server interceptor is if the user attempts to tamper with his/her role and/or clearance in
order to obtain more privileges. This action is identified when the access token sent on the
header is verified and blocks any further execution of the request and sends an error
message to the user telling him/her that the user verification failed as shown in Figure 6.8.
Note that the access control server interceptor can return error messages as either JSON or
XML format, which are two of the formats that are available in FHIR to return the client a
response. We utilized JSON since this is the format that the CT2 mHealth app has for
handling the user requests and responses. In addition, the requests shown on Figures 6.7
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and 6.8 were made with Postman (Postman, 2013) instead of doing these directly with the
CT2 mHealth app in order to present a clear view of the response the requests can have in
different scenarios.

Figure 6.7. JSON Response Messages from Interceptor.

Figure 6.8. JSON Response – Disallowed Request.

6.5.

Related Work
There are many efforts that propose access control mechanisms to secure mobile

applications by limiting the permissions and resources a mobile app can access in different
areas of the mobile device/app. In this section, we discuss related work in three areas:
permission control in Android; extending RBAC with context-aware techniques; and,
proposed security mechanisms for FHIR. As part of the discussion, we compare and
contrast these efforts to the work presented herein.
The first area of related work involves permission control in Android where many
approaches (Beresford et al., 2011; Benats, Bandara, Yu, Colin, & Nuseibeh, 2011; Wang
et al., 2014; Jin et al., 2015; Hao et al., 2013) focus on applying fine-grained access control
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policies to mobile devices that contain Android as their operating system. This is due to
the fact that Android contains a coarse-grained access control mechanism for allowing
permissions in mobile applications. Specifically, in order for a user to install a mobile app,
he/she needs to accept all of the permissions that the app requires. This may disregard the
fact that some permissions may not be necessary for the app to function and that some of
the permissions may not make sense for the app that is being downloaded and could result
in using the allowed component for malicious purposes (e.g., a flashlight app tells user it
needs permission to get the user’s location). Adding fine-grained access control to the APIs
that Android utilizes for the device and apps to function properly has been addressed by:
mocking the values that an app receives in order to function (Beresford, et al., 2011) (e.g.,
mocking latitude and longitude coordinates); extending the security policies of the mobile
device (Benats, Bandara, Yu, Colin, & Nuseibeh, 2011; Wang, Hariharan, Zhao, Liu, &
Du, 2014; Jin, Wang, Luo, & Du, 2015); rewriting the bytecode of the mobile device (Hao,
et al., 2013); and adding security modules to the mobile device (Backes, et al., 2014). In
contrast to these efforts, our work presented in this chapter focuses on applying access
control mechanisms to the APIs that are not part of the mobile system itself (we enforce
security in FHIR API services), with the intent to control access to the data utilized by the
mobile app via its services. In addition, while most of these works are specific for Android
OS/API, our service-based RBAC and MAC approach can be applied to any type of
application (even though we focus on the mobile setting) by controlling access to the
services. This was demonstrated via FHIR and the HAPI FHIR library that is enforced
within the HAPI FHIR server, but is adaptable to other cloud frameworks.

157

The second area of related work involves role-based access control and extensions
that expand RBAC with context-aware techniques in order to provide finer-grained access
control security policies to those systems that contain highly sensitive data. One effort
proposes an RBAC model with a spatiotemporal extension for web applications (Aich, et
al., 2009) that can be applied to an existing system as a dll component. Apart from web
applications, our server-based RBAC and MAC approach could work for any type of
system that utilizes a JAVA-based implementation of the server that handles the users’ API
requests and responses. Another approach proposes a dynamic RBAC approach for
Android devices (Rohrer, et al., 2013). That approach focuses on modifying the Android
framework to provide a uniform security policy to mitigate security risks in mobile devices
that are utilized by users who are part of an enterprise. Unlike the aforementioned approach,
our work is not device-specific and is enforced on the server side of a mobile application
(and can be applied to other systems as well). Finally, an effort (Fadhel et al., 2016)
proposed a model that extends RBAC to generate RBAC conceptual policies, but does not
provide details of which specific application domain(s) the approach could support. This
is contrary to our approach which is intended to work for any type of application that can
be connected with a JAVA-based server. In addition, our access control server interceptor
as discussed in Section 4.3 operates on the server-side and can be easily extended to support
other types of access control as given in (Aich et al., 2009; Rohrer et al., 2013; Fadhel et
al., 2016), expanding the interceptor logic (Appendix C-2). Moreover, even though we are
focusing on utilizing the HAPI FHIR server to enforce our access control model, we intend
to generalize this approach so that it works with a wider variety of cloud frameworks that
use RESTful, cloud, or web APIs.
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The third area of related work involves security mechanisms which can be applied
to the FHIR specification. The FHIR standard is an evolving standard (FHIR Release 3),
for which there are a number of efforts that address the way that security in FHIR could be
realized. The first effort (Lamprinakos, et al., 2014) applied FHIR to the AidIT mHealth
app for patients, doctors, and pharmacists in order to demonstrate the way that a mHealth
app can be integrated with the FHIR server side. The AidIT app can be utilized by users
who have different privileges, uses QR codes to secure the data, and includes an RBAC
mechanism to apply security policies to CRUD actions. The access control model is
enforced within the user interface of the mobile app by only showing the components
(buttons and tabs) that can be accessed according to a user’s role. Unlike our work, this
approach does not enforce access control via FHIR and the RESTful API services, but
focuses on programmatic changes to the AidIT mHealth app making reuse of the approach
problematic for other mobile apps. Our approach to control services by role and by
clearance/classification is applicable to any mHealth app accessing RESTful API FHIR
services to be controlled by RBAC and MAC, and is reusable without needing to modify
app code. The second effort (Franz, et al., 2015) applies FHIR to a health monitoring
system of vital signs (e.g., blood pressure, blood sugar, etc.) for patients in cardiac rehab
and for elderly with chronic diseases. The effort collected information using the
Observation FHIR resource for 68 patients and nearly 2000 data points. Such an effort
would need services used by patients to store their individual data and for researchers to be
able to access data from multiple participants. Clearly, there is a need to have the ability to
control who can enter/view data for different stakeholders (roles), making our approach
suitable. However, despite the work acknowledging the need to support security, this was
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a subject for future work. The third approach, SecFHIR (Altamimi, 2016), presented a
security specification model on FHIR resources represented using XML or JSON schemas.
The work on SecFHIR defined permissions on schemas, which implicitly specify the
permissions on the corresponding XML instances. As previously mentioned, ONC (Health
and Human Services Department, 2015) is promoting a national effort to have RESTful
APIs for healthcare data availability and security at the data level using XML in SecFHIR
while relevant, is not targeting the way that mHealth applications access healthcare data
via services. Our focus on applying RBAC and MAC at the role/clearanceclassification/RESTful API level means that our policies are applicable regardless of the
actual data format. Our work also does not need to add permission tags that would impact
the FHIR resource standard schemas for XML and JSON.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This dissertation presented and explained a comprehensive configurable framework
for RBAC (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992), MAC (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994) and DAC
(Department of Defense, 1985) for mobile applications that is capable of supporting access
control in different security layers. Security was controlled: for the user interface in terms
of which screens and/or their components are accessible to a user under RBAC with
optional delegation via DAC; for interactions from the mobile app to the mobile
application’s API services in order to define the API services that can be invoked by a
particular user based on RBAC and/or MAC permissions with optional delegation via
DAC; and, for interactions between the mobile app API services that seek to invoke the
API of server-side data sources also based on RBAC and/or MAC permissions with
optional delegation via DAC. The main objectives have been four-fold: define a Software
Architecture for a Configurable Access Control Framework for Mobile Applications;
create a Unified Mobile Computing and Security Model with Access Control to capture
characteristics of mobile applications and RBAC, MAC, and DAC that are defined on both
the user interface and various levels of API services; describe the ability to support the
Dynamic Combination of Access Control Models and Configuration Options; and, define
and implement Access Control Security Enforcement Code Generation and Interceptors
that operates for both the look-and-feel by RBAC of the mobile app as well as the services
that can be intercepted for RBAC, MAC, and DAC delegation checks on services. These
objectives were illustrated using a mHealth application linked to OpenEMR via the HAPI
FHIR server.
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The remainder of this conclusion is organized as follows. Section 7.1 summarizes
the dissertation, highlighting the attainment of the four aforementioned main objectives in
detail. Using this as a basis, Section 7.2 discusses the research contributions of this
dissertation, primarily in the areas of: Software Architecture for a Configurable Access
Control Framework for Mobile Applications; Unified Mobile Computing and Security
Model with Access Control to capture characteristics of mobile applications and RBAC,
MAC, and DAC; Dynamic Combination of Access Control Models and Configuration
Options; and, Access Control Security Enforcement Code Generation and Interceptors.
Then, on Section 7.3, we detail the ongoing and future research directions that include, but
are not limited to: supporting other access control models, supporting another cloud
framework for the interceptor, finer-grained DAC for UI, controlling services by instances,
adding time-based permissions, and testing the configurable framework with other mobile
apps and data sources.

7.1.

Summary
The work presented in this dissertation attempts to incorporate RBAC, MAC, and

DAC access control mechanisms in different parts of the architecture of mobile
applications in order to protect highly-sensitive data managed by mobile applications. The
main focus of the dissertation was to create a software architecture for our configurable
framework approach in which we could define different permissions on the UI, API, and
data sources of the mobile application that could be combined and enforced either on the
source code of a mobile application, on the mobile application’s APIs, or on the serverside APIs of a mobile application. In support of our focus, the discussion was presented
throughout six chapters.
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Chapter 1 introduced the main areas for our research and a high-level view of the
proposed configurable access control framework. Section 1.1 discussed the motivation of
adding access control to mobile applications as our main area of interest. Section 1.2
explored the motivation of the work in the healthcare domain as an appropriate context to
present the work of the dissertation due to its need for strict control of PHI and the
emergence and usage of mobile health (mHealth) applications for patients and medical
providers. As noted in Section 1.3, mHealth applications have critical requirements
regarding information usage and exchange with different stakeholders needing different
types of access. With the motivation in hand, Section 1.4 presented and explained the
configurable framework for RBAC, MAC and DAC for mobile applications of this
dissertation. Section 1.5 provided a list of the research objectives and expected
contributions for the dissertation. Section 1.6 discussed the work that has been published
by us in order to support the work presented in the dissertation. Finally, Section 1.7
presented an outline of the dissertation.
Chapter 2 provided background information on the main concepts and topics that
support the discussion and explanation of the dissertation. Section 2.1 presented the logical
architecture of a mobile application on different layers and their interaction. Section 2.2,
2.3, and 2.4 reviewed, respectively, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo &
Kuhn, 1992), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) (Bell & La Padula, 1976), and
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) (Department of Defense, 1985). Section 2.5 reviewed
the application programming interface (API) concept which is instrumental in support of
permissions based on which user is authorized to which API service. Section 2.6 explained
the Fast Healthcare Interoperable Resources (FHIR) specification (FHIR DSTU2, 2015)
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and the HAPI FHIR reference implementation (HAPI FHIR, 2014), which support the
proof-of-concept discussion in Chapter 6. Section 2.7 introduced and reviewed the
Connecticut Concussion Tracker (CT2) mobile application, a collaboration between the
Departments of Physiology and Neurobiology, and Computer Science & Engineering at
the University of Connecticut and Schools of Nursing and Medicine in support of a new
law passed to track concussions of children from kindergarten through high school in
public schools (CT Law HB6722) (Connecticut General Assembly, 2015).
Chapter 3 contained a detailed discussion of a unified model of access control for
mobile applications. Section 3.1 introduced definitions for the generalized structure of a
mobile application. Section 3.2 reviewed definitions for RBAC and MAC including: roles,
sets of roles, users, sets of users’ clearances and classifications for MAC. Section 3.3
presented definitions for RBAC permissions on the user interface. Section 3.4 presented
definitions for RBAC and MAC permissions on the mobile application API that is
partitioned into secure/unsecure services (RBAC) and labeled/unlabeled services (MAC);
and discussed service permission assignment to roles and users. Section 3.5 detailed
definitions for DAC that included the delegation of permissions from one user/group to
another user/group for RBAC permissions on the UI of a mobile application and RBAC
and/or MAC permissions on the services of the mobile application API. Collectively, the
model presented in Sections 3.1 to 3.5, allowed for the ability to model RBAC, MAC,
and/or DAC on the mobile application and its API and supports contribution B: Unified
Mobile Computing and Security Model with Access Control from Section 1.5 of Chapter
1. Section 3.6 discussed the ability to take the model concepts as given in Sections 3.1 to
3.5 and pick-and-choose in order to define and design a unique set of security capabilities
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for each mobile application; this supports contribution C: Dynamic Combination of Access
Control Models and Configuration Options. Section 3.7 contained an entity relationship
diagram to store information programmatically from the Unified Security Model in
Sections 3.1 to 3.5. Finally, Section 3.8 presented related work on access control in mobile
computing.
Chapter 4 presented the security policy definition and generation process for the
screens, components, and interactions of the user interface for the Direct UI Modifications
option (see Section 1.4 and Figure 1.3 again) that changes the look-and-feel of the UI
according to RBAC and/or DAC permissions. Section 4.1 reviewed a subset of the model
and permissions from Chapter 3 for the mobile app UI that define which screens and
components can be viewed/edited/viewed once/enabled/hidden in order to customize the
look-and-feel of the UI by role. Section 4.2 reviewed a subset of the ER diagram for the
unified security model in Figure 3.3 of Section 3.7, focusing on UI, screens, components,
screen interactions, users, roles, permissions, and optional delegation with examples using
the CT2 mobile app. Section 4.3 explained the programmatic changes that must be made to
the mobile application itself to allow for the screens and their components to be
customized. Section 4.4 provided a guide that stated which programmatic changes need to
be done in a mobile app in order to apply the Direct UI Modifications option. Finally,
Section 4.5 presented related work on the customization of user interfaces via adaptive UIs
and the usage of RBAC.
Chapter 5 presented the Intercepting API calls option on the interactions between
the UI and the mobile applications’ API services to control by RBAC, MAC, and/or DAC
permissions which services are allowed to be invoked on a user-by-user basis through the
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generation of an intercepting API that mirrors the original mobile applications API. Section
5.1 motivated the Intercepting API Calls option by explaining the important role of the API
in accessing information, especially PPI and PHI. Section 5.2 presented the high-level
processing of the Intercepting API Calls option using the classic architecture of the User
Layer, Presentation Layer, Business Layer, and, Data Layer. Section 5.3 explored the
underlying processing of the Intercepting API Calls option by examining the way that API
services are categorized. Section 5.4 examined the Interactions and Infrastructure for the
Intercepting API Calls option. Section 5.5 explored the algorithm generation process for
the Intercepting API Calls option. Section 5.6 illustrated the Intercepting API Calls option
via the CT2 mHealth application. Finally, Section 5.7 discussed related work in security
and access control mechanisms for mobile applications.
Chapter 6 presented the Server Interceptor API option on the interactions between
the mobile application’s API services and their invocations to server-side APIs of data
sources, with a server interceptor API defined using the HAPI FHIR reference
implementation. Section 6.1 motivated the way that the Intercepting API Calls option as
given in Chapter 5 is adapted and evolved to the Server Interceptor API option. Section 6.2
reviewed the HAPI FHIR reference implementation capabilities with a focus on the
intercepting process. Section 6.3 presented a set of modifications that incorporate RBAC,
MAC, and DAC into the FHIR specification and its realization within the HAPI FHIR
reference implementation. To demonstrate the inclusion and realization of RBAC, MAC,
and DAC for a mHealth app within HAPI FHIR, Section 6.4 provided an implementation
of the service-based access control approach by using the Connecticut Concussion Tracker
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(CT2) mHealth app and the OpenEMR HIT system (OpenEMR, 2002). Finally, Section 6.5
reviewed related works and compared and contrasted these to the work of this chapter.

7.2.

Research Contributions
This section revisits the expected research contributions given in Section 1.5 of

Chapter 1 and provides insight of their attainment across the chapters of the dissertation.
The Configurable Framework for RBAC, MAC, and DAC for Mobile Applications has the
following contributions:
A. Software Architecture for a Configurable Access Control Framework for
Mobile Applications: The contribution involved the specification, design, and
description of a software architecture for the configurable access control framework
as given in Figure 1.4 of Chapter 1. This facilitates the ability to insert role-based,
mandatory, and discretionary access controls at alternate and multiple locations
throughout the architecture. In support of this contribution, Chapters 4, 5, and 6
provided details of the architecture of the different options that are part of the
configurable framework (shown in Figure 1.3 of Chapter 1): Direct UI
Modifications option (Figure 4.4 of Chapter 4), Intercepting API Calls option
(Figure 5.1 of Chapter 5), and Server Interceptor API option (Figure 6.4 of Chapter
6).
B. Unified Mobile Computing and Security Model with Access Control: The first
four components in Figure 1.4 of Chapter 1 (i.e., Mobile Application, Mobile
Application Clients, Access Control Models, and Permissions and Impact on
Mobile App) all influenced the creation of a unified mobile computing and security
model which contains: a generalized structure of a mobile application as a user
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interface of screens, components (text fields, drop down, buttons, etc.), and
interactions among screens (Defns. 1-5 in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3); roles, sets of
roles, users, and sets of users (Defns. 6-12 in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3); permission
assignments of users and roles on screens, components, and interactions (Defns.
13-16 in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3); mobile application API that is partitioned into
secure/unsecure services (RBAC) (Defn. 17 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3) and
labeled/unlabeled services (MAC) (Defns. 18 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3); service
permission assignment to roles and users (Defns. 19-21 in Section 3.4 of Chapter
3); and, delegation permissions assignment (Defns. 22-33 in Section 3.5 of Chapter
3). This allowed the ability to model role-based, mandatory, and discretionary
access controls on the mobile application and the mobile app’s API and server-side
APIs of data sources.
C. Dynamic Combination of Access Control Models and Configuration Options:
The third and fourth components in Figure 1.4 of Chapter 1 (i.e., Access Control
Models, Permissions and Impact on Mobile App) are combinable on different ways.
The contribution provides the ability to combine different aspects of access control
models (RBAC, MAC, and DAC), of the mobile application (UI, API, and APIs of
Data Source), and of the configuration options (Direct UI Modifications,
Intercepting API Calls, and Server Interceptor API) into custom access control
solutions for a mobile application as given in Table 3.11 in Section 3.6 of Chapter
3. Each allowable combinations in Table 3.11 when selected results in the
Generation of Security Policies (fifth component in Figure 1.4) which in turn
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supports the specific Enforcement of Security Policies (sixth component in Figure
1.4).
D. Access Control Security Enforcement Code Generation and Interceptors: The
fifth and sixth components in Figure 1.4 of Chapter 1 (i.e., Generation of Security
Policies and Enforcement of Security Policies) are the programmatic changes or
generation of interceptor code for the configuration framework (research
contribution A) and the chosen combination (Contribution C) under the unified
model (Contribution B). For the Direct UI Modifications option, a process for
modifying mobile app code was described in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of Chapter 4 with
associated source code given in Appendix A. Processes for the Direct UI
Modifications are often human assisted and involve the need to actually modify
limited portions of the mobile application code, API, and/or server database. For
the Intercepting API Calls and Server Interceptor API options, algorithms were
generated for the different configuration options for the framework that support the
interceptors for the Intercepting API Calls (pseudocode and source code explained
on Section 5.5 of Chapter 5 and fully shown on Appendix B), and Server Interceptor
API options (pseudocode and source code explained on Sections 6.3 and 6.4, and
fully shown on Appendix C). Algorithms for the Intercepting API Calls, and Server
Interceptor API options were defined for those cases where actual code is
generated.

7.3.

Ongoing and Future Work
The work presented in this dissertation can serve as a foundation for further

enhancements and extensions. A list of ongoing and future topics includes: incorporating
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additional access control models in support of Direct UI Modifications, Intercepting API
Calls, and Server Interceptor API options; supporting alternate cloud frameworks for the
interceptor; Partial RBAC UI Delegation to have fine-grained control on delegating a
subset of screens and/or component permissions; controlling access to services by instances
to limit which data can be modified; time-based permissions for the UI and API which have
the ability to expire; and, inclusion of additional mobile apps and data sources to
demonstrate feasibility of the work.
Incorporating Additional Access Control Models: Currently, our configurable
framework utilizes RBAC, MAC, and DAC to enforce security mechanisms on different
parts of the mobile application architecture in support of Direct UI Modifications,
Intercepting API Calls, and Server Interceptor API options. As part of future work, we are
considering additional access control models. For example, attribute-based access control
(ABAC) and identity-based access control (IBAC) can be useful to generate finer-grained
access control and to contemplate other healthcare scenarios that could benefit from these
models (e.g., granting access to a user if he/she is on an specific location for perhaps a
physician that moves among locations). This future work will require additions to both the
unified security model and interceptors.
Supporting Alternate Cloud Frameworks for the Interceptor: Presently, our
Server Interceptor API option of the configurable framework relies on the HAPI FHIR
library in order to implement the server interceptors that enforce security on the server-side
APIs. As part of ongoing and future work, we are contemplating to support other cloud
frameworks such as openstack (openstack, 2012) and cloud stack (Apache Cloud Stack,
2016). In addition, we are exploring the generalization of our service-based RBAC, MAC,
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and DAC approach with HAPI FHIR in order to obtain a solution that can be utilized in
other apps that implement FHIR, and more generally, in other cloud computing
frameworks.
Partial RBAC UI Delegation: Recall that the Direct UI Modifications option of
the configurable framework can enforce RBAC and DAC permissions on the screens,
screen components, and screen interactions of a mobile application. Specifically, DAC
permissions allow an original user (see Defn. 22 on Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 again) or a
delegated user (see Defn. 24 on Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 again) with pass-on-delegation
authority (see Defn. 27 on Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 again) to delegate his/her full UI
permissions (see Defn. 28 on Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 again) to a delegated user. The future
work considers DAC delegations that could be more fine-grained by allowing users to
delegate a subset of their UI permissions meaning that they would have the choice to
delegate a subset of the screens, screen components, and screen interactions they have
access to instead of all of these permissions as it currently does.
Controlling Access to Services by Instances: As previously mentioned, our
configurable framework supports the assignment of a role and/or clearance to users of a
mobile application to control access to the mobile app services and server-side services.
However, we want to control which values the user can send/retrieve from the data source
instead of allowing them to send/retrieve all of the values that the service contains. In other
words, we want to be able to control which parts of the data a user can add/update/delete
from the mobile application and, which data a user can retrieve when he/she requests it
through the means of an API service. For example, in the CT2 mHealth app, we would want
to limit parents to only have access to the data of their own children, or in a school district
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that has multiple schools, limit a nurse to only seeing students within his/her school. This
work might also be achieved by constraining the parameters and/or return types values on
a service by service basis.
Time-Based Permissions for UI and APIs: Currently, a user has access to the UI
screens and screen components of a mobile app, and to the API services depending on their
role/clearance/MAC properties/delegations. This future work would augment these
permissions with time constraints that are definable on users, roles, UI permissions, service
permissions, etc., so a particular user/role or user/clearance only has access to a specific
UI component/API service at certain periods of time. For instance, suppose a user contains
a role that should only be available from 9am to 5pm on weekdays. With time-based
permissions we can restrict the user to the specified role between that period of time and
could assign another role that has less privileges on the weekends, for instance.
Inclusion of Additional Mobile Apps and Data Sources: In examples throughout
the dissertation, we relied on the the CT2 mHealth app and OpenEMR data source to test
the Direct UI Modifications, Intercepting API Calls, and Server Interceptor API options;
nonetheless, the app only connects to one data source. Therefore, we plan to continue to
test our approach with other mHealth apps that obtain data from multiple data sources and
determine if this affects our configurable framework. For example, ShareMyHealth is an
mHealth app developed over the last year, by a team of undergraduate students at the
University of Connecticut, for Android and iOS devices. ShareMyHealth provides patients
with a means to manage and share their fitness data across multiple systems. Patients can
gather data from multiple sources (e.g., MyGoogle, OpenEMR, etc.) that can then be made
available to medical providers. Applying our configurable framework to ShareMyHealth
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can led us to consider if we need to make modifications to the framework in terms of
contemplating other locations to enforce access control mechanisms and also determine
how we could add such mechanisms to the APIs if they have existing access control
permissions.
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Appendix
Appendix A – Sample Programmatic Changes for CT2 (Android version)
RBAC API – getScreenAccessJSON method:
public static int getScreenAccessJSON(int roleId, int screenId) {
String action = "/screenaccesses";
String params = "/" + roleId + "/" + screenId;
try {
JSONArray json = ServerConnectionHelper.toJSONArray
(ServerConnectionHelper.serverAsyncRequestGet
(action + params, LOCALSERVER_URL_API4430));
//Get screen permission based on the user’s role
screenAccess = new Screens(json.getJSONObject(0));
}
catch (Throwable t) {
t.printStackTrace();
}
return screenAccess.getAccess();
}

Screen Permissions:
public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setContentView(R.layout.tabs_activity);
setTitle(R.string.app_head_name);
// resource object to get drawables
Resources res = getResources();
// the activity TabHost
TabHost tabHost = getTabHost();
// reusable TabSpec for each tab
TabHost.TabSpec spec;
// reusable intent for each tab
Intent intent;
Bundle bundle = getIntent().getExtras();
int value = bundle.getInt("RoleID");
userID=bundle.getInt("UserID");
language=bundle.getInt("language");
// retrieve extras from intent
Bundle extras = getIntent().getExtras();
stateID = extras.getString("StateID");
cityID=extras.getString("CityID");
districtID=extras.getString("DistrictID");
schoolID=extras.getString("SchoolID");
this.school_id=schoolID;
// Search Tab
intent = new Intent().setClass(this, SearchStudentsActivity.class);
intent.putExtra("StateID", stateID);
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intent.putExtra("CityID", cityID);
intent.putExtra("DistrictID", districtID);
intent.putExtra("SchoolID", schoolID);
intent.putExtra("UserID", userID);
intent.putExtra("RoleID", value);
intent.putExtra("language", language);
spec = tabHost.newTabSpec("home").setIndicator
(getString(R.string.home),res.getDrawable
(R.drawable.ic_tab_home)).setContent(intent);
tabHost.addTab(spec);
// List of Students Tab
intent = new Intent().setClass(this, ListOfStudentsActivity.class);
intent.putExtra("StateID", stateID);
intent.putExtra("CityID", cityID);
intent.putExtra("DistrictID", districtID);
intent.putExtra("SchoolID", schoolID);
intent.putExtra("UserID", userID);
intent.putExtra("RoleID", value);
intent.putExtra("language", language);
spec = tabHost.newTabSpec("list").setIndicator
(getString(R.string.list),res.getDrawable
(R.drawable.ic_tab_list)).setContent(intent);
tabHost.addTab(spec);
// New Student Tab move
intent = new Intent().setClass(this, HomeAddNewStudentActivity.class);
intent.putExtra("StateID", stateID);
intent.putExtra("CityID", cityID);
intent.putExtra("DistrictID", districtID);
intent.putExtra("SchoolID", schoolID);
intent.putExtra("UserID", userID);
intent.putExtra("RoleID", value);
intent.putExtra("language", language);
spec = tabHost.newTabSpec("addNewStudent").setIndicator
(getString(R.string.student),res.getDrawable
(R.drawable.ic_tab_student)).setContent(intent);
tabHost.addTab(spec);
// Cause of Injury Tab
intent = new Intent().setClass(this, CauseOfInjuryActivity.class);
intent.putExtra("StateID", stateID);
intent.putExtra("CityID", cityID);
intent.putExtra("DistrictID", districtID);
intent.putExtra("SchoolID", schoolID);
intent.putExtra("UserID", userID);
intent.putExtra("RoleID", value);
intent.putExtra("language", language);
spec = tabHost.newTabSpec("cause").setIndicator
(getString(R.string.cause), res.getDrawable
(R.drawable.ic_tab_cause)).setContent(intent);
tabHost.addTab(spec);
// Immediate Symptoms Tab
intent = new Intent().setClass(this, ImmediateSymptomsActivity.class);
intent.putExtra("StateID", stateID);
intent.putExtra("CityID", cityID);
intent.putExtra("DistrictID", districtID);
intent.putExtra("SchoolID", schoolID);
intent.putExtra("UserID", userID);
intent.putExtra("RoleID", value);

185

intent.putExtra("language", language);
spec = tabHost.newTabSpec("symptoms").setIndicator
(getString(R.string.symptoms),res.getDrawable
(R.drawable.ic_tab_symptoms)).setContent(intent);
tabHost.addTab(spec);
// Injury Follow-up Tab
intent = new Intent().setClass(this, InjuryFollowUpActivity.class);
intent.putExtra("StateID", stateID);
intent.putExtra("CityID", cityID);
intent.putExtra("DistrictID", districtID);
intent.putExtra("SchoolID", schoolID);
intent.putExtra("UserID", userID);
intent.putExtra("RoleID", value);
intent.putExtra("language", language);
spec = tabHost.newTabSpec("follow_up").setIndicator
(getString(R.string.injury_follow_up), res.getDrawable
(R.drawable.ic_tab_follow_up)).setContent(intent);
tabHost.addTab(spec);
// Return to Learn Tab
intent = new Intent().setClass(this,ReturnToLearnActivity.class);
intent.putExtra("StateID", stateID);
intent.putExtra("CityID", cityID);
intent.putExtra("DistrictID", districtID);
intent.putExtra("SchoolID", schoolID);
intent.putExtra("UserID", userID);
intent.putExtra("RoleID", value);
intent.putExtra("language", language);
spec = tabHost.newTabSpec("return").setIndicator
(getString(R.string.return_to_learn), res.getDrawable
(R.drawable.ic_tab_return)).setContent(intent);
tabHost.addTab(spec);
// set the current tab (default Home)
tabHost.setCurrentTab(0);
for(int i = 1; i <= 7; i++) {
if (ServerConnection.getScreenAccessJSON(value, i) == 0)
{
tabHost.getTabWidget().getChildAt(i).setVisibility(View.GONE);
}
}
}
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Appendix B – Intercepting API
Generate Code for the Intercepting API
<?php
function echoInterceptingClassStart($write_file){
$start_string = "<?php
require_once \"renamedConcussionUConn.php\";
require_once \"JWT/APIJWT.php\";\n\n\n
class ConcussionUConn {
public function __construct(){
session_start();
\$this->dbServerName = \"localhost\";
\$this->dbUser = \"root\";
\$this->dbPassword = \"--------\";
\$this->dbName = \"concussion_uconn\";
}";
fwrite($write_file, $start_string);
}
function echoAPIPermissionCheckFunctions($write_file){
$permission_check_string = "
private function verifyAPIPermissions(\$function_name) {
\$jwt = \$_SESSION['jwt'];
\$JWT = new API_JWT();
\$user_role = \$JWT->getRole(\$jwt);
if(\$user_role == NULL){
return 0;
}
\$action_id = \$this->getActionID(\$function_name);
\$role_permissions_query = 'SELECT * FROM json_calls_map_access
WHERE action_id='.\$action_id;
\$role_permissions = \$this->performQuery
(\$role_permissions_query);
foreach(\$role_permissions as \$array){
if(\$array['role_id'] == \$user_role){
return \$array['enable_disable'];
}
}
}
private function getParamNames(\$functionName){
\$paramString = \"\";
\$numCommas = 0;
\$reflectionMeth = new ReflectionMethod('ConcussionUConn',
\$functionName);
\$numParam = \$reflectionMeth->getNumberOfParameters();
foreach(\$reflectionMeth->getParameters() as \$parameter){
\$paramString = \$paramString.'\$'.\$parameter->getName();
if(\$parameter->isOptional()){
\$defaultValue = \$parameter->getDefaultValue();
if(\$defaultValue == ''){
\$defaultValue = \"''\";
}
\$paramString = \$paramString.\" = \".\$defaultValue;
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}
if(\$numCommas < (\$numParam - 1)){
\$paramString = \$paramString.\", \";
\$numCommas++;
}
}
return \$paramString;
}
private function getActionID(\$function_name){
\$action_id = NULL;
\$function_name = \$function_name.\"(\".\$this->
getParamNames(\$function_name).\")\";
\$query = \"SELECT * FROM json_calls WHERE
action='\".\$function_name.\"' ORDER BY action_id\";
\$result = \$this->performQuery(\$query);
foreach(\$result as \$array){
if(\$array['action'] == \$function_name){
\$action_id = \$array['action_id'];
}
}
return \$action_id;
}";
fwrite($write_file, $permission_check_string);
}
function echoPrivateHelperFunctions($write_file){
$helper_string = "
private function performQuery(\$query){
\$result = NULL;
\$mysqlConnection = \$this->createMySqlConnection();
\$result = \$mysqlConnection->query(\$query);
if (!\$result) {
throw new Exception(\"Database Error [{\$this->database->
errno}] {\$this->database->error}\");
} else {
\$array = array();
while(\$row = \$result->fetch_assoc()) \$array[] = \$row;
}
\$mysqlConnection->close();
return \$array;
}
private function createMySqlConnection(){
\$conn = new mysqli(\$this->dbServerName, \$this->dbUser,
\$this->dbPassword, \$this->dbName);
if (\$conn->connect_error) {
die(\"Connection failed: \" . \$conn->connect_error);
}
else{return \$conn;}
}
private function setJWT(\$username, \$hashed_password){
\$query = \"SELECT * FROM user_accounts WHERE username = \" .
\$username . \" AND hashed_password = \" . \$hashed_password;
\$result = \$this->performQuery(\$query);
foreach(\$result as \$array){
\$role_id = \$array['role_id'];
\$user_id = \$array['user_id'];
}
\$header = array('typ' => 'JWT', 'alg' => 'HS256');
\$payload = array('user_id' => \$user_id, 'role_id' => \$role_id);
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\$JWT = new API_JWT();
\$jwt = \$JWT->create(\$header, \$payload);
return \$jwt;
}";
fwrite($write_file, $helper_string);
}
function echoInterceptingClassEnd($write_file){
$end_string = "}?>";
fwrite($write_file, $end_string);
}
function echoInterceptBody($functionName, $need_permission, $setJWT,
$write_file){
$wrapper_string = "public function ".$functionName."{";
if($setJWT){
$wrapper_string = $wrapper_string."\n\t\t\$_SESSION['jwt'] = \$this>setJWT(\$username, \$hashed_password);";
}
if($need_permission){
$wrapper_string = $wrapper_string."
\$permission = \$this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if(\$permission == 1){";
}
$wrapper_string = $wrapper_string."
\$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return \$renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMED".$functionName.";";
if($need_permission){
$wrapper_string = $wrapper_string."
} else{
return NULL;
}";
}
$wrapper_string = $wrapper_string."
}
";
fwrite($write_file, $wrapper_string);
}
function getFunctions(){
$functionList = array();
$query = "SELECT * FROM json_calls";
$mysqlConnection = initMySqlConnection();
$result = getResultsFromQuery($query);
foreach($result as $array){
$functionName = $array['action'];
$need_permission = $array['need_permission'];
$setJWT = $array['setJWT'];
$functionList[] = $need_permission.$setJWT.$functionName;
}
$mysqlConnection->close();
return $functionList;
}
function getResultsFromQuery($query){
$result = NULL;
$mysqlConnection = initMySqlConnection();
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$result = $mysqlConnection->query($query);
if (!$result) {
throw new Exception("Database Error [{$this->database->errno}]
{$this->database->error}");
} else {
$array = array();
while($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) $array[] = $row;
}
$mysqlConnection->close();
return $array;
}
function initMySqlConnection(){
$dbServerName = "localhost";
$dbUser = "root";
$dbPassword = "--------";
$dbName = "concussion_uconn";
$conn = new mysqli($dbServerName, $dbUser, $dbPassword, $dbName);
if ($conn->connect_error) {
die("Connection failed: " . $conn->connect_error);
}
else
{return $conn;}
}
function createInterceptingAPI(){
$write_file = fopen("../vTest/concussionUConn.php", "w");
$functionList = getFunctions();
$numFunctions = count($functionList);
echoInterceptingClassStart($write_file);
echoAPIPermissionCheckFunctions($write_file);
for($i = 0; $i < $numFunctions; $i++){
$functionName = substr($functionList[$i], 2);
$need_permission = $functionList[$i][0];
$setJWT = $functionList[$i][1];
echoInterceptBody($functionName, $need_permission, $setJWT, $write_file);
}
echoPrivateHelperFunctions($write_file);
echoInterceptingClassEnd($write_file);
fclose($write_file);
}
createInterceptingAPI();?>

Generate Code for the Intercepting API – Output
<?php
require_once "renamedConcussionUConn.php";
require_once "JWT/APIJWT.php";
class ConcussionUConn {
public function __construct(){
session_start();
$this->dbServerName = "localhost";
$this->dbUser = "root";
$this->dbPassword = "--------";
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$this->dbName = "concussion_uconn";
}
private function verifyAPIPermissions($function_name) {
$jwt = $_SESSION['jwt'];
$JWT = new API_JWT();
$user_role = $JWT->getRole($jwt);
if($user_role == NULL){
return 0;
}
$action_id = $this->getActionID($function_name);
$role_permissions_query = 'SELECT * FROM json_calls_map_access
WHERE action_id='.$action_id;
$role_permissions = $this->performQuery($role_permissions_query);
foreach($role_permissions as $array){
if($array['role_id'] == $user_role {
return $array['enable_disable'];
}
}
}
private function getParamNames($functionName){
$paramString = "";
$numCommas = 0;
$reflectionMeth = new ReflectionMethod('ConcussionUConn',
$functionName);
$numParam = $reflectionMeth->getNumberOfParameters();
foreach($reflectionMeth->getParameters() as $parameter){
$paramString = $paramString.'$'.$parameter->getName();
if($parameter->isOptional()){
$defaultValue = $parameter->getDefaultValue();
if($defaultValue == ''){
$defaultValue = "''";
}
$paramString = $paramString." = ".$defaultValue;
}
if($numCommas < ($numParam - 1)){
$paramString = $paramString.", ";
$numCommas++;
}
}
return $paramString;
}
private function getActionID($function_name){
$action_id = NULL;
$function_name = $function_name."(".$this->getParamNames
($function_name).")";
$query = "SELECT * FROM json_calls WHERE action=
'".$function_name."' ORDER BY action_id";
$result = $this->performQuery($query);
foreach($result as $array){
if($array['action'] == $function_name){
$action_id = $array['action_id'];
}
}
return $action_id;
}
public function getListOfScreenObjects(){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetListOfScreenObjects();
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} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getListOfScreens(){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetListOfScreens();
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getListofScreenSequences(){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetListofScreenSequences();
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getScreenObjectByScreenID($screen_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetScreenObjectByScreenID($screen_id);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getScreenObjectByName($object_name){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetScreenObjectByName($object_name);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getScreenObjectByObjectID($object_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetScreenObjectByObjectID($object_id);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getObjectsLabelsByScreenID($screen_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetObjectsLabelsByScreenID($screen_id);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getScreenByID($screen_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetScreenByID($screen_id);
} else{return NULL;}
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}
public function getScreenByName($screen_name){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetScreenByName($screen_name);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getScreenSequenceByRoleID($role_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetScreenSequenceByRoleID($role_id);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getScreenSequenceByObjectID($object_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetScreenSequenceByObjectID($object_id);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getScreenSequenceByScreenID($screen_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetScreenSequenceByScreenID($screen_id);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getScreenAccessByRole($role_id, $screen_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetScreenAccessByRole($role_id, $screen_id);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function returnAllowableComponents($role_id,$screen_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDreturnAllowableComponents($role_id,$screen_id);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getNamesOfScreen($screen_id){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetNamesOfScreen($screen_id);
} else{return NULL;}
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}
public function getLabelsOfScreen($screen_id,$lang){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetLabelsOfScreen($screen_id,$lang);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getUserAccountByLogin($username, $hashed_password){
$_SESSION['jwt'] = $this->setJWT($username, $hashed_password);
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetUserAccountByLogin($username, $hashed_password);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getListOfStates(){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetListOfStates();
}
public function getListOfRegions($stateId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetListOfRegions($stateId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getListOfDistricts($regionId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetListOfDistricts($regionId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getListOfSchools($districtId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetListOfSchools($districtId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getSchoolDetails($schoolId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetSchoolDetails($schoolId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
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public function getDistrictAndRegionBySchool($schoolId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetDistrictAndRegionBySchool($schoolId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getStateByRegion($regionId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetStateByRegion($regionId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function addEmployee($employeeObject){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDaddEmployee($employeeObject);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getEmployee($userId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetEmployee($userId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getEmployees(){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetEmployees();
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getUserRoleSchoolId($userId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetUserRoleSchoolId($userId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getUsersRoleSchoolSport(){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetUsersRoleSchoolSport();
} else{return NULL;}
}
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public function addUserRoleSchool($userRoleSchool){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDaddUserRoleSchool($userRoleSchool);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function addUserAccount($userAccountObject){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDaddUserAccount($userAccountObject);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getUserAccount($userId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetUserAccount($userId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getUserAccounts(){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetUserAccounts();
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getUsers(){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetUsers();
}
public function getUserById($userId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetUserById($userId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getSchoolStudents($schoolId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetSchoolStudents($schoolId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getStudentByID($studentId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
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RENAMEDgetStudentByID($studentId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function searchForStudents($firstName = '', $lastName = ''){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDsearchForStudents($firstName = '', $lastName = '');
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getStudentGuardians($studentId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetStudentGuardians($studentId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function addStudent($studentObject){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDaddStudent($studentObject);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function updateStudent($studentObject, $studentId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDupdateStudent($studentObject, $studentId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function addStudentGuardian($studentGuardian){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDaddStudentGuardian($studentGuardian);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function updateStudentGuardian($studentGuardian, $guardianId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDupdateStudentGuardian($studentGuardian,
$guardianId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getConcussion($concussionId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
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return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetConcussion($concussionId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getConcussionsByUserID($concussionId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetConcussionsByUserID($concussionId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getConcussionFollowups($concussionId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetConcussionFollowups($concussionId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getSymptomsWithRecord($recordId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetSymptomsWithRecord($recordId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getSchoolConcussions($schoolId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetSchoolConcussions($schoolId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getStudentConcussions($studentId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetStudentConcussions($studentId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getUserConcussionsByID($userId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetUserConcussionsByID($userId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getIncidentOperationHistory($incidentId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
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return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetIncidentOperationHistory($incidentId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getFollowUpOperationHistory($followupId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetFollowUpOperationHistory($followupId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function changeIncidentStatus($incidentId, $status){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDchangeIncidentStatus($incidentId, $status);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function addConcussionEvent($concussionEvent){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDaddConcussionEvent($concussionEvent);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function updateConcussionEvent($concussionEvent, $incidentId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDupdateConcussionEvent($concussionEvent,
$incidentId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function addConcussionEventFollowup($concussionEventUpdate,
$incidentId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDaddConcussionEventFollowup($concussionEventUpdate,
$incidentId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function updateConcussionEventFollowup($concussionEventUpdate,
$followUpId, $lingeringSymptomsRecordId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDupdateConcussionEventFollowup($concussionEventUpdate
, $followUpId, $lingeringSymptomsRecordId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
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public function getEventSymptoms($referenceId){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetEventSymptoms($referenceId);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function getAssessmentTools(){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetAssessmentTools();
}
public function getEventLocations(){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetEventLocations();
}
public function getContactMechanisms(){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetContactMechanisms();
}
public function getImpactHeadLocations(){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetImpactHeadLocations();
}
public function getSports(){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetSports();
}
public function getSymptoms($type = 2){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetSymptoms($type = 2);
}
public function getRoles(){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetRoles();
} else{
return NULL;
}
}
public function getMedicalImaging(){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->RENAMEDgetMedicalImaging();
}
public function getDiagnosingRoles(){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDgetDiagnosingRoles();
}
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public function importSchoolDistrict($districtName, $ctrName){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDimportSchoolDistrict($districtName, $ctrName);
} else{return NULL;}
}
public function importSchool($districtName, $schoolName){
$permission = $this->verifyAPIPermissions(__FUNCTION__);
if($permission == 1){
$renamedConcussionUConn = new renamedConcussionUConn();
return $renamedConcussionUConn->
RENAMEDimportSchool($districtName, $schoolName);
} else{return NULL;}
}
private function performQuery($query){
$result = NULL;
$mysqlConnection = $this->createMySqlConnection();
$result = $mysqlConnection->query($query);
if (!$result) {
throw new Exception("Database Error [{$this->database->
errno}] {$this->database->error}");
} else {
$array = array();
while($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) $array[] = $row;
}
$mysqlConnection->close();
return $array;
}
private function createMySqlConnection(){
$conn = new mysqli($this->dbServerName, $this->dbUser, $this>dbPassword, $this->dbName);
if ($conn->connect_error) {
die("Connection failed: " . $conn->connect_error);
}
else{
return $conn;
}
}
private function setJWT($username, $hashed_password){
$query = "SELECT * FROM user_accounts WHERE username = " .
$username . " AND hashed_password = " . $hashed_password;
$result = $this->performQuery($query);
foreach($result as $array){
$role_id = $array['role_id'];
$user_id = $array['user_id'];
}
$header = array('typ' => 'JWT', 'alg' => 'HS256');
$payload = array('user_id' => $user_id, 'role_id' => $role_id);
$JWT = new API_JWT();
$jwt = $JWT->create($header, $payload);
return $jwt;
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}
}
?>

Renaming API Code
<?php
function renameAPI(){
$concussionUConnFile = fopen("../concussionUConn.php", "r");
$write_file = fopen("../vTest/RENAMEDConcussionUConn.php", "w");
$functionList = array();
$renameFunction = 0;
$renameClass = 0;
while(!feof($concussionUConnFile)){
$line = fgets($concussionUConnFile);
$lineArray = explode(' ', $line);
$write_string = "";
for($i = 0; $i < count($lineArray); $i++){
if($renameClass == 1){
$write_string =
$write_string."RENAMED".$lineArray[$i];
$renameClass = -1;
}else if($renameFunction == 1){
$write_string =
$write_string."RENAMED".$lineArray[$i];
$renameFunction = 0;
} else{
$write_string = $write_string.$lineArray[$i]." ";
}
if($lineArray[$i] == "function" && $i < count($lineArray)-1
&& $i > 0){
if(substr($lineArray[$i+1], 0, 2)!="__" &&
$lineArray[$i-1] == "public"){
$renameFunction = 1;
}
}
if($lineArray[$i] == "class" && $renameClass == 0){
$renameClass = 1;
}
}
fwrite($write_file, $write_string);
}
fclose($concussionUConnFile);
fclose($write_file);
}
renameAPI();?>

Renaming API Code - Output
<?php
class RENAMEDConcussionUConn
{
public function __construct(){
$this->dbServerName = "localhost";
$this->dbUser = "root";
$this->dbPassword = "--------";
$this->dbName = "concussion_uconn";
}
public function RENAMEDgetListOfScreenObjects(){
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$sql = "SELECT * FROM screen_objects ORDER BY object_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetListOfScreens(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screens ORDER BY screen_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetListofScreenSequences(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screen_objects ORDER BY screen_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetScreenObjectByScreenID($screen_id){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screen_objects WHERE screen_id = " . $screen_id . "
ORDER BY object_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetScreenObjectByName($object_name){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screen_objects WHERE object_name = " .$object_name.
" ORDER BY object_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetScreenObjectByObjectID($object_id){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screen_objects WHERE object_id = " . $object_id . "
ORDER BY object_name";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetObjectsLabelsByScreenID($screen_id){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screen_objects_labels WHERE screen_id = " .
$screen_id . " ORDER BY object_screen_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetScreenByID($screen_id){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screens WHERE screen_id = " . $screen_id . " ORDER
BY screen_name";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetScreenByName($screen_name){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screens WHERE screen_name = " . $screen_name . "
ORDER BY screen_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetScreenSequenceByRoleID($role_id){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screen_sequence WHERE role_id = " . $role_id . "
ORDER BY screen_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetScreenSequenceByObjectID($object_id){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screen_sequence WHERE object_id = " . $object_id .
" ORDER BY screen_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
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public function RENAMEDgetScreenSequenceByScreenID($screen_id){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screen_sequence WHERE screen_id = " . $screen_id .
" ORDER BY role_id";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetScreenAccessByRole($role_id,$screen_id){
$sql = "SELECT role_id,screen_id,access FROM screen_access WHERE
screen_id = "
. $screen_id . " AND role_id = " . $role_id;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDreturnAllowableComponents($role_id,$screen_id){
$sql = "SELECT role_id,screen_id,access,visibility FROM object_access
WHERE role_id=".$role_id." AND screen_id=".$screen_id;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetNamesOfScreen($screen_id){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM screens WHERE screen_id = ".$screen_id;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetLabelsOfScreen($screen_id,$lang){
if($lang == 1){
$sql = "SELECT objects_screen_id, object_name_e from
screen_objects_labels WHERE screen_id = ".$screen_id;
}
else{
$sql = "SELECT objects_screen_id, object_name_s from
screen_objects_labels WHERE screen_id = ".$screen_id;
}
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetUserAccountByLogin($username,$hashed_password){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM user_accounts WHERE username = " . $username . "
AND hashed_password = " . $hashed_password;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetListOfStates(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM state_territory ORDER BY state_name";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetListOfRegions($stateId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM city_town_region WHERE state_id = " . $stateId . "
ORDER BY ctr_Name";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetListOfDistricts($regionId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM districts WHERE ctr_id = " . $regionId . " ORDER BY
district_name";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
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public function RENAMEDgetListOfSchools($districtId){
if($districtId != "all"){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM schools WHERE district_id = " . $districtId
. " ORDER BY school_name";
} else {
$sql = "SELECT * FROM schools ORDER BY school_name";
}
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetSchoolDetails($schoolId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM schools, school_details WHERE schools.school_id =
school_details.school_id AND schools.school_id = " . $schoolId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetDistrictAndRegionBySchool($schoolId){
$sql = "SELECT district_id, ctr_id FROM schools WHERE school_id=" .
$schoolId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetStateByRegion($regionId){
$sql = "SELECT state_id FROM city_town_region WHERE ctr_id = ".$regionId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDaddEmployee($employeeObject){
$sqlEmployee = "INSERT INTO employees (user_id, first_name, middle_name,
last_name, suffix, email, title, employee_id, phone)
VALUES (" . $employeeObject->userId . ",
'" . $employeeObject->firstName . "','" . $employeeObject->
middleName . "',
'" . $employeeObject->lastName . "','" . $employeeObject->suffix . "',
'" . $employeeObject->email . "','" . $employeeObject->title . "',
" . $employeeObject->employeeId . ",'" . $employeeObject->phone . "')";
$recordId = $this->addRecord($sqlEmployee);
if($recordId){return 1;}
else
{return 0;}
}
public function RENAMEDgetEmployee($userId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM employees WHERE user_id = ". $userId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetEmployees(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM employees";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetUserRoleSchoolId($userId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM school_users_roles WHERE user_id = ". $userId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetUsersRoleSchoolSport(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM school_users_roles";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
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public function RENAMEDaddUserRoleSchool($userRoleSchool){
$sqlUser = "INSERT INTO school_users_roles (user_id,
role_id,school_id,student_id) VALUES (" . $userRoleSchool->userId . ",
" . $userRoleSchool->roleId . ",
" . $userRoleSchool->schoolId .",". $userRoleSchool->studentId.")";
$recordId = $this->addRecord($sqlUser);
if($recordId)
{return $recordId;}
else
{return 0;}
}
public function RENAMEDaddUserAccount($userAccountObject){
$sqlUserAccount = "INSERT INTO user_accounts (
email,username,hashed_password,enabled,role_id)
VALUES ('" . $userAccountObject->email . "',
'" . $userAccountObject->username . "',
'" . $userAccountObject->hashedPassword . "',
" . $userAccountObject->enabled . ",
" . $userAccountObject->roleId . ")";
$userId = $this->addNewRecord($sqlUserAccount);
if($userId)
{return $userId;}
else
{return 0;}
}
public function RENAMEDgetUserAccount($userId){
$sql = "SELECT user_id, email, username, hashed_password, enabled,
role_id
FROM user_accounts
WHERE user_id = ". $userId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetUserAccounts(){
$sql = "SELECT user_id, email, username, hashed_password, enabled,
role_id
FROM user_accounts";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetUsers(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM users";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetUserById($userId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE user_id = ".$userId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetSchoolStudents($schoolId){
$sql = "SELECT students.student_id, first_name, middle_name, last_name,
suffix, email, student_number, school_id, date_of_birth, gender FROM
students, student_demographics
WHERE students.student_id = student_demographics.student_id
AND school_id = " . $schoolId . "
ORDER BY last_name";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
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public function RENAMEDgetStudentByID($studentId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM students, student_demographics
WHERE students.student_id = " . $studentId . "AND
student_demographics.student_id = " . $studentId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDsearchForStudents($firstName= '', $lastName = ''){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM (SELECT students.student_id, first_name,
middle_name, last_name, suffix, email, student_number, school_id,
date_of_birth, gender FROM students, student_demographics WHERE
students.student_id = student_demographics.student_id) AS A
WHERE A.first_name LIKE '%" . $firstName . "%' OR A.last_name LIKE '%"
. $lastName . "%' ORDER BY A.last_name";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetStudentGuardians($studentId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM parents_or_guardians WHERE student_id = " .
$studentId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDaddStudent($studentObject){
$sqlGeneralStudent = "INSERT INTO students
(first_name,middle_name,last_name,
suffix,email,student_number,school_id)
VALUES ('" . $studentObject->firstName . "',
'" . $studentObject->middleName . "','" . $studentObject->lastName . "',
'" . $studentObject->suffix . "','" . $studentObject->email . "',
'" . $studentObject->studentNumber . "'," . $studentObject-> schoolId .
")";
$recordId = $this->addNewRecord($sqlGeneralStudent);
if($recordId){
$sqlStudentDemo = "INSERT INTO student_demographics (student_id,
date_of_birth,
gender)
VALUES ('" . $recordId . "',
'" . $studentObject->dateOfBirth . "',
'" . $studentObject->gender . "')";
if($this->addRecord($sqlStudentDemo)) return $recordId;
else return $recordId;
}
else{return 0;}
}
public function RENAMEDupdateStudent($studentObject,$studentId){
$sqlGeneralStudent = "UPDATE students SET first_name =
'" . $studentObject->firstName . "',
middle_name = '" . $studentObject->middleName . "',
last_name = '" . $studentObject->lastName . "',
suffix = '" . $studentObject->suffix . "',
email = '" . $studentObject->email . "',
student_number = '" . $studentObject->studentNumber . "',
school_id = '" . $studentObject->schoolId . "'
WHERE student_id = " . $studentId;
$recordId = $this->updateRecord($sqlGeneralStudent);
if($recordId){
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$sqlStudentDemo = "UPDATE student_demographics date_of_birth = '"
. $studentObject->dateOfBirth . "',
gender = '" . $studentObject->gender . "'
WHERE student_id = " . $studentId;
if($this->updateRecord($sqlStudentDemo)) return 1;
else return 2;
}
else{return 0;}
}
public function RENAMEDaddStudentGuardian($studentGuardian){
$sqlGeneralStudent = "INSERT INTO parents_or_guardians (student_id,
parent_name,parent_email,parent_phone,parent_address,`primary`)
VALUES (" . $studentGuardian->studentId . ",
'" . $studentGuardian->name . "','" . $studentGuardian->email . "',
'" . $studentGuardian->phone . "','" . $studentGuardian->address . "',
" . $studentGuardian->isPrimary . ")";
return $this->addNewRecord($sqlGeneralStudent);
}
public function RENAMEDupdateStudentGuardian($studentGuardian,$guardianId){
$sqlGeneralStudent = "UPDATE parents_or_guardians SET student_id = " .
$studentGuardian->studentId . ",parent_name = '" . $studentGuardian->name
. "',
parent_email = '" . $studentGuardian->email . "',
parent_phone = '" . $studentGuardian->phone . "',
parent_address = '" . $studentGuardian->address . "',
primary` = " . $studentGuardian->isPrimary . "
WHERE guardian_id = " . $guardianId;
return $this->updateRecord($sqlGeneralStudent);
}
public function RENAMEDgetConcussion($concussionId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incidents WHERE incident_id = " . $concussionId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function getConcussionsByUserID($concussionId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incidents WHERE reporting_user_id = ".
$concussionId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetConcussionFollowups($concussionId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incident_updates WHERE incident_id = " .
$concussionId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetSymptomsWithRecord($recordId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incident_lingering_symptoms WHERE record_id = " .
$recordId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetSchoolConcussions($schoolId){
$sql = "SELECT incidents.incident_id, incident_reference_id, student_id,
school_id, reporting_user_id, incident_location_id,
incident_location_details, school_location_id, sport_id,
contact_mechanism_id,impact_location_id,protection_present,
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loss_conciousness, parents_notified, protocol, removed,
removed_by_user_id,tool_id, symptom_comments, date, closed, updated AS
status_updated
FROM incidents, incident_status
WHERE incidents.incident_id = incident_status.incident_id
AND incidents.school_id = " . $schoolId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetStudentConcussions($studentId){
$sql = "SELECT incidents.incident_id, incident_reference_id, student_id,
school_id, reporting_user_id, incident_location_id,
incident_location_details, school_location_id, sport_id,
contact_mechanism_id, impact_location_id, protection_present,
head_gear_usage, loss_conciousness, parents_notified, protocol, removed,
removed_by_user_id, tool_id, symptom_comments, date, closed, updated AS
status_updated FROM incidents, incident_status
WHERE incidents.incident_id = incident_status.incident_id
AND incidents.student_id = " . $studentId. " ORDER BY incidents.date
DESC";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function getUserConcussionsByID($userId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM school_users_roles WHERE user_id = ". $userId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetIncidentOperationHistory($incidentId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incident_records
WHERE incident_id = " . $incidentId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetFollowUpOperationHistory($followupId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incident_records WHERE follow_up_id = ".
$followupId;
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDchangeIncidentStatus($incidentId,$status){
$sql = "UPDATE incident_status SET status = " . $status . "
WHERE incident_id = " . $incidentId;
return $this->updateRecord($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDaddConcussionEvent($concussionEvent){
$referenceId = crypt($concussionEvent->studentId .
$concussionEvent->schoolId . date('Y-m-d H:i:s'));
$sqlConcussionEvent = "INSERT INTO incidents (incident_reference_id,
student_id, school_id, reporting_user_id, incident_location_id,
incident_location_details, school_location_id, sport_id,
contact_mechanism_id, impact_location_id, protection_present,
head_gear_usage, loss_conciousness, parents_notified, protocol,
removed, removed_by_user_id, tool_id, symptom_comments, date)
VALUES ('" . $referenceId . "'," . $concussionEvent->studentId . ",
" . $concussionEvent->schoolId . "," . $concussionEvent->
reportingUserId . ",
" . $concussionEvent->incidentLocationId . ",
'" . $concussionEvent->incidentLocationDetails . "',
" . $concussionEvent->schoolLocationId . ",

209

" . $concussionEvent->sportId . "," . $concussionEvent->
contactMechanismId . ",
" . $concussionEvent->impactLocationId . ",
" . $concussionEvent->wasProtectionPresent . ",
" . $concussionEvent->headGearUsage . ",
" . $concussionEvent->wasLossOfConciousness . ",
" . $concussionEvent->parentsNotified . "," . $concussionEvent-> protocol
. ",
" . $concussionEvent->isRemoved . "," . $concussionEvent->
removedByUserId . ",
" . $concussionEvent->assessmentToolId . ",
'" . $concussionEvent->symptomComments . "'," . $concussionEvent-> date .
")";
$incidentId = $this->addNewRecord($sqlConcussionEvent);
$arrayOfSymptomsIds = $concussionEvent->symptomsArray;
$sqlConcussionEventSymptoms = "INSERT INTO incident_lingering_symptoms
(record_id, symptom_id) VALUES ";
$symptomValues = "";
foreach ($arrayOfSymptomsIds as $key => $value){
$symptomValues .= "('" .$referenceId. "', ". $value->symptomId .
"), ";
}
$sqlConcussionEventSymptoms = substr($sqlConcussionEventSymptoms .
$symptomValues, 0, -2);
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlConcussionEventSymptoms);
$sqlIncidentStatus = "INSERT INTO incident_status (incident_id) VALUES ("
. $incidentId . ")";
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlIncidentStatus);
$sqlIncidentRecordWrite = "INSERT INTO incident_records (incident_id,
operation_type_id) VALUES (" . $incidentId . ", 2)";
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlIncidentRecordWrite);
return $incidentId;
}
public function RENAMEDupdateConcussionEvent($concussionEvent,$incidentId){
$sqlConcussionEvent = "UPDATE incidents SET student_id = " .
$concussionEvent->studentId . ",school_id = " . $concussionEvent->
schoolId . ",
reporting_user_id = " . $concussionEvent->reportingUserId . ",
incident_location_id = " . $concussionEvent->incidentLocationId . ",
incident_location_details='".$concussionEvent-> incidentLocationDetails.
"',
school_location_id = " . $concussionEvent->schoolLocationId . ",
sport_id = " . $concussionEvent->sportId . ",
contact_mechanism_id = " . $concussionEvent->contactMechanismId . ",
impact_location_id = " . $concussionEvent->impactLocationId . ",
protection_present = " . $concussionEvent->wasProtectionPresent . ",
head_gear_usage = " . $concussionEvent->headGearUsage . ",
loss_conciousness = " . $concussionEvent->wasLossOfConciousness . ",
parents_notified = " . $concussionEvent->parentsNotified . ",
protocol = " . $concussionEvent->protocol . ",
removed = " . $concussionEvent->isRemoved . ",
removed_by_user_id = " . $concussionEvent->removedByUserId . ",
tool_id = " . $concussionEvent->assessmentToolId . ",
symptom_comments = '" . $concussionEvent->symptomComments . "'
WHERE incident_id = " . $incidentId;
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if ($this->updateRecord($sqlConcussionEvent)) {
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incidents WHERE incident_id = " .
$incidentId;
$result = $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
if (sizeof($result) > 1) {return 0;}
else {
$sql = "DELETE FROM incident_lingering_symptoms WHERE record_id
= '" . $result[0]["incident_reference_id"] ."'";
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sql);
$arrayOfSymptomsIds = $concussionEvent->symptomsArray;
$sqlConcussionEventSymptoms = "INSERT INTO
incident_lingering_symptoms (record_id, symptom_id) VALUES ";
$symptomValues = "";
foreach ($arrayOfSymptomsIds as $key => $value){
$symptomValues .= "('" .
$result[0]["incident_reference_id"] . "',
" . $value->symptomId . "), ";
}
$sqlConcussionEventSymptoms = substr($sqlConcussionEventSymptoms
.
$symptomValues, 0, -2);
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlConcussionEventSymptoms);
$sqlIncidentRecordWrite = "INSERT INTO incident_records
(incident_id, operation_type_id) VALUES (" . $incidentId . ",
1)";
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlIncidentRecordWrite);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
public function RENAMEDaddConcussionEventFollowup($concussionEventUpdate,
$incidentId)
{
$lingeringSymptomsRecordId = crypt($concussionEventUpdate->incidentId .
$incidentId . date('Y-m-d H:i:s'));
$arrayOfSymptomsIds = $concussionEventUpdate->lingeringSymptomsArray;
$sqlConcussionEventFollowupSymptoms = "INSERT INTO
incident_lingering_symptoms
(record_id, symptom_id) VALUES ";
$symptomValues = "";
foreach ($arrayOfSymptomsIds as $key => $value){
$symptomValues .= "('" . $lingeringSymptomsRecordId . "', " .
$value->symptomId . "), ";
}
$sqlConcussionEventFollowupSymptoms =
substr($sqlConcussionEventFollowupSymptoms .
$symptomValues, 0, -2);
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlConcussionEventFollowupSymptoms);
$sqlConcussionEventFollowup = "INSERT INTO incident_updates (incident_id,
reporting_user_id, lingering_symptoms_record_id, lingering_description,
time_resolved, diagnosed_by, pcs_diagnosis, imaging, follow_up_comments,
days_absent, scheduled_modified, plan_504, rtl_date, rtp_date, date)
VALUES (" . $concussionEventUpdate->incidentId . ",
" . $concussionEventUpdate->reportingUserId . ",
'" . $lingeringSymptomsRecordId . "',
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'" . $concussionEventUpdate->lingeringDescription . "',
" . $concussionEventUpdate->timeResolved . ",
'" . $concussionEventUpdate->diagnosedBy . "',
" . $concussionEventUpdate->pcsDiagnosis . ",
" . $concussionEventUpdate->imaging . ",
'" . $concussionEventUpdate->followUpComments . "',
" . $concussionEventUpdate->daysAbsent . ",
" . $concussionEventUpdate->scheduledModified . ",
" . $concussionEventUpdate->plan504 . ",
'" . $concussionEventUpdate->rtlDate . "',
'" . $concussionEventUpdate->rtpDate . "',
" . $concussionEventUpdate->date . ")";
$followUpId = $this->addNewRecord($sqlConcussionEventFollowup);
$sqlIncidentRecordWrite = "INSERT INTO incident_records (follow_up_id,
operation_type_id) VALUES (" . $followUpId . ", 2)";
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlIncidentRecordWrite);
return $followUpId;
}
public function RENAMEDupdateConcussionEventFollowup($concussionEventUpdate,
$followUpId, $lingeringSymptomsRecordId){
$sqlConcussionEvent = "UPDATE incident_updates SET reporting_user_id = ".
$concussionEventUpdate->reportingUserId . ",
lingering_description = '" . $concussionEventUpdate->
lingeringDescription. "',
time_resolved = " . $concussionEventUpdate->timeResolved . ",
diagnosed_by = '" . $concussionEventUpdate->diagnosedBy . "',
pcs_diagnosis = " . $concussionEventUpdate->pcsDiagnosis . ",
imaging = " . $concussionEventUpdate->imaging . ",
follow_up_comments = '" . $concussionEventUpdate->followUpComments . "',
days_absent = " . $concussionEventUpdate->daysAbsent . ",
scheduled_modified = " . $concussionEventUpdate->scheduledModified . ",
plan_504 = " . $concussionEventUpdate->plan504 . ",
rtl_date = '" . $concussionEventUpdate->rtlDate . "',
rtp_date = '" . $concussionEventUpdate->rtpDate . "'
WHERE follow_up_id = " . $followUpId;
if($this->updateRecord($sqlConcussionEvent)) {
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incident_updates WHERE follow_up_id = " .
$followUpId;
$result = $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
if(sizeof($result) > 1) {return 0;}
else {
$sql = "DELETE FROM incident_lingering_symptoms WHERE
record_id = '" .
$lingeringSymptomsRecordId ."'";
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sql);
$arrayOfSymptomsIds = $concussionEventUpdate->
lingeringSymptomsArray;
$sqlConcussionEventFollowupSymptoms = "INSERT INTO
incident_lingering_symptoms
(record_id, symptom_id) VALUES ";
$symptomValues = "";
foreach ($arrayOfSymptomsIds as $key => $value)
{
$symptomValues .= "('" . $lingeringSymptomsRecordId .
"', " . $value->symptomId . "), ";
}
$sqlConcussionEventFollowupSymptoms =
substr($sqlConcussionEventFollowupSymptoms .
$symptomValues, 0, -2);
$this->
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addRecordNoReturn($sqlConcussionEventFollowupSymptoms);
$sqlIncidentRecordWrite = "INSERT INTO incident_records
(follow_up_id, operation_type_id) VALUES (" . $followUpId .
", 1)";
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlIncidentRecordWrite);
return 1;
}
}
}
public function RENAMEDgetEventSymptoms($referenceId){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incident_lingering_symptoms WHERE record_id = '" .
$referenceId ."'";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetAssessmentTools(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM concussion_assessment_tools";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetEventLocations(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM incident_locations";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetContactMechanisms(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM contact_mechanisms";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetImpactHeadLocations(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM impact_head_location";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetSports(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM sports";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetSymptoms($type= 2){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM symptoms";
if($type == 0){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM symptoms WHERE isFollowUpType = 0";
} else if($type == 1){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM symptoms WHERE isFollowUpType = 1";
}
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetRoles(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM roles";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDgetMedicalImaging(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM medical_imaging";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
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public function RENAMEDgetDiagnosingRoles(){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM diagnosing_roles";
return $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
}
public function RENAMEDimportSchoolDistrict($districtName,$ctrName){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM city_town_region WHERE ctr_Name = '" . $ctrName .
"'";
$result = $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
if (sizeof($result) > 0) {
$sqlInsert = "INSERT INTO districts (district_name,ctr_id)
VALUES ('" . $districtName . "', " . $result[0]["ctr_id"] . ")";
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlInsert);
}
}
public function RENAMEDimportSchool($districtName,$schoolName){
$sql = "SELECT * FROM districts WHERE district_name = '" . $districtName
. "'";
$district = $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
if (count($district) > 0) {
$sql = "SELECT * FROM city_town_region WHERE ctr_id = " .
$district[0]["ctr_id"];
$ctr = $this->getResultsFromQuery($sql);
if(count($ctr) > 0) {
$sqlSchoolInsert = "INSERT INTO schools (school_name,
district_id, ctr_id) VALUES ('" . preg_replace('/[^a-zA-Z09\s]/', '',
strip_tags(html_entity_decode($schoolName))) . "',
" . $district[0]["district_id"] . ",”. $ctr[0]["ctr_id"] .
")";
$schoolId = $this->addNewRecord($sqlSchoolInsert);
$sqlSchoolDetailsInsert = "INSERT INTO school_details
(school_id, address,phone_number) VALUES (" . $schoolId .
", '--', '--')";
$this->addRecordNoReturn($sqlSchoolDetailsInsert);
}
}
}
private function getResultsFromQuery($query){
$result = NULL;
$mysqlConnection = $this->initMySqlConnection();
$result = $mysqlConnection->query($query);
if (!$result) {
throw new Exception("Database Error [{$this->database->errno}]
{$this->database->error}");
} else {
$array = array();
while($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) $array[] = $row;
}
$mysqlConnection->close();
return $array;
}
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private function addNewRecord($query){
$result = NULL;
$mysqlConnection = $this->initMySqlConnection();
$result = $mysqlConnection->query($query);
$recordId = $mysqlConnection->insert_id;
$mysqlConnection->close();
return $recordId;
}
private function addRecord($query){
$result = NULL;
$mysqlConnection = $this->initMySqlConnection();
$result = $mysqlConnection->query($query);
$mysqlConnection->close();
return $result;
}
private function addRecordNoReturn($query){
$mysqlConnection = $this->initMySqlConnection();
$mysqlConnection->query($query);
$mysqlConnection->close();
}
private function updateRecord($query){
$result = NULL;
$mysqlConnection = $this->initMySqlConnection();
$result = $mysqlConnection->query($query);
$mysqlConnection->close();
return $result;
}
private function initMySqlConnection(){
$conn = new mysqli($this->dbServerName, $this->dbUser, $this->dbPassword,
$this->dbName);
if ($conn->connect_error) {
die("Connection failed: " . $conn->connect_error);
}
else{
return $conn;
}
}
}
class Employee{
public $userId;
public $firstName;
public $middleName;
public $lastName;
public $suffix;
public $email;
public $title;
public $employeeId;
public $phone;
public function __construct($userId = 0, $firstName = 'Y',$middleName =
'K',$lastName = 'R',$suffix = '',$email = '',$title = '',$employeeId = 1,
$phone = ''){
$this->userId = $userId;
$this->firstName = $firstName;
$this->middleName = $middleName;
$this->lastName = $lastName;
$this->suffix = $suffix;
$this->email = $email;
$this->title = $title;
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$this->employeeId = $employeeId;
$this->phone = $phone;
}
}
class UserAccount{
public $email;
public $username;
public $hashedPassword;
public $enabled;
public $roleId;
public function __construct($email = '',$username = 'Jane Doe',
$hashedPassword = '',$enabled = 0, $roleId = 1){
$this->email = $email;
$this->username = $username;
$this->hashedPassword = $hashedPassword;
$this->enabled = $enabled;
$this->roleId = $roleId;
}
}
class UserRoleSchool{
public $userId;
public $roleId;
public $schoolId;
public $studentId;
public function __construct($userId = 0, $roleId = 0,$schoolId =0,
$studentId = 0){
$this->userId = $userId;
$this->roleId = $roleId;
$this->schoolId = $schoolId;
$this->studentId = $studentId;
}
}
class Screen {
public $screenId;
public $screenName;
public function __construct($screenId = 0, $screenName = '') {
$this->screenId = $screenId;
$this->screenName = $screenName;
}
}
class ScreenObject {
public $objectId;
public $objectName;
public $screenId;
public function __construct($objectId = 0, $objectName = '', $screenId =
0) {
$this->objectId = $objectId;
$this->objectName = $objectName;
$this->screenId = $screenId;
}
}
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class ScreenAccess {
public $roleId;
public $screenId;
public $access;
public function __construct($roleId = 0, $screenId = 0, $access = 1) {
$this->roleId = $roleId;
$this->screenId = $screenId;
$this->access = $access;
}
}
class ObjectAccess {
public $screenId;
public $objectId;
public $roleId;
public $readWriteClickable;
public $isButton;
public $showHide;
public function __construct($screenId = 0, $objectId = 0, $roleId = 0,
$readWriteClickable = 1, $isButton = 1,$showHide = 1) {
$this->screenId = $screenId;
$this->objectId = $objectId;
$this->roleId = $roleId;
$this->readWriteClickable = $readWriteClickable;
$this->isButton = $isButton;
$this->showHide = $showHide;
}
}
class ScreenSequence {
public $roleId;
public $objectId;
public $screenId;
public function __construct($roleId = 0, $objectId = 0, $screenId = 0) {
$this->roleId = $roleId;
$this->objectId = $objectId;
$this->screenId = $screenId;
}
}
class Student
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
public

{
$firstName;
$middleName;
$lastName;
$suffix;
$email;
$studentNumber;
$schoolId;
$dateOfBirth;
$gender;

public function __construct($firstName = 'John', $middleName = '',
$lastName = 'Doe', $suffix = '', $email = '', $studentNumber = '',
$schoolId = 0, $dateOfBirth = '01/01/2000', $gender = ''){
$this->firstName = $firstName;
$this->middleName = $middleName;
$this->lastName = $lastName;
$this->suffix = $suffix;
$this->email = $email;
$this->studentNumber = $studentNumber;
$this->schoolId = $schoolId;
$this->dateOfBirth = $dateOfBirth;
$this->gender = $gender;
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}
}
class StudentGuardian {
public $studentId;
public $name;
public $email;
public $phone;
public $address;
public $isPrimary;
public function __construct($studentId = 0, $name = 'Jane Doe', $email =
'', $phone = '', $address = '', $isPrimary = 0){
$this->studentId = $studentId;
$this->name = $name;
$this->email = $email;
$this->phone = $phone;
$this->address = $address;
$this->isPrimary = $isPrimary;
}
}
class ConcussionEvent {
public $studentId;
public $schoolId;
public $reportingUserId;
public $incidentLocationId;
public $incidentLocationDetails;
public $schoolLocationId;
public $sportId;
public $contactMechanismId;
public $impactLocationId;
public $wasProtectionPresent;
public $headGearUsage;
public $wasLossOfConciousness;
public $parentsNotified;
public $protocol;
public $isRemoved;
public $removedByUserId;
public $assessmentToolId;
public $symptomComments;
public $date;
public $symptomsArray;
public function __construct($studentId = 0,$schoolId = 0,$reportingUserId
= 0, $incidentLocationId = 0,$incidentLocationDetails =
'',$schoolLocationId = 0,
$sportId = 0,$contactMechanismId = 0,$impactLocationId = 0,
$wasProtectionPresent = 0,$headGearUsage = 0,$wasLossOfConciousness = 0,
$parentsNotified = 0,$protocol = 0,$isRemoved = 0,$removedByUserId = 0,
$assessmentToolId = 0,$symptomComments = '',$date = 0,$symptomsArray =
array()){
$this->studentId = $studentId;
$this->schoolId = $schoolId;
$this->reportingUserId = $reportingUserId;
$this->incidentLocationId = $incidentLocationId;
$this->incidentLocationDetails = $incidentLocationDetails;
$this->schoolLocationId = $schoolLocationId;
$this->sportId = $sportId;
$this->contactMechanismId = $contactMechanismId;
$this->impactLocationId = $impactLocationId;
$this->wasProtectionPresent = $wasProtectionPresent;
$this->headGearUsage = $headGearUsage;
$this->wasLossOfConciousness = $wasLossOfConciousness;
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$this->parentsNotified = $parentsNotified;
$this->protocol = $protocol;
$this->isRemoved = $isRemoved;
$this->removedByUserId = $removedByUserId;
$this->assessmentToolId = $assessmentToolId;
$this->symptomComments = $symptomComments;
$this->date = $date;
$this->symptomsArray = $symptomsArray;
}
}
class ConcussionFollowup{
public $incidentId;
public $reportingUserId;
public $lingeringSymptomsArray;
public $lingeringDescription;
public $timeResolved;
public $diagnosedBy;
public $pcsDiagnosis;
public $imaging;
public $followUpComments;
public $daysAbsent;
public $scheduledModified;
public $plan504;
public $rtlDate;
public $rtpDate;
public $date;
public function __construct($incidentId = 0,$reportingUserId = 0,
$lingeringSymptomsArray = array(),$lingeringDescription =
'',$timeResolved = 0,
$diagnosedBy = 0,$pcsDiagnosis = 0,$imaging = 0,$followUpComments
= '',
$daysAbsent = 0,$scheduledModified = 0,$plan504 = 0,$rtlDate = '',
$rtpDate = '',$date = 0){
$this->incidentId = $incidentId;
$this->reportingUserId = $reportingUserId;
$this->lingeringSymptomsArray = $lingeringSymptomsArray;
$this->lingeringDescription = $lingeringDescription;
$this->timeResolved = $timeResolved;
$this->diagnosedBy = $diagnosedBy;
$this->pcsDiagnosis = $pcsDiagnosis;
$this->imaging = $imaging;
$this->followUpComments = $followUpComments;
$this->daysAbsent = $daysAbsent;
$this->scheduledModified = $scheduledModified;
$this->plan504 = $plan504;
$this->rtlDate = $rtlDate;
$this->rtpDate = $rtpDate;
$this->date = $date;
}
}
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Appendix C – Server Interceptor API
1)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Pseudocode for Access Control Interceptor function
//Serves as Access Control Interceptor function
public boolean incomingRequestPostProcessed(requestDetails, request,
response){
authToken = requestDetails.getHeader(“Authorization”);
//Retrieves the user’s id, clearance and, read and write MAC
properties
[userId,userRole,userClearance,readP,writeP] = verifyUser(authToken);
httpMethod = request.getMethod();
resourceName = requestDetails.getResourceName();
serviceId = getServiceId(httpMethod, resourceName);
acPermission = false;
if(userId > 0){
//Check if requested resource is secured/labeled
[secured,labeled] = getResourceSecurity(httpMethod,resourceName);
if(!(secured || labeled)){
return true; //Continue with request processing
}
//Analyze MAC policies (if any)
if(userClearance > 0 && labeled){
acPermission = checkAndEnforceMAC(userClearance, serviceId,
readP, readW);
}
//Analyze RBAC policies (if any)
if((roleId > 0 && secured) && (acPermission || !labeled)){
acPermission = checkAndEnforceRBAC(userRole, serviceId);
}
}
else{//Error Message: User could not be verified}
if(acPermission == false){
//Error message: User does not have permission to access the
//requested resource
}
return acPermission;
}
private int delClrDAC(userId, serviceId) {
//Check if delegated user has a delegated clearance for the requested
service
if(currentTime>getStartTimeMAC() && currentTime<getEndTimeMAC()) {
if(serviceId in service_permissions_mac(userId))
{return delegatedClearance;}
}
return 0;
}
private int delRoleDAC(userId, serviceId) {
//Check if delegated user has a delegated role for the requested
service
if(currentTime>getStartTimeRBAC() && currentTime<getEndTimeRBAC() {
if(serviceId in service_permissions_rbac(userId))
{return delegatedRole;}
}
return 0;
}
private boolean checkAndEnforceMAC(userId, serviceId){
acPermission = false;
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//MAC services delegation
if(dacPermission() && checkIfDacMac(userId)) {
delClr = delClrDAC(userId, serviceId);
if(delClr>0) { userClearance=delClr; } //Delegated clearance_id
}
//Get service classification and http method
serviceClassification = getServiceClass(serviceId);
//Retrieve MAC read or write property for pertinent user
if(httpMethod == “GET”){
//Simple security property
if(readP == simpleSecurityProperty){
if(userClearance >= serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}
//Strict * property
elseif(readP == strictStarProperty){
if(userClearance == serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}
}
else{
//Simple integrity property
if(writeP == simpleIntegrityProperty){
if(userClearance >= serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}
//Strict * property
elseif(writeP == strictStarProperty){
if(userClearance == serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}
//Liberal * property
elseif(writeP == liberalStarProperty){
if(userClearance <= serviceClassification){
acPermission = true;
}
}
}
return acPermission;
}
private boolean checkAndEnforceRBAC(userRole, serviceId){
acPermission = false;
//RBAC services delegation
if(dacPermission() && checkIfDacRbac(userId)) {
delRole = delRoleDAC(userId, serviceId);
if(delRole>0) { userRole=delRole; } //Delegated role_id
}
//Get service set of roles
serviceRoles = getRoleSet(serviceId);
if(roleId in serviceRoles){
acPermission = true;
}
return acPermission;
}
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2)

Source Code for incomingRequestPostProcessed function

1 public boolean incomingRequestPostProcessed(RequestDetails theRequestDetails,
HttpServletRequest theRequest, HttpServletResponse
theResponse) {
2
String jwt = theRequest.getHeader("Authorization");
3
Boolean acPermission = false; //Initially, the user does not have
permission to access the resource
4
String identifiers = "";
5
JSONObject object = null;
6
HttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
7
HttpContext localContext = new BasicHttpContext();
8
// Verify if the user is a valid one
9
HttpGet httpGet= new HttpGet(serviceLink+"/verifyUser/"+jwt);
10
try {
11
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
12
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
13
identifiers = EntityUtils.toString(entity);
14
//Returns user_id, role_id, clearance_id, write_property, and read
property
15
object = new JSONObject(identifiers); //Convert String to JSON Object
16
} catch (Exception e) {/*throw new UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
17
//If the user's identity could be properly validated then it returns the
18
//user's role, clearance, and an indicator that the request was successful
19
try {
20
int user_id = Integer.parseInt(object.getString("user_id"));
21
int mac_read = Integer.parseInt(object.getString("mac_read"));
22
int mac_write = Integer.parseInt(object.getString("mac_write"));
23
if(user_id>0) {
24
JSONObject securedResource = null;
25
String httpMethod = theRequest.getMethod();
26
String resourceName = theRequestDetails.getResourceName();
27
//Check if requested resource is secured/labeled
28
httpGet = new
HttpGet(serviceLink+"/resourceSecurity/"+httpMethod+"/"+resourceName);
29
try {
30
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet,
localContext);
31
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
32
identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
33
securedResource = new JSONObject(identifiers);
34
} catch (Exception e) {/*throw new
UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
35
boolean secured = securedResource.getBoolean("secured");
36
boolean labeled = securedResource.getBoolean("labeled");
37
if(!(secured||labeled)){
38
return true; //Continue with request processing (resource can
be accessed by anyone)
39
}
40
//Obtain the id of the requested service
41
JSONObject sid = null;
42
httpGet = new
HttpGet(serviceLink+"/serviceId/"+httpMethod+"/"+resourceName);
43
try {
44
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet,
localContext);
45
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
46
identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
47
sid = new JSONObject(identifiers);
48
int service_id = sid.getInt("service_id");
49
Integer clearance_id =
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Integer.parseInt(object.getString("clearance_id"));
if(clearance_id>0 && labeled) {//Analyze MAC policies (if any)
acPermission = checkAndEnforceMAC(user_id, clearance_id,
service_id, mac_read, mac_write);
}
Integer role_id =
Integer.parseInt(object.getString("role_id"));
if((role_id>0 && secured) && (acPermission || !labeled))
{//Analyze RBAC policies (if any)
acPermission = checkAndEnforceRBAC(user_id, role_id,
service_id);
}
} catch (Exception e) {/*throw new
UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
if(!acPermission) {
try {
theResponse.setContentType("application/json+fhir");
PrintWriter out = theResponse.getWriter();
out.println("{");
out.println("\"status\": \"403\",");
out.println("\"errorMessage\": \"User does not have
permission to
access the requested resource.\"");
out.println("}");
out.close();
} catch (IOException e) {e.printStackTrace();}
return false;
}
return true;
}
else {
try {
theResponse.setContentType("application/json+fhir");
PrintWriter out = theResponse.getWriter();
out.println("{");
out.println("\"status\": \"400\",");
out.println("\"errorMessage\": \"User Verification failed.
Please try to do the request again...\"");
out.println("}");
out.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
return false;
}
} catch (JSONException e) {e.printStackTrace();}
return true;
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88 }
89
90 private boolean checkAndEnforceMAC(int user_id, int clearance_id, int
service_id, int mac_read, int mac_write) {
91
boolean acPermission = false;
92
JSONObject serviceClassification = null;
93
Integer delclr_id = 0;
94
Integer class_id = 0;
95
Integer macProperty = 0;
96
String httpMethod = "";
97
HttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
98
HttpContext localContext = new BasicHttpContext();
99
100 //MAC Service Delegation
101 delclr_id = delClrDAC(user_id, service_id);
102 if(delclr_id>0)
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103 {clearance_id = delclr_id;}
104
105 //Get service classification and http method
106 HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(serviceLink+"/serviceClass/"+service_id);
107 try {
108
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
109
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
110
String identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
111
serviceClassification = new JSONObject(identifiers);
112
class_id = serviceClassification.getInt("clearance_id");
113
httpMethod = serviceClassification.getString("http_method");
114 } catch (Exception e){/*throw new UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
115 //Retrieve MAC read or write property for pertinent user
116 if(httpMethod=="GET") {
117
macProperty = mac_read;
118
//Simple security property
119
if (macProperty == 1) {
120
if (clearance_id > class_id) {
121
acPermission = true;
122
}
123
}
124
//Strict * property
125
else if (macProperty == 2) {
126
if (clearance_id == class_id) {
127
acPermission = true;
128
}
129
}
130 }
131 else{
132
macProperty = mac_write;
133
//Simple integrity property
134
if (macProperty == 3) {
135
if (clearance_id >= class_id) {
136
acPermission = true;
137
}
138
}
139
//Strict * property
140
else if (macProperty == 4) {
141
if (clearance_id == class_id) {
142
acPermission = true;
143
}
144
}
145
//Liberal * property
146
else if (macProperty == 5) {
147
if (clearance_id <= class_id) {
148
acPermission = true;
149
}
150
}
151 }
152 return acPermission;
153 }
154
155 private boolean checkAndEnforceRBAC(int user_id, int role_id, int
service_id) {
156
boolean acPermission = false;
157
Integer delrole_id = 0;
158
JSONArray role_set = null;
159
HttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
160
HttpContext localContext = new BasicHttpContext();
161
162
//MAC Service Delegation
163
delrole_id = delClrDAC(user_id, service_id);
164
if(delrole_id>0)
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165
{role_id = delrole_id;}
166
167
//Get service set of roles
168
HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(serviceLink+"/roleSet/"+service_id);
169
try {
170
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
171
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
172
String identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
173
JSONObject rs = new JSONObject(identifiers);
174
role_set = rs.getJSONArray("");
175
Integer role = 0;
176
for (int i = 0; i < role_set.length(); i++) {
177
role = role_set.getInt(i);
178
if(role_id == role) {
179
acPermission = true;
180
break;
181
}
182
}
183
} catch (Exception e) {//throw new UnprocessableEntityException();}
184
return acPermission;
185 }
186
187 private int delClrDAC(int user_id, int service_id) {
188
Integer delclr_id = 0;
189
HttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
190
HttpContext localContext = new BasicHttpContext();
191
//MAC Service Delegation
192
//Check if delegated user has a delegated clearance for the requested
service
193
JSONObject userDelegation = null;
194
HttpGet httpGet = new
HttpGet(serviceLink+"/userClearanceDelegation/"+user_id+service_id);
195
try {
196
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
197
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
198
String identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
199
userDelegation = new JSONObject(identifiers);
200
delclr_id = userDelegation.getInt("du_dclr_id");
201
return delclr_id;
202
} catch (Exception e){/*throw new UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
203
return 0;
204 }
205
206 private int delRoleDAC(int user_id, int service_id) {
207
Integer delrole_id = 0;
208
HttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
209
HttpContext localContext = new BasicHttpContext();
210
//RBAC Service Delegation
211
//Check if delegated user has a delegated role for the requested service
212
JSONObject userDelegation = null;
213
HttpGet httpGet = new
HttpGet(serviceLink+"/userRoleDelegation/"+user_id+service_id);
214
try {
215
HttpResponse response = httpClient.execute(httpGet, localContext);
216
HttpEntity entity = response.getEntity();
217
String identifiers = getASCIIContentFromEntity(entity);
218
userDelegation = new JSONObject(identifiers);
219
delrole_id = userDelegation.getInt("du_drole_id");
220
return delrole_id;
221
} catch (Exception e){/*throw new UnprocessableEntityException();*/}
222
return 0;
223 }
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3)

Source Code for registering the server interceptor in HAPI FHIR

1 public class FHIR_RestfulServer extends RestfulServer {
2
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
3
FhirVersionEnum fhirVersion = FhirVersionEnum.DSTU2;
4
5
@Override
6
protected void initialize() throws ServletException {
7
// Set the resource providers used by this server
8
super.setFhirContext(new FhirContext(fhirVersion));
9
List<IResourceProvider> providerList=new ArrayList<IResourceProvider>();
10
providerList.add(new PatientResourceProvider());
11
providerList.add(new ConditionResourceProvider());
12
providerList.add(new ObservationResourceProvider());
13
providerList.add(new CarePlanResourceProvider());
14
setResourceProviders(providerList);
15
InterceptorAdapter addInterceptor = new AuthInterceptor();
16
registerInterceptor(addInterceptor);
17
}
18}
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